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ABSTRACT 
 
The thesis explores peace-building processes in the city of Jos, Plateau State, Nigeria with a 
specific focus on the depth of youth participation in peace-building initiatives. The study 
revolves around the 2000 to 2010 era bearing in mind that this epoch was characterised by 
unceasing outbursts of conflicts in the city. It employed a qualitative design with thirty 
purposively selected respondents. Respondents were interviewed using a semi-structured 
interview instruments. The interviews generated detailed empirical data that illuminated 
various peace-building initiatives and the depth of youth participation in these initiatives in 
Jos.  
 
Academics and practitioners have identified peace-building as a potential technique could 
ensure sustainability of peace in conflict-prone societies. Since the early 90s, the United 
Nations have popularised peace-building efforts via its peace-building frameworks in making 
available a strategic response to violent conflicts and its causes. Guided by the human security 
conceptual framework and civic participatory theory, this study contributes to the debate on 
how the youth can genuinely and adequately participate in peace-building initiatives in Jos 
and globally. The comprehension of the concept of human security introduces a shift away 
from the traditional state-oriented security approach which gives rise to the utilization of 
military power based on the quest for state security. Human security draws attention to 
humans, both as individuals and groups, in a society. Findings from this study demonstrate 
that the Nigerian government and the Plateau State government in particular, are 
progressively subscribing to the idea of the human security oriented approach to peace-
building over the State security approach. Although a lot need to be done in this respect, the 
identified peace-building initiatives are indicative of developments in the right direction.  
 
Included in some of the notable forms of peace-building initiatives that emerged from the 
analysis of the study’s empirical data, are the establishment of commissions of inquiry, the 
formation of inter-religious council, the appointment of the Special Advisor to the Governor 
on peace-building and trust and capacity building programs. Analysis of these initiatives 
revealed the strategic marginalisation of youth in peace-building processes. Peace-building 
endeavours such as trust and capacity building programs were manipulated and exploited 
rather than making a credible effort towards peace. These elements in some of the peace-
building initiatives coupled with the total neglect of youth in other peace-building initiatives 
summed up the unscrupulous nature of the identified peace-building initiatives in Jos and 
consequently remaining stuck to the perimeter of Arnstein’s non-participation and tokenism 
in the ladder of participation.  
 
This study therefore, recommends the development of a comprehensive peace-building policy 
and civic participatory framework. A framework that facilitates and guides stakeholders’ 
effort towards genuine youth participation in peace-building initiatives. This will include but 
not limited to the prioritization of public participation in peace-building and other communal 
and societal affairs, the enhancement of the government’s commitment to peace-building 
efforts and civic participation, the development of stakeholders’ capacity, and finally, the 
enhancement of a culture of accountability with a focus on peace-building and genuine youth 
participation in decision-making processes. In so doing, the study contributes to extant 
literature about the youth as agents of positive change rather than instruments of violence.  
 
Key Words: Peace-building, Youth, Peace, Conflict, Participation and Human Security 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
Introduction and Background to the Research 
 
1.1. Introduction  
 
The city of Jos, situated in the geopolitical region commonly known as “Middle-Belt”, was 
one of the peaceful cosmopolitan cities in Nigeria prior to mid-1990s. This was strongly 
reflected in its popular association with serenity; hence, it was recognized as the “City of 
Peace”.  Contrary to this recognition, the city witnessed unrelenting form of violent conflict 
from 1994, but with the 2000-2010 decade as pick of its violence conflicts. Various accounts 
of the conflict both from the government and Nongovernmental Organizations sectors 
identify youth as strategic stakeholders in the conflict due to their numerical superiority over 
other categories and their active participation in violent conflict. The strategic position of 
youth makes them invaluable stakeholders in the peace-building processes in Jos. This 
research study explores youth participation in peace-building initiatives. It interrogates 
various peace-building initiatives in Jos, Nigeria, with the view of probing the depth of youth 
participation in the identified peace-building initiatives. The study embarks on the analysis of 
relevant peace-building initiatives with the view of elucidating the depth and quality of youth 
participation in peace-building.  
 
This introductory chapter presents a succinct overview of the political, economic and socio-
political background of the conflicts and peacebuilding activities of focused era. It 
commences with a brief illustration of youth activities in peace building and violence while 
narrowing the focus of the discourse to Jos, Nigeria. This is followed by discussions and 
justification of the research objectives and research questions. The presentation of the 
relevant research objectives and research questions will provide a clear and comprehensible 
task that the study sets to accomplish. The final parts of this chapter succinctly discusses the 
validity, reliability limitations, delimitations and structure of the study.  
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1.2. Background to the research study 
 
Conceptually, “youth” is a social construct and its comprehension is shaped by the historical, 
economic and cultural realities of a people. Just like many other social constructs or 
phenomena, its understanding varies from society to society and the various understanding of 
youth shall be uncovered in the subsequent chapters. Owing to the disparity in the definition 
of youth and the focus of this study, this study limits its comprehension of youth to people of 
all sexes between 18 and 35 years of age, as defined in Nigeria ’s National Youth Policy 
(2001).  
 
The youth are a category of the world population that are perceived as agents of conflict and 
violence. This perception of youth as agents of conflict and violence largely emerged from 
the analysis of conflict related reports, intelligence information and researches. A review of a 
variety of conflict-related documents and literature, to a large degree, depicts the youth as the 
primary actors (agents and victims) in violent conflicts. Relevant literature within the field of 
conflict analysis including authors such as Abdullah (2005), Argueta (2015) and United 
Nation’s Inter-Agency Network on Youth Development (2016) largely identify youth as both 
perpetrators and victims of violent conflict in society. This perception is strongly reflected in 
the unrelenting assertions highlighting young people’s involvement in violent conflict across 
the globe. A good number of such studies give credence to youth as constructive agents, 
spearheading political, cultural and religious transformation across the globe while 
simultaneously underscoring their ‘destructive approaches’ evident in the apolitical and 
rebellious movements in society. According to Diouf (2003: 1), “The violent irruption of 
African youth into the public and domestic spheres seems to have resulted in the construction 
of their behaviour as a threat, and to have provoked, within society as a whole, a panic that is 
simultaneously moral and civic”. The role of young people in the resistance against apartheid 
in South Africa and youth participation in the violent demonstrations that challenged the 
tradition and authoritarianism of Senegal and Egypt’s  political scene as well as other 
countries, are clear examples of their activism1  (Marks 2001). As evident in the second 
                                                 
1
 Though their activism in these highlighted examples may be vio lent, it is worthy of note it is not all their 
activism that are indeed violent. Examples of their non-violent activism shall be highlighted in other sections 
and chapters of this study.  
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chapter of this thesis, there is an extensive documentation of youth activism. Although the 
majority of their documented activities are fundamentally violent, this study draws attention 
to other nonviolent youth activities and their potential to engage in nonviolent activism.  
 
In a recent study, Ansell (2017: 3) holds that “children and youth as defined by the UN ... 
account for nearly half the world’s population”. He further asserts that “in some African 
countries, more than half the population is under 18years and the proportion of the global 
population aged under 25years is set to continue growing for some years” (Ibid). The United 
Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2015) identifies 
Niger as a nation with world’s youngest population, 56.9% are under 18years and 68.3% 
under 25years. The increasing youth population and their realities of socio-political 
injustices, political and social marginalization2 underscores their vulnerability to violence 
alongside other socio-political ills in the society (United Nation’s Inter-Agency Network on 
Youth Development 2016 and Argueta, 2015). In contrast with the above view, Ansell (2017) 
argues that young people’s dominance in global population places them as prominent agents 
in societal development. Pereznieto and Hamilto (2013) equally underscore this view in their 
assertion that “globally, today’s 15-24 year olds comprise the largest cohort of youth ever, a 
youth bulge that is said to offer a demographic dividend if such youth are educated, healthy 
and gainfully employed”. Similarly, their pivotal status (perceived and factual) in the 
interaction and transformation in Africa and other parts of their world has been repeatedly 
echoed (Ansell 2017; Pereznieto and Hamilto 2013; Sait 2011; Dari 2011 and Hilker and 
Fraser 2009).  
 
Despite the potential and the actual impact of the youth demographic dominance, they have 
been relegated to the political and economic decision-making processes in the contemporary 
society. According to Abbink (2005) and the United Nations’ Inter-agency Network on 
Youth (2016), the youth face tremendous odds and do not seem to have their future in their 
                                                 
2
 “Throughout the world today, more than 600 million young people live in fragile and conflict -affected 
contexts. They are among the most affected by the mult iple and often interlinked forms of violence – from 
political vio lence and criminal gangs to organized crime and terrorist attacks that plague their countries and 
communit ies, bearing enormous and long-lasting human, social and economic costs. Young men aged 15 to 29 
account for the majority of casualties of lethal armed vio lence; while young women (as well as young men) are 
at heightened risk of physical and sexual abuse and explo itation” (United Nations Inter-Agency Network on 
Youth Development 2016:7). 
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own hands. They are shaped by the multiple political, economic and social challenges that 
confront their realities.  They are also marginalised in national state policies and have a weak 
legal position. This concern has been re-echoed by the youth themselves, declaring that “they 
receive too little attention from those in power – both in rural society (chiefs, ruling age 
grades) and in the cities (political leaders, party bosses, teachers etc)” (Abbink 2005: 3). 
Aside from the youth’s apprehension and uneasiness as expressed above, researchers and 
practitioners give emphasis to the plight of youth via their line of reasoning that  
 
Children and youth are pushed, pulled and coerced into various action by 
encompassing structures and processes over which they have little or no control: kin, 
family community, education, media, technology, the state and its decay, war, 
religion, tradition and the weight of the past, and the rules of the global markets. In the 
process, they are frequently broken, put at risk and destroyed by unemployment, 
exploitation, war, famine, rape, physical mutilation, poverty, homelessness, lack of 
access to education, medical facilities and HIV AIDS (Dawes and Honwana 1996; 
Scheper-Hugehes and Sargent 1998, and De Boeck and Honwana 2005).  
 
Such negligence and side- lining spurs their desire and quest for the exercise of their human 
agency and relative autonomy in the world around them. In the absence of constructive 
channels through which their autonomy could be expressed, violence becomes an attractive 
and feasible tool for the actualisation of their agency. Hence violence serves as their 
instrument of communication; it becomes a medium to make themselves heard.  
 
As highlighted above, young people in conflict and areas affected by violence have been 
dominantly perceived as either perpetrators or victims of violence. While males in this 
category are by far thought of as the primary architects and executors of violence, the females 
are essentially considered to be victims, especially of sexual and gender-based violence3. 
Such constructed views of youth intimate the alienation of youth from key strategic positions 
                                                 
3
 Such perception however does not undermine young female’s  active participation as agents (and sometimes) 
architects of violence. It is made clear in the second chapter of this thesis, supported by both existing 
publications and from the study’s respondents, that young ladies are also active agents of violent conflict in Jos. 
The instance of the young lady’s involvement in the 2001’s violence as illustrated in this thesis is a clear 
example of young people’s involvement.  
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and activities in society resulting in their realities of under-empowerment, marginalisation 
and perpetual poverty. 
 
Despite this dominant view, McIntyre and Thusi (2003), Sait (2011), and Ungerleider (2012) 
relay the indispensability of youth in an effort towards the attainment of sustainable peace-
building processes and peace across the globe. Ungerleider (2012: 381-2) discloses an 
account of young people’s experience in peace-building and leadership programs. He asserts 
that: 
For over twenty years, young people from all over the world have been coming together in a 
peaceful rural setting for Youth Peace-building and Leadership Programs that include 
structured dialogue sessions addressing issues they care about and conflicts that affect them 
directly. Youth dialogue is part of a holistic, programmatic approach to building relationships 
and a sense of empowerment, particularly for teens in conflict-prone communities. 
(Ungerleider 2012: 381-2).  
 
The youth within the program - Youth Peace-building and Leadership Programs (YPLP)4 - 
congregated from the different parts of the world (from the Northern and Southern 
hemisphere, the Christians and Muslims, Catholics and Protestants and so forth) to learn and 
speak genuinely about their worldviews, experiences, fears and aspirations. In the process, 
they equipped each other with a deeper knowledge of the other, an ability to listen attentively, 
to dialogue and to reconcile.  Similar to other programs, the genuineness and authenticity of 
the program could be called to question. Hence valid questions could be asked about the 
program ability and disposition to empower and reorient the youth. To what extent is the 
program another form of window dressing rather than the its claimed objective of 
empowerment? In spite of these possibly valid concerns and questions, the program, at its 
minimal, provided the youth a platform to demonstrate their competence to positively 
contributing to peace-building processes across the world.  
 
Sait (2011) recognizes the international community’s acknowledgement of the need to 
address youth’s educational, political, social and economical issues. He re-echoes the view 
that with increasing normative clarity, budgets and political will, the international 
community’s demonstrate their appreciation of youth as not just beneficiaries but partners in 
                                                 
4
 This program aimed at developing leadership skills and build character with youth from low-income families. 
The activities of the program included twenty 2-hour (workshop, lectures or seminar) sessions delivered over 
eight months.  
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development. This recognition of youth is evident in other international organisations’ 
decisions to establish various youth agencies and portfolios. The Commonwealth Youth 
Programme (CYP), the 2010 Caribbean Ministerial Declaration on Youth and UNICEF’s 
recognition of youth are some illustration of the improved recognition of the urgency with 
which the effort of working closely with the youth is to be embraced.  
 
In view of the demographic advantage5 of youth in the world population and their apparent 
agency in violent conflicts, especially in Africa, young people are positioned as strategic 
stakeholders in sustainable and effective peace-building endeavours. According to Sait (2011: 
8), “there is universally greater acceptance of the proposition that global poverty, improved 
governance, human rights protection or the achievement of the Millennium Development 
Goals (MDGs) [now replaced with Social Development Goals]  would not be possible without 
targeting and engaging the youth”6. This view rests on the fact that the continuous growth of 
the youth population, depending on how it is managed, could swing a society in either 
direction. If adequately managed and utilized, that is when suffic ient attention and resources 
are invested in the development, education and empowerment of youth, the youth will be a 
positive force of development, growth and peace in society. On the other hand, if 
unsatisfactorily managed, through marginalisation and oppression7, their large numbers, 
availability, and eagerness to take up anything that may relieve them of the conditions of 
poverty and idleness, leaves them vulnerable to being easily recruited by political parties, 
armed groups or criminal networks for violence (Abbink 2005: 3).  The Commonwealth 
Secretary-General Patricia Scotland reiterates this viewpoint in her assertion that the Global 
Youth Development Index8  
 
                                                 
5
 According to the population division of the United Nat ions (2015), “there were 1.2 b illion youth aged 15-24 
years globally in 2015, accounting for one out of every six people in the world”.  
6
 It is worthy of mentioned that the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) have recently been replaced by the 
Social Development Goals (SDGs) which came into effect in January 2016. Similar to Sait’s argument, as 
highlighted above, it is plausible to contend that the acceptance of the proposition that global reduction of 
poverty, improved governance, human rights protection or the achievement of the Social Development Goals 
(SDGs ) would not be possible without targeting and engaging the youth. 
7
According to Abbink (2005 :13), all over the continent, youth while forming a numerical majority, are in a 
situation of dependency economically marg inalized and feel excluded from formal power and prestige, even 
when the time has come for them to become part of the established society 
8
 The Global Youth Development Index which demonstrate that numerous countries are experiencing a “yo uth 
bulge” with adolescents and young adults making up a third of the population. 
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[t]hrows down a challenge to policy-makers everywhere: without action to promote young 
people’s empowerment, boosting opportunities for employment and opening up spaces for 
political dialogue, countries will be squandering their most precious resource and storing up 
problems for the future
9
. 
 
 Essentially, there is a fundamental need to integrate youth in societal and peace-building 
endeavours globally and with an even greater sense of urgency on the African continent.  
 
Some of the recent literature’s narrative on the African continent, to a large extent, highlight 
the challenges of unscrupulous governance and corruption resulting in disproportionate 
distribution of wealth and opportunities among the population. For instance, Bangura, in text 
titled: 10 African youth – an underutilised resource in peace-building asserts, “Half of the 
population of Africans, especially youth, live in abject poverty, a condition that keeps 
Africa’s youth craving for ways to attain better lives” Bangura (2015:103). This leads to a 
yearning and pursuit of a better quality of life makes the youth vulnerable to easy recruitment 
by the rebel and terrorist groups. In countries such as Kenya, Somalia, Nigeria, Sudan and 
South Sudan with common history of relentless violence, there are records of significant 
youth activities in violent and terrorist activities in search of a better life. Although many 
national governments endorsed the African Youth Charter (AYC)11 in 2006 which signals a 
step in the right direction with respect to youth’s integration in peace-building, there is still an 
urgent need for the investment of resources towards the implementation of the charter. Below 
are extracts from the Charter that are of relevance to this study: 
 
Every young person shall have the right to participate in all spheres of society. The 
government of individual countries shall a) guarantee the participation of youth in 
parliament and other decision-making bodies in accordance with the prescribed laws; 
b) Facilitate the creation or strengthening of platforms for youth participation in 
decision-making at local, national, regional, and cont inental levels of governance; c) 
Ensure equal access to young men and young women to participate in decision-
making and in fulfilling civic duties (African Youth Charter 2006, Article 11 – 16). 
 
                                                 
9
 http://thecommonwealth.org/media/news/state-worlds-youth-population-new-index-underscores-urgent-need-
invest-young#sthash.psAVNgY5.dpuf 
10
 African youth – an underutilised resource in peace-building Development Dialogue 
11
African Youth Charter serves as a strategic framework for the African states that gives direction for youth 
empowerment and development at continental, regional and national levels.  
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As youth, we should learn a culture of peace and also create an enabling environment 
for Disarmament, Demobilization, Rehabilitation and Reintegration (DDRR), for 
countries that are just coming out of war. State parties shall undertake to pursue the 
full implementation of this right and in particular take measures to ensure all about 
health is provided” (Ibid) 
 
The implementation of these recommendations and other values in the African Youth Charter 
continue to encounter various challenges including the socio-economic and political realities 
of various countries. Some of these challenges include the lack of political will by leaders in 
Africa and some other parts of the world, limited resources, conflict of communal interest 
versus political parties and some leaders’ individual interest. Irrespective of the challenges in 
implementing the World Programme of Action for Youth (WPAY)12, the Commonwealth 
Youth Programme (CYP) and the African Youth Charter’s (AYC) recommendations13, some 
countries have made some strides in the incorporation of the youth in their peace and societal 
building initiatives.  Nepal, for instance, stands out as one of the few countries in a conflict-
ridden region of the world that enjoy some success stories in their commitment and effort 
towards the incorporation of youth in peace-building. Adopting an approach geared towards 
civic awareness for peaceful social relations and development programmes, Nepal 
underscored their commitment to employing the disposition, skills and services of the youth 
to rebuilding a peaceful and harmonious society. According to Bennett, Karki, and Nepal 
(2012: 38), through their Ministry of Youth and Sports, Nepal “Has been involved with 
young political groups to build their capacity level. The ministry is collaboratively working 
with 600 youth organisations right now”. Their awareness of the unique and indispensable 
roles of youth as constructive actors in society motivated the design and steady 
implementation of their National Youth Policy, which has addressed youth issues and 
concerns since 2009. Additionally, it was highlighted that vital facets of this endeavour was 
the establishment of links between youth and government. Such links alleviate frustrations 
and resentments that accompany the marginalisation of any fragment of a society. It was 
further noted that through the support and championing of awareness campaign with respect 
                                                 
12
 The World Programme of Action for Youth (WPAY) was adopted in 1995 and provides a policy framework 
and practical guidelines for national action and international support to improve the situation of young people 
around the world. The WPAY covers fifteen youth priority areas and contains proposals for action in each of 
these areas (General Assembly 1995: https://www.un.org/development/desa/youth/world -programme-of-action-
for-youth.html). 
13
 World Programme of Action for Youth (WPAY), the Commonwealth Youth Programme (CYP) and the 
African Youth Charter’s (AYC) are some of the key International establishments that are on the look-out for the 
interest of youth globally and regionally.  
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to the relevance of youth in political issues, Nepal’s government enhanced the youths’ 
disposition to accept their roles and participate in the decision-making process in the country.  
Among the many initiatives that contributed to the relative success of Nepal’s integration of 
youth in peace-building processes, was their focus on training and capacity building. There 
was a consolidated interest from many of the organisations working on youth and peace-
building to enhance the capacity and competency of youth through training. Bennett, Karki, 
and Nepal (2012: 34), threw more light on this in their assertion that  
 
The capacity of youth has been empowered by focusing on skill-based trainings and soft 
skills. For skill-based trainings, youth are given technical skill according to their needs. The 
vocation oriented skill-based trainings that were conducted helped the youth to enhance their 
skills while engaging in income-generating activities. Soft skill trainings are focused on 
fostering leadership, positive roles of youth and increasing their engagement in societal 
activities and social issues.  
 
Although the adopted empowerment programs benefit the youth individually, their ultimate 
goal rests in the enhancement of youths’ capacity to meaningfully participate in decision-
making processes and conflict mitigation. To the contrary, the formal mechanisms for youth 
participation in Nigeria are vulnerable to the archetypal challenges of participation, which 
include lack of implementation ability, exclusion of marginalized voices and token 
participation. For instance, Aro and Ani (2017:53) noted, “since 1979 to the present day, the 
Igbo youth have been crying of political exclusion and marginalization”.  The actions of the 
Plateau state government have rarely been interested in addressing the patterns of social 
differentiation and unequal distribution of resources that make poverty, marginalisation and 
exclusion a collective reality. 
 
Comparable to Nepal, Kenya is another conflict-ridden country that demonstrated their 
sensitivity to youths’ participation in the peace-building process through the promotion of 
various development and skill acquisition programs. As highlighted by Prisca, Kandagor and 
Kiprono (2012: 188), Kenya’s establishment of the Ministry of Youth Affairs (MOYA) in 
2005, was a direct response to their commitment to addressing youth concerns in the country. 
Their choice and commitment of working closely with the ir youth was informed by the 
realization that “the government may not achieve meaningful development and progress 
without adequately dealing with the many socio-economic challenges facing the Kenyan 
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youth” (Prisca, Kandagor and Kiprono 2012: 188). Hence, through the Ministry of Youth 
Affairs, the Kenyan government worked at maximising the full potential of the youth through 
participatory programs that serve the needs and aspirations of the youth while building a 
better society. It is remarkable that of the 14 million registered voters in the Kenyan election 
of 2007, the youth accounted for about 75% of the voting population with a total number of 
11 million (MOYAS and UNDP 2009, cited in Prisca, Kandagor and Kiprono 2012). This 
implies that the youth, with their numerical advantage, could influence the political landscape 
of Kenya. To make the most of this potential resource, the Kenyan government through the 
Ministry of Youth and Sports, embarked on various socio-developmental programs with the 
goal of capacitating and inspiring the youth as positive agents in the peace-building programs 
of the nation. The establishment of Youth Empowerment Centres (YEC), the Youth 
Enterprise Development Fund and Tuelewane Peace Exchange Programs are some examples 
of youth integration initiatives taken on board by Kenyan’s Ministry of Youth and Sports.  
 
Tuelewane Peace Exchange Program was designed to improve youths’ knowledge and 
appreciation of other cultures through a ‘live- in’14 experience. This was embarked upon with 
the expectation that such exposure to experiencing and appreciating other cultures will 
promote a peaceful society through the youths’ ability to tolerate and celebrate cultural 
diversity. Another equally important initiative was the establishment of the Youth 
Empowerment Centres (YEC) around the country. According to Prisca, Kandagor and 
Kiprono (2012:193) these centres provide the “youth with the opportunity to interact, share 
and discuss several issues ranging from entrepreneurship, Indivisible Connecticut 4 (ICT4), 
community mobilization, peer counselling, participating in games and sports and networking 
for peace-building initiatives”. The design of Tuelewane Peace Exchange Program and the 
establishment of Youth Empowerment Centres in Kenya were inherently valuable within the 
framework of youth participation. They offered youth the platform and opportunity to learn 
and appreciate values and skills from each other in such a way that might not be possible in a 
formal educational setting. In so doing, the youth are not just instruments for sustainability of 
                                                 
14
 The live-in experience was a part of the program designed to enabled the youth of different cultural 
backgrounds to visit and live amongst each other. This involves youth travelling from their community to live 
with a community that they not know much about and which is different from the person’s community. The 
youth spends a minimum period of two weeks  with such community with the goal of learning more about the 
people and hopefully in the process develop the value of respect and appreciation of other cultures; these are 
qualities that essential for a peaceful and harmonious society. 
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the value of peace, but co-creators of desired values in the society. In this way, the youth 
were able to participate authentically in the peace-building initiatives in Kenya.  
 
An evaluation of the Kenyan and Nepalese youth integration endeavour established that “the 
youth were able to identify some of the important causes of the conflict such as ideological 
differences, resources distribution, and power distance”. It also demonstrated that “most of 
the trainee participants highly appreciated that the youth leadership development and 
community/civil society capacity development training programs succeeded in empowering 
the youth to understand the root and latent causes of conflict and how to resolve them” 
(Prisca, Kandagor and Kiprono 2012).  
 
Although the highlighted attempts at youth involvement in peace-building may not be 
flawless or complete, it is nevertheless worthy of some endorsement. At minimum, these 
make a good starting point for both Nepal and Kenya in their peace-building endeavours. The 
success of the youth integration and participation in nonviolent politics demands a holistic 
approach to the discourse and management of the issue 15. Youth participation is gradually 
becoming an essential component of peace-building (in an ideal world) due its high potential 
of ensuring the sustainability of acquired peace. McEvoy (2001) and Bennett and Karki 
(2012) clearly itemize the significance of youth participation in peace-building processes. 
They hold that in many cases youth have been active agents during armed conflict; 
consequently:  
a. Their participation in peace-building processes is vital since their agency 
creates special and diverse needs in the post-war period.  
b. Secondly, they hold that youth support and participation is needed and 
essential for the success of new laws and order in post-war settings because 
they are often the primary producers of violence in the post-accord period – 
from political dissident violence to crime.  
c. Thirdly, the youth are also the victims of much post-accord violence – direct 
assaults and displacement as well as structural violence – which, while it may 
                                                 
15
 It necessitates a holistic comprehension of the factors that propels them to violence and their roles and 
responsibilit ies during the armed conflicts. 
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not fatally affect the peace process, will shape attitudes and behaviour in the 
long run.  
d. Finally, youth are the primary actors in grassroots community 
development/relations work; hence, they should be at the frontlines of peace-
building (Bennett and Karki, 2012: 10-11). 
 
In response to the above benefits and arguably the necessity of incorporating youth in any 
peace-building process, more than a few countries have made some effort in taking youth 
participation seriously through design of pro-youth policies and portfolios in their 
government. These establishments of youth-focused portfolios; ministries and the 
development of national youth oriented policies in many countries are well documented in 
existing literature. For instance, the Ministry of Youth, Sports and Culture in Botswana, the 
Ministry of Youth and Sports in Zambia and the Ministry of Youth Development in Nigeria 
are expected to attend to youth related issues and challenges. Within the geopolitical context 
of Nigeria, the Ministry of Youth Development is specifically responsible for the 
development of the national youth policy, youth development programmes, ensuring 
availability of funding for youth activities, facilitation of youth participation in relevant 
issues and to manage the Citizenship and Leadership Training Centres. In addition to these 
ministries and agencies, numerous youth oriented policies and activities such as the Nigerian 
National Youth Policy and the National Youth Services Corps were enacted by a variety of 
countries in the last two decades. Regardless of some of the highlighted and well-known 
values of working closely with the youth, evaluations of these ministries, related portfolios 
and polices in Nigeria as well as in some other countries, reveal the ineffective and 
lackadaisical attitudes of the implementing agencies towards the youth and their issues. It is, 
for instance, well articulated by Ubi (2007: 6), that “the Nigerian Ministry of Youth, Sports 
and Culture and the Ministry of Youth Development are ineffective. They are riddled with 
one problem or another. In a nutshell, they concentrate more on sports than on the issues and 
predicaments of youth.” 
 
The negligent and lackadaisical attitude of the Nigerian government towards the youth 
ministry and its policies could be dated back to the 1990s in the military era. During this 
period, the Ministry of Youth and Sport was disbanded and its youth related policies were 
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relegated to the background of government priorities. Although the youth ministry and its 
related policies are reinstated since the advent of democracy, no substantial difference or 
improvement has been experienced in the attitude of the recent democratic government 
towards youth related issues. The Nigerian government, in line with the African Youth 
Charter, the Common Wealth and the Global Youth Forum, have developed National Youth 
Policies. Central to this policy, is the recognition of the need to enhance youth participation in 
societal building, but an outcome of recent evaluations of the ministry, holds that youth 
related issues continue to be taken less seriously.  
 
The discourse of youth participation in peace-building initiatives is not estranged from youth 
issues in general. It is rather positioned at the centre of youth integration and assimilation in a 
society. This is evident in the draft of the Action Plan and Implementation Strategy for the 
National Youth Policy 2009 – 2014. It is worth noting that Nigeria’s first attempt to introduce 
a National Youth Policy dates back to 1981 of which the outcome was the draft of an 
inclusive social development policy for Nigeria in 1989. The national youth polity was 
successfully designed after its second attempt in 2009 according to the expectation of the 
Commonwealth Plan of Action for Youth Empowerment (PAYE) 2006 – 2015. As stated in 
the action plan and the implementation strategy, the National Youth Policy exhibits: 
 
Well-focused programmes carefully planned to reflect the specific goals and 
objectives of the National Youth Policy, the guiding principles on which the policy is 
based, and the priority themes and strategic intervention. Some of the areas of priority 
covered in the action plan for the National Youth Policy include but are not limited to 
education, health, drug abuse, crime, science and technology, HIV/AIDS, sports and 
recreation, participation in decision-making and conflict prevention/peace-building 
(Nigeria Youth Action Plan 2009: 2).  
 
As indicated above, youth participation in decision-making and peace-building are areas of 
priority for the Nigerian government. It is expected that effective implementation of this 
policy shall promote the right of young people to be heard and to express their views 
constructively in all matters that affect them, while having their views respected by all.  In 
specific terms, the effective implementation of the National Youth Policy ought to promote 
youth participation in initiatives geared towards the prevention of violence and the reduction 
of conflict situations across the country, and promote active involvement of young men and 
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women in peace-building. Some of the key principles and guiding values, of the National 
Youth Policy insinuate a central focus on the youth as indispensible members of the society. 
As such their participation in the civic decision-making and development process, as 
reflected below, was a thing of priority for the nation 
 
 Young people are the most important and valuable resource of the nation. 
Government shall recognize, discover and understand their conditions, needs, 
interests, issues, aspirations, ideas and capacities and make appropriate provision for 
their growth and development.  
 
 Commitment to youth participation in the democratic process, as well as in 
community and civic decision making and development process.  
 
 The National Youth Policy shall be based on the fact that all youth development 
programmes must be youth‐driven and youth centered.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
 
The above extracts from the Nigerian Youth Action Plan and the apparent youth development 
strategies are indicative of the Nigerian government’s intent towards the youth. However, the 
trepidation about the Nigerian government’s lack of commitment to facilitating youth 
participation in matters that affect the youth is yet to be adequately explored. It is worthy to 
mention that a variety of studies have delved into the discourse of violence and conflict 
resolution in Jos. All the same, there is a considerable dearth of critical and systematic 
research that engages with the depth of youth participation in peace-building in Jos and 
Nigeria at large. In an effort to response to this deficiency of critical and systematic research, 
the next section of this chapter presents succinct overview of the reality of conflict in Nigeria 
with a primary focus on Jos.  
 
1.2.1. A Concise Overview of Violent Conflicts in Nigeria 
 
At a superficial level, Nigeria is arguably considered a stable country. Such a claim is 
anchored on the account that the political stability of States is, by and large, construed as “the 
lack of significant changes and continuity characterizing a political system or regime” (Nir 
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and Kafle 2013: 111 - 112). Central to this comprehension of stability is the commitment to 
avoid public violence and the prevention of the unconstitutional change of government in an 
unpredictable and violent manner ( Alesina et al., 1996; Barro, 1989; Davies, 2014 and Haber 
et al., 2003). Consistent with this understanding of political stability, the Nigerian political 
environment is, arguably a stable state since the birth of its democracy in 199916. Despite the 
recent level of threats ensuing from the advent of terrorist organisations such as Boko 
Haram17, in the North, the Niger Delta AVENGERS18 in the South and other insurgent 
groups in the country, Nigerian politics have witnessed a regular flow of exchanges political 
power in its four democratic political elections between 1999 and 2017. Hence, from the 
understanding of stability as the lack of significant changes and continuity characterizing a 
political system or regime, Nigeria’s outward democratic and sequential exchange of power 
reflect its growing stability and conformity with its constitution, which are core elements of a 
stable society.  
 
Despite this increasingly stable outlook of the country’s political system, its susceptibility to 
events of violence cannot be overlooked. Nigerian politics, prior to its independence in 1960, 
was partially characterised by ethnic suspicion and political distrust. This was evident in the 
tense relations between the Northern and Southern region of the country, during the latter part 
of the colonial era. The “post-1953’s [...] agitations associated with minority ethnic groups’ 
demand for the creation of more states on the basis of perceived fears of political domination 
by the majority groups” are further demonstrations of this claim (Alapiki, 2005: 53). 
Furthermore, Nigeria’s confrontation with incidents of severe conflicts, ranging from “a 
secession attempt by the Eastern Region and the resulting devastating ‘Civil War’ [of 1967 – 
                                                 
16
 It is important to emphasise that the concept of political stability has been deliberated from diverse theoretical 
standpoints without arriving at any universally accepted definition or understanding of the concept. Ake (1975: 
273), for instance, defines political stability as “the regularity of the flow of political exchanges”, which implies 
that the political stability of the state could be measured in degrees putting into consideration events large scale 
violence, coup d’état or other forms of unlawful change of government. In contrast to Ake, other studies see 
“stability as dichotomous” (Olugbade 1992 and Dwoding and Kimber 1983). Po lit ical stability, from the 
dichotomous viewpoint, cannot be measured since it is sharply divided between two conflicting ends. Thus , a 
country is either stable or unstable. The protracted trend of debates and conflicting comprehension among 
scholars makes the task of designing a unanimous definition a d ifficult one.  
17
 According to Onapajo and Uzodike (2012) Boko Harm is a well-known term that means ‘education is 
forbidden’ in the Hausa language. They hold that this is not a registered name giv en to the group by its founders, 
rather the media influence and perception of the group’s activity inform the construct of the term.  
18
 The Niger Delta Avengers (NDA) is a militant group in Niger Delta region of Nigeria's Niger Delta. Although 
they came to the lime light through their destructive attacks on Nigeria Oil Installations, they only publicly  
pronounced their existence in March 2016 (Niwor 2017 and Idahosa 2016)  
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1970], a festering confrontation between (Northern) military power holders and (Western) 
civic activists over the annulled presidential elections of June 12, 1993” (Afrobarometer, 
2002) are other occasions of such events of conflicts and violence in Nigeria. These 
reservations and arguments against the notion of Nigeria’s strong political stability is 
summed up in the resurgence of the lingering subject matter of Biafra that is championed by 
the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB), the never-ending attack of the terrorist group Boko 
Haram and the ongoing battle between the Fulani Herdsmen and various communities in 
Nigeria. 
 
Also noteworthy, is the fact that ethnicity, religious beliefs and the question of resource 
control are major causes of violent conflicts in Nigeria’s political history. The Northern 
region of the country, especially Maiduguri, Kano and Zaria, are renowned areas of religious 
conflict19 while the so-called Southern region also known as “south-south20” the geo-political 
zone of the country, is known for crises instigated by the quest for resource control, advocacy 
of environmental protection and ethnic-related disputes. The Middle-Belt region of the 
country is gradually being caught up in the spill-over of conflicts from the Northern and 
Southern parts of the country and this is evident in the Herdsmen’s battle for grazing land in 
various communities across the Middle-Belt. The region is increasingly evolving into another 
battleground in the country for ethno-religious, political, social and economic control. States 
such as Plateau and Benue have witnessed considerable conflict since 1994. According to the 
Human Rights Watch (2011: 3): 
 
More than 14,800 people [in Nigeria] have been killed in inter-communal, political, and 
sectarian violence in the past 12 years. The human cost of this violence has been particularly 
high in Plateau State, where Human Rights Watch estimates more than 3,800 people have 
been killed since 2001, at least 250 of these since December 2010. The victims, both Muslim 
and Christian, have been hacked to death, burned alive, or dragged off buses and murdered in 
tit-for-tat killings, in many cases based simply on their ethnic or religious identity. 
 
Post-2011 election conflicts in Jos, Kaduna and Abuja and the ongoing upsurge of Fulani 
Herdsmen attack on the population of central Nigeria are outstanding examples of the current 
                                                 
19
 The blight of Boko Haram in the Northern Nigeria supports this view 
20
 This includes States such as Akwa Ibom, Cross River, Edo, Delta, Rivers, Bayelsa 
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nature of politically-related conflicts in the Middle-Belt. Uji (2016: 56) posits, “these attacks 
have resulted to the decimation of lives and property on a large scale. From Plateau, 
Nasarawa, Taraba and Benue state, the Fulani herdsmen, employing the tactics of other 
terrorist groups like Alshaabab, Boko-haram and the Taliban, have succeeded in wiping out 
population and destroying economic of rural population”  In view of the various interventions 
to these conflicts, this study centres its inquiry on the depth of youth participation in some of 
the ensuing peace-building efforts in Jos. Bearing in mind the extensive scholarly discourse 
relating to youth activism and involvement in violent conflicts and the simultaneous openness 
and acknowledgement of the need to enhance youth participation in peace-building 
initiatives, this study explores the peace-building mechanisms in Jos with the view of 
uncovering the depth or quality of their participation in such peace-building mechanisms. In 
order to effectively actualize the objectives of this study, the next section discusses some of 
the existing views and thoughts and in the extant literature for a comprehensive and adequate 
understanding of the current arguments in this field.  
 
1.3. A Background review of youth involvement in violent conflict and peace-
building initiatives in Jos 
 
Jos is the capital city of Plateau state – one of the 36 states in the Federal Republic of Nigeria. 
Economically, the city was strategically positioned with its recognition as one of the leading  
producers of tin in Africa and globally (Danfulani and Fwatshak, 2002a). Jos was renowned 
for its relative peace until the 1990s. This recognition accorded it the status “land of peace 
and tourism” (Danfulani and Fwatshak, 2002a: 243; Ambe-Uva, 2010: 42). However, the 
development of frequent conflicts and violence in Jos since the mid-90s defies this status. 
This rapid degeneration of Jos into a conflict-prone city is strongly reflected in the writings of 
Danfulani and Fwatshak, (2002a); Ettang (2015)  Mwadkwon, (2001) and Ostien, (2009) in 
their discussion of Jos’s vulnerability to violent conflict resulting from the manipulation of its 
ethnic/religious differences and the economic insecurity of the people. The Human Rights 
Watch (HRW) underscores the consequences of the various conflicts in their report that at 
least  
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1000 people were killed in the September 2001 in inter-communal clashes in Jos 
(Human Rights Watch 2001) and over 775 people lost their lives in the sectarian 
conflict in the year 2004 (Human Rights Watch 2005); while two days of inter-
communal clashes on 28 and 29 November 2008, following local government 
elections, left at least 700 people dead in Jos… (Human Rights Watch 2009). 
 
Prior to the 1990’s, the International Crisis Group (ICG) documented moments of tensions 
and confrontations in Jos between the alleged Christian indigenes which are the Berom-
Anaguta-Afizere (BAA) and the Muslim Fulan/Housa settlers over the ownership of land and 
resource control in Jos (ICG, 2012: 9). However, it was the ethno-political conflict of 1994, 
which was a reaction to the appointment of a non- indigenous candidate as the chairperson of 
a Local Government Area (LGA), that marked the beginning of severe and recurring violent 
conflicts in Jos (Danfulani, 2006: 3). Post 1994, conflicts have multiple causal factors; some 
of such factors include ethnic, political, economic and religious factors. Danfulani (2006: 5), 
in his paper presented at Jos Peace Conference, identifies the struggle for political 
participation, the tussle for land and the manipulation of religious and ethnic differences as 
the underlying causes of the post 1994 conflicts in Jos. The conflict of the 7 th to 14th 
September 2001, which is popularly known as ‘Black Friday’, is an example of a religious ly 
motivated conflict in Jos (Danfulani and Fwatshak, 2002a: 243). Over and above this notable 
dimension of the conflict,  HRW (2005, p.14) noted that respondents referred to the violent 
clashes as the “genesis of the crisis… and a warning sign of the potential for further violence. 
 
Government efforts to curtail these conflicts in Jos were to no avail (Krause, 2011: 13). One 
of the primary approaches of the government was the deployment of armed forces to scenes 
of violence, which led to “repression, torture, looting, rape, extra-judicial killing of its 
citizens” and further conflict in society (Omeje, 2006: 142).  The federal and the state 
governments in other peace-building endeavours in Jos, set-up various judicial commissions 
of inquiries to investigate the various components of the conflicts. Following the violence 
conflict of 28th November 2008, for example, a commission of inquiry led by Justice Ajibola 
was mandated with the task of establishing the causes of the unrest in Jos and to recommend 
ways of avoiding such conflicts in the future (Ajibola 2009: 10). Taking the above 
classification of the 2001 and 2002 events of conflict as the “genesis of the crisis” into 
consideration, better effort would have been invested in the avoidance and deterrence of other 
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events of violence conflicts in Jos. The reoccurring nature of violent conflict in Jos in focused 
era exposes the insufficient intervention and peace-building strategies of the government.  
 
It was highlighted by Danfulani (2006: 6) that the efforts of the judicial commission of 
inquiries failed due to the lack political will from the government to implement 
recommendations made by the judicial commissions. Some of such recommendations include 
“government’s facilitation ... of a genuinely bottom-up approach to peace and a confidence-
building process, through effective engagement with ... youth and other groups to assess their 
concrete needs and demands. Additionally, the boycott of the commissions by some youth 
organizations, for example, the Jama’atu Nasril Islam (JNI), a Muslim youth organisation, as 
reflected in the 2009 judicial commission of inquiry’s report (Ajibola 2009), had a negative 
bearing on the impact and effectiveness of these commissions. Jama’atu Nasiril Islam was 
believed to have engineered some of the Jos conflicts including that of November 2008. 
Hence, the decision of such organisations not to participate in these processes and the lack of 
enthusiasm from the government in ‘buying them in’ do not help the quest for sustainable 
peace in Jos. It rather predisposes such youths or organisations to revert to violence at the 
slightest provocation.  
 
It is against the backdrop of this background that this study focuses on the appraisal of youth 
participation in peace-building processes in Jos. Unlike other periods, the era of 2000 to 2010 
witnessed a great deal of violent conflicts (with about eight cases of lethal conflicts in this 
decade) than any other period in the history of Jos. This study therefore, focuses on this 
period with the aim of analysing the causes of these conflicts, the various peace-building 
endeavours of this era and, more importantly, the depth of youth participation in these 
endeavours. It is worth mentioning that to adequately analyze youth participation in peace-
building in Jos; it is necessary to unpack their participation in violent conflicts. Hence, the 
next section introduces youth and their involvement in violent conflicts.  
 
1.3.1. Youth and violent conflict 
 
Youths’ activism leading to the escalation of conflict is a subject that has received broad 
attention from scholars across the globe. Izzi, (2013); McEvoy-Levy, (2001); Kustrin, (2004) 
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and Walton, (2010) are some of the scholars that have interrogated issues related to youths’ 
notorious use of violence in conflict situations in Europe and beyond. These scholars 
acknowledge European youths’ experiences of various forms of political mobilization 
through which their agency for violence was idolized as a vehicle for social and political 
change. Socio-political violence and confrontations after the treaties in Northern Ireland ’s  
history further illustrate a youth presence in violent conflicts in Europe (McEvoy-Levy, 2001: 
5). Brett and McCallin (1996), in their study “Children: The Invisible Soldiers” provide a 
statistical representation of youth involvement in violent conflict, with the claim that “23% of 
young men have been victims of sectarian assaults and are also more often the perpetrators of 
such attacks”. Young people’s dominance in the recent “Arab Spring” and their assertive 
presence in ongoing political violence in Syria and Turkey are a further demonstration of the 
youth’s utilization of violence as a tool for self-expression in the political arena (Ezbawy, 
2012). In essence, a salient attribute of the youth in the illustration thus far is the explicit 
demonstration of their agency as human subjects. Regardless of the possible interrogation of 
the appropriateness of their adoption of violence, their choice-making ability makes evident 
their agency as individuals and a category of people in the society.  
 
On the African continent, Charles Taylor’s exploitation of youth serves as one of the primary 
explanations for his successful destabilisation of Sierra Leone and gain access to the 
country’s diamonds (in the course of the war) (Omeje, 2006: 22). The young ones in society 
were Taylor’s tool for the disruption of society for the acquisition of diamonds. 
Corresponding with the exploitation of youths as political thugs in Nigeria, Abdullah (2005: 
176) underscores the politician’s marginalisation of the violent element of the “Rarray 
Boys”21, turning them into an electioneering asset. (Abdullah, 2005) and (Omeje, 2006) 
studies throw some light on roles of political elites vis-à-vis youth’s adoption of violence in 
contemporary society. The on-going political crisis in Egypt which is an upshot of the 
revolution instigated by youth social protest movements in 2011 (Ezbawy, 2012) points to the 
element of youth frustration with the ever increasing economic challenges in the form of high 
youth unemployment and hopelessness. Omeje (2005a: 1), in his study Youths, Conflicts and 
Perpetual Instability in Nigeria claims that “youths are prosecutors of 90-95% of violent 
                                                 
21
 These were mostly unemployed young males on the edge of society... living by their wits (Abdullah 2005: 
175). 
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conflicts in Nigeria”. Youth presence in violent conflict is evident in the ever-growing militia 
groups such as the Pan Niger Delta Revolutionary Militias (PNDRM), the Ijaw Youth 
Council (IYC) and the Egbesu Boys of Africa (EBA) in Nigeria (Ojakorotu and Okeke-
Uzodike, 2006). Some of these groups have become identical with young people, due to their 
dominance and active participation in such movements and violent conflicts in Nigeria and 
their motivations for such conflicts include their creation of employment opportunit ies and 
their quest for a more secure society. Other significant highlights of youth involvement in 
violent conflicts include their role as architects of the South African anti-apartheid struggle 
(Soweto uprising of 1976), their roles in the Rwandan genocide of 1994 and the Kenyan post-
electoral conflict in 2007. According to Cockell (2001: 17) youth involvement in “protracted 
conflicts are most often founded on the contested pursuit of basic human needs such as group 
security, recognition of identity and culture, access to the political process, and effective 
participation in the local economy”. This suggests that an effort to meet such vulnerable 
youth’s needs and adequately equipping them against forced or voluntary participation in 
violence would limit their disposition to violence. This study considers youth participation in 
peace-building as plausible means to limiting youth’s disposition to violence and enhancing 
sustainable peace, hence the next section will introduce deliberations on youth and their 
participation in peace-building. 
 
1.3.2. Youth and peace-building 
 
The idea of peace-building was popularised by the United Nation’s (UN) former Secretary-
General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, in his report, An Agenda for Peace, in 1992 (Call and Cook, 
2003; Haugerudbraaten, 1998 and Morris 2013). In this report, Boutros-Ghali proposed a 
couple of strategies through which the UN could manage and deal with issues of 
contemporary conflicts around the globe. Envisaged strategies in his proposal include 
concepts such as preventive diplomacy22, peace-making23, peacekeeping24 and post-conflict 
peace-building (Boutros-Ghali, 1993).  
                                                 
22
 Preventive diplomacy is defined as “action to prevent disputes between parties, to prevent existing disputes 
from escalating in conflicts and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur” (Boutros –Ghali 1992: Par 20) 
23
 Peacemaking is understoods as “action that brings hostile parties to agreement, essentially through necessa ry 
peaceful means…” (Ibid )  
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Although peace-building, as a socio-political concept, came to limelight in recent history25, it 
has enjoyed a progressive and widespread approval by both peace scholars and practitioners.  
In spite of its widespread endorsement by relevant stakeholders, it remains opened to 
complex understanding and interpretations by both scholars and practitioners. Barnett et al. 
(2007)  Lopes Cardozo (2015); Udofia (2011)  and Tschirgi (2003) echo this view in their 
claim that, despite the attention enjoyed, peace-building remains a less-than-clear concept 
and that there is no commonly agreed post-conflict peace-building theory.  Focusing on the 
lack of homogeneous comprehension of peace-building, Woodrow and Chigas (2009: 3-4) 
posit,  
“While the expansion of the meaning of “peace-building” reflects the realities of 
building and consolidating peace, it also has created confusion and gaps in practice. 
The lack of definitional specificity and intellectual rigor about peace-building has 
allowed an attitude of anything goes. Thus, anything that anyone chooses to call 
peace-building is embraced as part of the field. Many policies, programmes and even 
conceptual frameworks for peace-building, for example, do not make conceptual 
distinctions between state building, peace-building, governance and development”  
Furthering the discourse around the challenges with the conceptual clarity of peace-building, 
Chandler (2017) in a more recent publication, titled “Peace-building as State-building”, 
explored the development, content and consequences of equating peace-building with state-
building as understood by some scholars and practitioners. Judy Cheng-Hopkins while 
serving as the Assistant Secretary-General for UN Peace-building Support, for instance, 
conceptualizes peace-building as “a range of measures targeted to reduce the risk of lapsing 
or relapsing into conflict by strengthening national capacities at all levels for conflict 
management, and to lay the foundations for sustainable peace and development…” (Cheng-
Hopkins 2010: 5). While Karbo (2012: 4) in his paper Localising Peace-building in Sierra 
Leone defines “peace-building as a complex, long-term and fundamentally value- laden 
process that involves core decisions about how to construct a peaceful society”. In line with 
Chandler’s critique, peace-building interventions increasingly appeared not as external 
coercion but as an internal matter of administrative assistance for ‘good governance’ or 
                                                                                                                                                        
24
 Peacekeeping is the deployment of a UN’s, reg ional and sub -regional presence in the field, hitherto with the 
consent of all parties concerned, normally involving UN military and/or police personnel and frequently 
civilians as well (Ib id) 
25
 In comparison with other long standing concepts such as virtue, power etc, the discourse of peace -building is 
relatively recent 
 
 
23 
 
‘institutional capacity-building’, thus questionably equating peace-building with state-
building. McCandless (2014: 20) argued that “while peace-building and state-building are 
distinct and complimentary agendas, merging them entirely and allowing them to be 
conflated blurs lessons learnt and fosters compromises within both that inhibit their potential 
distinct and positive contributions”. Hence, while the two concepts remain compatible and 
reinforcing, there is a need to retain the conceptual distinction between them.  
 
Having discussed the existing challenges in the deliberation and understanding of peace-
building, this study adopts Lederach's (1997: 20), definition of peace-building as a 
“comprehensive concept that encompasses, generates, and sustains the full array of processes, 
approaches and stages needed to transform conflict towards more sustainable, peaceful 
relationships”. Lederach’s concept of peace-building is adopted over other possible 
definitions owing to its comprehensive nature. His definition effectively encompasses the key 
ideas of Cheng-Hopkins and (2010) and Karbo (2012) while making available a necessary 
platform for a thorough engagement with peace-building initiatives that are inherently 
complex, multi-actor oriented and distinct from state-building. Embedded in this definition is 
the idea that peace-building is a process with complex elements and it cannot be divorced of 
multiple actors. An indispensable set of these actors, as this thesis shall argue, is the youth.  
 
According to Checkoway and Gutierrez (2006: 1-2), youth participation in peace-building is 
“a process of involving young people in the institutions and decisions that affect their lives. It 
includes efforts by young people to plan programs of their own choosing; by adults to involve 
young people in their agencies; and by youth and adults to work together in intergenerational 
partnerships.” Complimenting Checkoway and Gutierrez’s depiction of youth participation in 
peace-building, Lopes Cardozo et al (2015: 15) posit that “there is a growing consensus that 
greater consideration needs to be afforded to the demands and desires of youth themselves.” 
(Dunne et al, 2014:1), nevertheless, hold that “there is still uncertainty as to how this might 
best be achieved in different contexts and how to understand, connect with and promote the 
political agency of youth in relation to peace-building processes”. Embedded in this study’s 
adopted comprehension of peace-building is the view that youth standpoint be sought and 
included in peace processes as well as within programmes that seek to support youth peace-
building activities. In fact, Kurtenbach emphatically asserts:  
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“The active and participatory inclusion of young people is a necessary condition for 
sustainable peace. Post-war societies produce high risks for sustainable peace if the 
society fails to integrate young people into the political system and to allow them to 
participate in political decisions and actions. Where the war-time generation has an 
exclusive control of social and political resources generational conflict will arise. This 
might lead to renewed armed conflict and war or shift violence from the political 
arena to society and crime. El Salvador provides evidence of the escalation of violence 
due to a lack of social and economic integration of young people. In spite of its status 
as a formally democratic political system, El Salvador, remains one of the most 
violent societies in the worldwide” (2017: 3). 
 
The active and participatory inclusion of young people is achievable through affording the 
youth the opportunity to be involved in a variety of social and democratic activities aimed at 
the building of more peaceful societies. Shipler (2008: 8) in his paper Nepal’s Youths as 
Peacebuilders further emphasizes this line of reasoning in his assertion that “as a generation, 
they [youth] found themselves at the centre of a great political storm; they were the ones sent 
to the front lines by feuding leaders to fight the war. Given their role, it was clear that they 
needed to be involved in bringing about peace”. The logical outcome of youth participation in 
peace-building is easily comprehensible. This is demonstrated in the overwhelming support 
of viewpoint in both scholarly writings and practitioners’ rhetoric. Scholars such as 
Ungerleider (2012), for instance, highlights Youth Peace-building and Leadership Programs 
(YPLP) effort in bringing youths together from conflict prone communities such as Iraq, 
Cyprus, Northern Ireland, Northern Uganda, Rwanda, Serbia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, 
Denmark, and England with the primary goal of equipping them with the skill of open 
dialogue. Ungerleider (2012: 382) holds that such training helps them learn how to “relate 
with each other, express themselves openly, understand intercultural differences, analyse 
critical world issues, and even experience a sense of personal transformation”. Hilker and 
Fraser (2009b: 41) in reference to McEvoy-Levy (2006) and Robertson (2008), further 
highlighted various peace-building programmes that position young people as key actors in 
their activities and strategies. Such programmes include peace education, training in human 
rights, peace-building and conflict resolution training, and the direct involvement of youth in 
elections and human rights monitoring and accountability programmes.  
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There are contrasting views about Civil Societies (CSOs), International Nongovernmental 
Organizations (INGOs) and Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs) and their roles in 
various sectors of a society. Narrowing the focus to peace-building, it is evident that some 
Civil Society Organisations (CSOs), International Nongovernmental Organization (INGOs) 
and Non-governmental Organisations (NGOs) are great proponents of peace-building 
activities in conflict and post-conflict societies in Jos and beyond.  By the same token, the 
motivation and objectives of other INGOs’ and CSOs’ peace-building activities are 
questionable and subject of relentless interrogation and criticism. Amongst a host of reasons, 
such CSOs and NGOs are subject of criticisms due to their possible ulterior motives and  for 
“being stuck in the global and applying a deductive Western rationality in their work” 
(Neumann and Schia 2012: 13), even when they operate outside of the Western society. A 
judicious approach to analysing such NGOs, INGOs and CSOs, according to Mamdani 
(1996: 19) “to look at actually existing civil society which involves looking at its actual 
formation, rather than as a promised agenda for change”. Such an approach has a strong 
potential of unravelling the disparities between their objectives and implementation 
strategies. According to Ikelegbe (2001) “in Nigeria ... recent events are pointing to the 
negative roles played by some civil groups in the construction of platforms for ethnic 
militancy and violent confrontation with other groups and the state”.  
 
Regardless of their shortcoming and criticisms though, some of these organizations such as 
Search for Common Ground (SFCG), Justice, Development and Peace Commission (JDPC), 
Center for Peace Advancement (CEPAN) and Centre for Peace Initiative and Development 
(CEPID) play dominant roles in the effort towards restoration of peace in Jos. Similarly to 
Jos, the role of Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) cannot be overemphasized in Ghana’s 
effort to restore sustainable peace in its society. In recent years, there has been increased 
recognition of the role CSOs can play as partners with government and intergovernmental 
organizations in the conflict resolution and peace-building agenda Ghana. CSOs have been 
instrumental in ensuring some level of stability in conflict-shattered areas, especially in the 
Northern regions of Ghana, where a number of post- independence challenges have conspired 
to create pockets of relative instability and armed conflicts (Bukari & Guuroh, 2013). 
 
 
 
26 
 
Scholars such as Ene, (2016) and Wamucii (2014) also highlight CSOs and NGOs efforts 
towards peace-building in their publications. Wamucii (2014) notes that the formation of 
CSOs in Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania led to success in the mobilization of the masses 
toward political transition, creating civic awareness, and opening up civil spaces for public 
participation. Within the context of Nigerian society, Ene (2016: 7) holds that “CSOs 
facilitate individual and group participation in development process at the grassroots and 
national levels, hence their relevance and important role in the attainment of sustainable 
human and social development goals. Development agencies commit to collaborating with 
CSOs in the planning and implementation of their development programmes. As a result, 
indigenous CSOs have increasingly come to limelight in the development landscape of 
Nigeria, with the explosion in the last two decades of the number of CSOs operating in the 
country”. In more recent publications, Karim (2017) and Justino, Mitchell and Muller (2018) 
have equally acknowledged the positive roles of NGOs, INGOs and CSOs in conflict prone 
areas. With a focus on Ghanaian society, Karim (2017:1) acclaims, “many of the conflicts in 
Ghana have often needed the intervention of civil society organizations to end them, or to 
bring relative peace since warring parties often, do not see the government as neutral”. While,  
Justino, Mitchell and Muller (2018), credits the NGOs and CSOs for the increased 
participation of women in Afghanistan, Liberian, Nepal and Sierra Leone ’s peace-building 
activities. Hence, the positive role and strategic position of most Civil Society Organizations 
and other Non-governmental organizations cannot be undermined globally. This is akin to 
Nigeria’s society; this sector of the society has been instrumental in keeping Nigerians 
attentive to various developments through their observations, regular reports and advocacy 
for more sustainable peace-building programmes and initiatives.  
 
Bratton (1994); Haynes (2009) and Opeyemi (2009) also explored and expressed their 
thoughts on the peace-building processes in Nigeria. Opeyemi (2009: 99) in his study on 
Communication, Youth, Empowerment and Peace-building in Nigeria, discusses the 
significance of “communication between leaders, and their citizens, and among yo uth from 
different sides of conflict through strategic relationships, information sharing, and 
recreational activities” in the quest for sustainable peace in the country. While Haynes (2009) 
emphasises inter-faith dialogue as an adequate mechanism to peace-building in Nigeria given 
the centrality of religion in Nigeria’s conflict. Inter-faith dialogue, under the umbrella of the 
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Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) and the Nigerian Supreme Council for Islamic 
Affairs (NSCIA), is frequently employed as a channel of communication between the two 
large faith groups in Nigeria and specifically Jos. However, irrespective of the regular 
exchange of ideas and information flow between these two dominant religions in Nigeria, 
events of violent conflicts with religious undertones remain unyielding. Consequently, there 
is a pertinent need to delve into these less explored fields and subjects in the quest for 
sustainable peace in society. 
 
1.4. Problem statement 
 
In brief, extant literature explicate the overwhelming presence of youth in the contemporary 
society (Ansell (2017), their significant involvement in the violent conflicts across the globe 
(Ezbawy, 2012 and Stoddard, Epstein-Ngo, Walton, Zimmerman, Chermack, Blow, Booth, 
and Cunningham (2015) and their absence from peace-building processes (Ungerleider 2012 
and  Shipler 2008). Kurtenbach (2017: 2) holds that “... this lack of youth’s political 
citizenship is counterproductive for sustainable peace”. In the same light, youth’s lack of 
genuine participation in the peace-building initiatives in Jos threatens the sustainability of 
acquired peace in the city. This begets the question: why are youth not participating in the 
peace-building initiatives in Jos? To response to this question, this study interrogates the 
depth of youth participation in peace-building initiatives in Jos between the year 2000 and 
2010. It goes about this through it quest to unravel the factors responsible for youth 
participation in violence, how the youth are denied participation in peace-building initiatives 
and why the youth are denied genuine participation in peace-building processes in Jos. Given 
the centrality of youth in violent conflict in Jos, their participation in peace-building is 
considered an indispensible strategy to acquiring sustainable peace in the city. The 
interrogation and analysis of related research questions offer scholars and practitioners 
reliable platform for the development of appropriate policies and systematic strategies for the 
enhancement of youth participation in peace-building in Jos.   
 
 
 
 
28 
 
1.5. Problem and research questions 
 
This study explores youth participation in the peace-building processes in Jos between 2000 
and 2010.  The study is underpinned by the following broad research questions:  
 
i. What are the primary factors that influence youths’ involvement in violent 
conflicts in Jos?  
ii. What are the various peace-building initiatives in Jos?   
iii. How is youth participation in peace-building initiatives in Jos enhanced?  
iv. Why are the youth denied genuine participation in the peace-building 
processes and initiatives in Jos? 
 
1.6. Research objectives  
 
The objectives of this study are as follows: 
 
i. To establish the patterns and the primary factors that influence youths’ 
involvement in violent conflicts 
ii. To analyze the various peace-building initiatives in Jos, Nigeria 
iii. To interrogate peace-building initiatives in Jos as a strategy to account for 
the absence of youth involvement in peace-building activities 
iv.  To establish the depth of youth participation in peace-building processes in 
an effort to explain the indices responsible for the deficiency of youth 
participation in peace-building initiatives   
 
 
1.7. Justification of research 
 
This section explains why this study is worthwhile and  necessary. It does this using the 
identified limitations in the existing literature in the field of youth participation in peace-
building in Jos. In so doing, the study clarifies its point of entry into the discourse of peace-
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building and participation by ascertaining the gaps in extant literature and how it bridges 
these gaps. 
 
Scholars such as Abama and Kwaja (2009); Danfulani and Fwatshak (2002a); Kwaja (2011) 
and Sampson (2012) proposed a variety of initiatives and programs in support of peace-
building and for the sustainability of peace in Jos. Some of their proposed initiatives 
comprised of security, economic and socio-political dimensions of the society. Ettang further 
dissect these recommended peace-building programs to identifiable activities such as  
 
[e]xtensive l and ownership reform, building of legitimate and effective public institutions, 
strengthening the security sector to improve prevention efforts and enhance security, ensuring 
solid early warning and response mechanisms, robust disarmament initiatives, building 
employment and entrepreneurial opportunities, and, very importantly, eliminating the 
indigene/settler dynamic in all sectors (2015: 7).  
 
The places and roles of youth in these peace-building recommendations and undertakings 
remain vague and insufficiently researched in the highlighted studies. Although Mecha 
(2013) made a positive strides via his study “Empowering Youth as Peace-builders”, his 
narrow focus on the NGOs’ peace-building activities was very restricted. Firstly, such narrow 
focus denied Mecha the opportunity of engaging with government- led peace-building 
initiatives26. Secondly, his findings are arguably inadequate on the account that they do not 
reflect the depth of issues and challenges entrenched in the questions of youth participation in 
peace-building. This is because most of the NGOs and CSOs in peace-building and related 
services are advocates of civic participation in the society. I t is a direct consequence therefore 
that they will be strong proponents of the idea of youth participation as opposed to the state 
government agencies. The extension of the discourse of youth participation in Jos  to 
including government- led peace-building activities offers a holistic comprehension of the 
depth of youth in peace-building initiatives in Jos. 
 
Bearing in mind that Mecha’s centre of attention was on the activities of NGOs and CSOs, he 
was unable to critically explore some of the pertinent challenges that confront youth 
                                                 
26
 When compared with the NGOs, the government personnel are less proactive in the acknowledgement of 
youth agency. Available literatures crit icize their subjection of the youth to the margin in their programs 
(Malaba 2011).  
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participation in peace-building, especially within government- led peace-building initiatives. 
It is on this account, that this study holds that a limited focus on NGOs peace-building 
initiatives as they relate to youth participation does not offer a genuine nor reliable state of 
youth participation in peace-building in Jos.  
 
In view of the fact that adequate attention has not been devoted to the analysis of youth 
participation in the peace-building processes, is worthwhile and necessary considering the 
fact that it contributes to the existing body of knowledge. This study’s interrogation and 
anticipated recommendations to the question of youth participation in peace-building in Jos 
profoundly extends the body of literature in the field. It does this through its systematic and 
rigorous scrutiny of the various peace-building initiatives in Jos while simultaneously 
unpacking the depth of youth participation in such initiatives. Furthermore, an exhaustive 
search of academic and relevant database reveals a gap in the theoretical interrogation of 
youth participation in Jos’s peace-building initiatives. Consequently, enquiries into the depth 
and quality of youth participation in peace-building in Jos predominantly remained 
understudied. Concisely, this study bridges this gap: 
 
a) Through critical and meticulous interrogation of the depth of youth participation in 
both government- led and NGO-led peace-building initiatives. In so doing, this study 
adds impetus and depth to the already existing body of literature on peace-building 
initiatives in Jos. 
 
b) This study also enlightens and equips policy-makers with relevant knowledge in 
relation to youth participation in peace-building. In this way, this study assists peace-
related policy-makers with knowledge relevant for effective incorporation of youth in 
the peace-building initiatives in Jos, and Nigeria at large.  
 
c) The focus on 2000 to 2010 eras in Jos unpacks the principal factors responsible for 
the incessant violent conflicts, absence of youth in the peace-building activities and 
evocation of practices and procedures that could avert such incessant violence. In so 
doing, this study contributes towards sustainable peace in Jos and surroundings 
environments.  
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It is worthy of mention that the newness of this study is entrenched in the very nature of the 
study. This is on the account that this study is a holistic analysis of the depth and quality of 
relevant stakeholders’ participation in the peace-building initiatives in Nigeria. Given the 
dearth of scholarly research in this sphere, this study distinctively stretches scholarly inquiry 
in its quest for a comprehensive understanding of youth’s participation in peace-building.     
 
1.8. Research methodology  
 
As mentioned in previous sections, this study focuses on youth and their experiences of 
peace-building initiatives in Jos. This is done through the engagement with the perception 
and views of some of the primary stakeholders in the peace-building processes in Jos. This 
section sets out the researcher’s adopted procedure in the collection and analysis o f data as 
well as the assumptions, which underpinned his decisions. The section discusses the design 
and methodology used in this study, the study’s participants, the sampling technique, the 
methods and techniques of data generation, collection and analysis as well as the research 
instruments.  
 
The discourse of peace-building takes place within the broad reality of human experience, 
including the memories of the past, management of current realities and events and future 
objectives. These are very complex realities, which are laden with subjective comprehensions 
capable of generating intense emotions and sentiments. Some of such sentiments and 
understanding could, on one hand, be overly idealist27 and optimistic culminating in a utopian 
view of the world and one’s immediate society; while, on the other hand, it could also 
generate more realist and pessimistic view of the world. Consequently, a person’s approach 
to the discourse of peace-building may depend on how a person is affected by the 
consequences of violent conflict, peace and his/her general attitude to life. Although violence 
and peace are embedded with direct and indirect consequences, such effects are often 
subjectively experienced. This understanding of the subjective experience of reality informs 
the adopted qualitative methodology since this study’s interrogation of people subjective 
                                                 
27
 These are category of people that conceive of the perfect world; they are sometimes thought of as naive and 
inexperienced.  
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experience and perception of youth participation in peace-building will aid its comprehension 
of the depth of youth participation in peace-building initiatives. 
 
1.8.1. Research approach 
 
One of the common challenges of most scientific inquiries is the choice of methodological 
approach to the study. This primarily revolves around deciding to either use a quantitative, 
qualitative or mixed methods approach in a study. Although any of these research approaches 
may be adequately embraced in other similar studies, the nature and objectives of this study 
informed the researcher’s adoption of qualitative approach in the data collection and analysis 
of the study. Prior to the in-depth discussion of the adopted research methods, it is necessary 
to briefly examine other methods and why they are considered unsuitable for this study.   
 
1.8.2. Quantitative research methodology 
 
Quantitative research approaches, situated in the positive paradigm,  are research methods that 
primarily rely and deal with information that are collected and analysed numerically. One of 
the fundamental expectations in a study’s adoption of a quantitative research method is the 
generalizability of the findings of the study. Onwuegbuzie and Collins (2005:283) reiterate 
this view asserting, “Quantitative researchers tend to make statistical generalizations, which 
involve generalizing findings and inferences from a representative statistical sample to the 
population from which the sample was drawn”. Findings from a quantitative study are 
expected to be applicable and relevant to other similar situations and population. Therefore, 
sampling becomes a very important component of a quantitative study. This is because an 
appropriate sampling method ensures that all the relevant categories are represented (or have 
an equal chance of being represented) in the study sample and that, the sample is large 
enough to adequately represent the views of the population.   
 
As evident from the previous chapters, this study is exploratory in its nature. Consequently,  
rather than a quantitative generation of statistical data via rigid approaches, this study is 
better approached with a qualitative research method due to the researcher’s ability to 
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critically engage with the subject matter of the study. For this reason, a qualitative research 
methodology was adopted to facilitate a robust interrogation of the research questions.  
 
1.8.3. Qualitative research methodology 
 
This study adopts a qualitative approach to its exploration of youth participation in peace-
building initiatives in Jos. A qualitative research methodology is a complex approach to 
research with a multiplicity of meanings and approaches. In simple terms, Kothari, (2004:5) 
understands qualitative research methodology  
 
To be concerned with the subjective assessment of attitudes, opinions and behaviour. 
Research in such a situation is a function of researcher’s insights and impressions. Such an 
approach to research generates results either in non-quantitative form or in the form, which 
are not subjected to rigorous quantitative analysis.  
 
Qualitative research methodologies are established in the interpretivist paradigm. Further 
recognized as the anti-positivism worldview, the interpretivist paradigm according to Cock 
(1989: 104) is the view that “truth must be discovered by thought rather than by sensory 
observation”. He argues that researchers are confident in the discovery of “some truth” of an 
event from the personal understanding of the research participants. A central point in the 
interpretive paradigm, however, is the significance it places on unique details and exhaustion 
in the analysis of relevant data. This calls for researchers to pay attention to the probable 
tangled-web of issues in gathered data rather than mere regurgitation of participants’ 
responses and views. Grant and Giddings (2002: 16) express this clearly in their assertion that 
the researcher ought to “interpret the significance of their self-understandings in ways the 
participants may not have been able to see”.  
 
The interpretive paradigm is deeply rooted in the principle of the existence of multiple truths 
(Erlingsson and Brysiewicz, 2013). It acknowledges the uniqueness and the relativity of truth 
and the meaning of an individual’s experiences. This element of relativity within this 
paradigm consents to multiple interpretations of the same reality or event. In contrast to the 
positive paradigm that argues for an objective truth, which is assumed to be external to the 
researcher and study participants, entrenched in the interpretivist paradigm is the idea of 
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subjective truth. The element of subjective truth is emphasised in the interpretive worldview 
through its “emphasis on the individual’s interpretation and construction of meaning” (Mack, 
2010:7). In harmony with this understanding, Tuli (2011: 103) asserts that the interpretivist 
paradigm “portrays the world as a social construct, complex and ever changing”.  
 
Since qualitative research methodologies are entrenched in the interpretive paradigm, they 
(qualitative research methodologies) celebrate the richness, depth, nuance, context, multi-
dimensionality and complexity of the interpretive paradigm (Mason 2002:1). Rather than the 
quest of objective truth, a qualitative research method seeks to unravel the unique value of 
individual participants’ experiences and understanding of reality. This approach to research is 
concerned with subjective assessment of attitudes, opinions and behaviour. Research in such 
a situation is a function of the researcher’s insights and impressions. Such an approach to 
research generates results either in non-quantitative form or in the form which is not 
subjected to the rigid quantitative analysis (Kothari, 2004, p. 5). Although qualitative 
methodology celebrates flexibility in its analysis of data, it is nonetheless systematic and 
rigorous in its analysis.  
 
Bearing in mind the subjective nature of a qualitative methodology and its appreciation of 
individual participants’ experiences and understanding of reality, Erlingsson and Brysiewicz 
(2012: 94) and Denzin and Lincoln, (2011, 3) argue that it “embraces the ontological 
assumption of multiple truths or multiple realities, i.e., that each person understands reality 
from an individual perspective”. Furthermore, qualitative procedures make possible the 
appraisal of unquantifiable facts about the subjects under investigation. Accordingly, Berg 
believe 
 
Qualitative techniques allow researchers to share in the understanding and 
perceptions of others and to explore how people structure and give meaning to 
their daily lives. Researchers using qualitative techniques examine how people 
learn about, and make sense of, themselves and others (2004:7).  
 
Along these lines, qualitative methodologies are thought to be “concerned with understanding 
the ways people construct, interpret and give meaning to their experiences” (May 2003: 199). 
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Embedded in this conception is some sensitivity to the strong possibility the same event could 
generate a variety of responses and feeling from different people.  
 
Denzin and Lincoln (2011: 3) also highlighted that qualitative research is multidimensional 
given that it integrates “multiple methodological practices, empirical materials, perspectives  
that enhances the rigor, breadth, complexity, richness, and depth” of a study. Included in the 
methods of data collection that frequently identified with qualitative research methods are in-
depth interviews, focus group discussions, observations, narratives, art-work and the analysis 
of documents. According to Snape and Spencer (2003: 5), qualitative methods are generally 
appropriate in addressing and engaging with research questions that require in-depth 
exploration and comprehension of the focus of the study.  
 
This study aims at a critical analysis of youth participation in peace-building processes in Jos. 
This study’s objectives and its exploratory nature inform the adoption of qualitative 
methodology. It deals with peoples’ comprehension of their experiences and the 
interpretation of their participation in both violent conflict and peace-building processes in 
Jos. The qualitative methodology facilitated the researcher’s interrogation and comprehension 
of youth experiences and the interpretation of their participation in both violent conflic ts and 
peace-building initiatives in the city of Jos. The use of this approach made the generation of a 
genuine understanding of the research participants’ standpoints regarding the depth of youth 
participation in peace-building initiatives in Jos possible. Through the intensive interrogation 
of individual participants and focus group discussions, this study unearths a rich and 
contextualized comprehension of youth, the challenges concerning their participation in 
peace-building initiatives and the elicitation of possible ways that the youth could further 
serve as agents of peace in Jos.  
 
1.9. Data collection method 
 
This study employed both primary and secondary data. The contextualisation and the 
theoretical basis of the study was by and large, furnished with data from the secondary 
sources. Vartanian (2010:3) understands secondary data to “include any data that is examined 
to answer a research question other than the question(s) for which the data were initially 
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collected”. In a more recent study, Johnston (2017) considers secondary data to mean 
previously collected data in the area of interest. These are data brought together (or outcomes 
of analysed data) by researchers of a different study or project. In most cases, secondary data 
includes published research, reports, media reports and so forth.  Included in the sources of 
the secondary data utilized for this study, are scholarly articles, books, book chapters, 
government documents, official statistics and a few unpublished but relevant academic 
papers.  
 
Thorough analysis of the secondary data enhanced the realization of three key objectives of a 
literature review as illustrated by Bhattacherjee’s (2012: 21). Firstly, the analysis of the 
study’s secondary data facilitated the survey of the current state of knowledge in the field of 
conflict, peace, peace-building and youth. Secondly, it helped in the identification of key 
authors, articles, theories and recent findings in the field of peace-building. Finally, the 
engagement with secondary data enabled recognition of existing gaps in this research area. 
With respect to the theoretical framework, the analysis of secondary data was fundamental in 
the identification and the choice of a suitable theoretical basis for this study.  
 
This study adopted in-depth interviews as its method of primary data collection28.  This was 
employed in the form of semi-structured interviews and focus group discussions (FGD). 
Semi-structured interviews were primarily utilized for the collection of primary data for this 
study. These included face-to-face in-depth interviews, telephonic interviews and focus group 
discussions. This method of primary data collection was adopted over others possible 
methods due to its ability to facilitate respondents’ free expression of their thoughts, 
experiences and interpretation of realities around them. The interviews were designed to elicit 
respondents’ viewpoints about the events of Jos violent conflicts and youth participation in 
Jos’s peace-building initiatives.  
 
                                                 
28
 It is commonly understood that primary data is gathered from the affected population by the researcher(s) 
either through in-depth interviews, survey questionnaires, focus group discussions with members of the 
community or even via e -interv iews (such as Skype™, phone interviews and email correspondences) (ACAPS 
2012: 3). 
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Neuman (2011) views a semi-structured interview as a form of interview with a set of 
predetermined questions that serves as a guide for the interviews. The lack of rigidity in semi-
structured interviews was an important advantage of semi-structured interviews in this study, 
as it permits the exploration of unexpected ideas that emerged during the interviews. 
Additionally, the flexibility of semi-structured interviews also provided an opportunity to 
clarify confusing responses that emerged during the interviews. Interviews were conducted 
between July 2012 and August 2014. The first phase of fieldwork in July 2012 ended 
abruptly due to an anticipated attack in Jos. This resulted in the immediate departure of the 
researcher from the city of Jos to ensure his safety should any crisis occur. The second and 
third rounds of data collection were held in August 2013 and August 2014 respectively.  
 
In addition to the individual interviews, focus group discussion was also employed for the 
collection of primary data in this study. The utilisation of FGD in this study was considered 
necessary due to its ability to highlight, ideas, debates and emotions that might not emerge 
through individual respondents interviews. It is worthy of note that the researcher found the 
organisation of focus group discussions in Jos challenging and highly complicated. The 
organization of focus group discussions in the city of Jos was a genuine challenge due to 
pertinent questions about respondents’ security in the possible event of flared emotions 
during the focus group discussion. Respondents’ repeated expression of strong emotions via 
their tone of voice, and other times through their body language and facial expressions, was 
strongly noted during some of the individual interviews. Considering the sensitive nature of 
the study, respondents’ polarized stance about the key themes in the study, the researcher’s 
trepidations, and the possibility of insurmountable emotions emanating from the focus group 
discussion, the researcher opted to conduct the focus group discussions outside the city of 
Jos. As a result, two focus group discussions were organised at the University of KwaZulu-
Natal.   
 
In order to assess the views of participants from different perspectives, two sets of questions 
covering the different segments of research were prepared based on the research objectives 
and questions. The first set of questions aimed at assembling information about the events of 
violent conflicts in Jos with a focus on youth involvement in these conflicts. This entails the 
documentation of the specific roles that the local elite, the government and the youth played 
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in these conflicts and the identification of factors that intensified their involvement in the 
violent conflict in Jos. The second group of questions delved into the peace-building 
mechanisms and initiatives in Jos. Genuine effort was made to interrogate both government-
led and non-governmental peace-building initiatives and the depth of youth participation in 
these initiatives. These questions dealt with more specific issues aimed are at unearthing 
respondents’ perception with regards to youth participation in the highlighted peace-building 
initiatives. It is worth mentioning that respondents’ views were to various degrees consistent 
and at variance with each other. This was an acceptable phenomenon given that the 
intricacies in the issues of youth participation in violent conflict and peace-building are 
highly contentious issues. 
 
1.10. Sampling method 
 
Purposive sampling method was adopted in the selection of respondents for this study. This 
sampling method enabled the researcher to choose respondents that were relevant for this 
study. They were selected based on their experiences in peace-building initiatives, their 
perceived ability to provided relevant information for a deeper understanding of the issues in 
question, and their willingness to participate in this study.  
 
Thirty in-depth interviews and two focus group discussions were conducted for this study. 
The interviews took several forms, which were informed by various constraints while on 
fieldwork in Jos. Of the thirty in-depth interviews, there were twenty-seven face-to- face 
interviews, two e- interviews via Skype™ and one telephonic interview. The telephonic and e-
interviews were utilized due to perceived insecurity in accessing some locations and the 
unavailability of some of the respondents while on fieldwork in Jos.  
 
While deciding on the research respondents, the researcher ensured that the strategic 
stakeholders in Jos’s peace-building programs were selected. These include the government 
personnel, non-governmental organisation, religious leaders or leaders of religious 
organisations and the youth. An effort was made to make sure that the participants from the 
NGO category held leadership positions in their respective organisations and had the 
adequate knowledge of the peace-building initiatives in Jos. Where the leader of an 
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organization was not available, he or she was asked to endorse another member of the 
organization with the relevant knowledge of peace-building initiatives for the interview. Four 
respondents were selected from various peace-building related NGOs in Jos. Face to face 
interviews were held with these participants from the selected NGOs. In addition to the 
above-mentioned participants, two participants were selected from two religious 
organisations in Jos. Bearing in mind, that manipulation of religious differences is one of the 
causal factors of violent conflict in Jos; the selection of these participants was necessary to 
enlighten the researcher about the perception and contribution of the religious bodies towards 
youth participation in peace-building initiatives in Jos.  
 
A prominent figure in the Plateau State’s peace-building committee was also interviewed. 
Given his strategic position (which cannot be divulged due to possible ethical implications), 
he was instrumental in providing the researcher with relevant information regarding the 
government’s initiatives on peace-building programs and youth participation in such 
initiatives.  
 
Finally, 23 youth participated as respondents in this study. Three research assistants from 
some of the selected NGOs assisted with the identification of youth with adequate knowledge 
and experience of peace-building programs in Jos. Most of the youth, were to some extent, 
involved in some peace-building initiatives in Jos. In addition to the individual interviews, 
focus groups interviews were held with other research participants at the Old Main Building 
of University of KwaZulu-Natal premises. Participants in these discussions were selected 
based on their knowledge of peace-building initiatives and with specific emphasis and 
interest in Jos. 
 
Table 1: Breakdown of interview participants  
 
Categories of Respondents Status  Total 
Number 
Government Personnel  High profile personnel from Plateau State’s 
Peace-building Committee 
1 
Religious Leaders  One Christian (Reverend)  2 
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 One Muslim (One Personal Assistant to an 
Imam and the Publicity Secretary to a 
Muslim Organisation) 
Nongovernmental 
Organization 
 One Executive Directors and CEO 
 One Founder of an NGO 
 One Coordinator of Peace-building programs 
 One Program Manager 
4 
Youth  Adequate knowledge or experience in 
theories of peace-building and/or peace 
initiatives in Jos 
23 
 
 
1.11. Data analysis 
 
Content analysis was employed in the analysis of data collected for this study. Hsieh and 
Shannon (2005:1278) comprehend content analysis as “a research method for the subjective 
interpretation of the content of text data through the systematic classification process of 
coding and identifying themes or patterns”. Similarly, Babbie and Mouton (2012: 491) define 
content analysis as “a research method which …examines words or phrases within a wide 
range of texts, including books, book chapters, essays, interviews and speeches as well as 
informal conversation and headlines”. The adoption of content analysis enabled the 
researcher to analyse the content of various gathered data. The techniques of content analysis 
facilitated the researcher’s engagement with respondents’ views via systematic identification 
of relevant and specific issues from the research data. Guided by the study’s objectives and 
research questions, the researcher delved into the content of the data with the aim of isolating 
trends of peace-building initiatives in Jos and the depth of youth participation in these 
initiatives. Research data were coded into specific content categories. After that, the 
relationships between the identified categories were analysed in correspondence with the 
research objectives and the underlying theories of the study. This analysis process involved 
reading and re-reading, coding and re-coding of transcripts until derived categories were 
considered sufficient for this study. This element of back and forth practice is considered by 
Erlingsson and Brysiewicz (2013: 96) as a “hands-on-analysis”. They understand hands-on-
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analysis as a “process of reading, re-reading and immersing oneself in the text”. The back and 
forth swing enabled the researcher to tap into the data seeking similarities and differences 
while exploiting his knowledge/experiences, theories and previous research to build a novel 
approach to youth participation in peace-building initiatives in Jos. Concisely, the gathered 
data both from primary and secondary sources was synthesized with the view of offering a 
holistic analysis of the depth of youth participation in peace-building processes/initiatives in 
Jos. 
 
1.12. Ethical considerations  
 
The primary aim of this study was the appraisal of youth participation in peace-building 
initiatives in Jos. The study relied on primary data from strategic stakeholders such as the 
government, the NGOs and religious representatives and the youth. To embark on the data 
collection process, the approval of the University of KwaZulu-Natal’s Human Science Ethics 
Committee was obtained (Protocol Reference Number: HSS/0927/012D)29. The data 
collection process commenced after the distribution of letters to stakeholders and 
gatekeepers, seeking their permission to gain access to their human and literary resources for 
this study. Contained in letter was a clear introduction of the researcher, the research project 
and the objectives of the research.  
 
The researcher ensured that the selected samples for the study were given consent forms, 
which contained comprehensive information about the purpose of the research. This 
confirmed that their decision to participate, withdraw from the study or not to participate was 
a well- informed decision. In other words, no participant was deceived or coerced to 
participate. With respect to the e- interviews, the consent form was read out to the participants 
prior to the commencement of the interview. Participants’ responses informed the 
researcher’s continuation or termination of the interviews.  
 
All the respondents were informed that data collected for the research will solely be used for 
research purposes. To ensure accurate capturing of data, respondents’ permission was 
                                                 
29
 See appendices 
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obtained to audio record the interview sessions. All respondents were comfortable with the 
researcher’s utilization of the audio recorder.  
 
Contained in the consent form was clear information that respondents’ participation was 
voluntary. It was also brought to their attention that they were at liberty to withdraw from the 
study at any point should they wish to do so, even without giving any reason or justification 
for their withdrawal. Additionally, the study’s participants were informed that they could 
choose not respond to question(s) that they were not comfortable with. However, none them 
refused to answer any question. 
 
Equally important is the principle of respondents’ anonymity. The consent form also 
guaranteed the respondents’ protection via their anonymity throughout the research process. 
Although some participants clearly asked the researcher to use their identity (names and sex) 
when necessary, the researcher was guided by the Protocol in his omission of details that 
could reveal the identity of respondents from citations of extracts from interviews and other 
references in this thesis. In this way, the anonymity of the participant was guaranteed.  
Participants in this study were therefore identified with broad-spectrum identities such as 
youth, NGO personnel, government personnel and so forth, depending on their status in their 
society. All illustration of research subjects and quotation of excerpts from interviews in this 
thesis were cited using the above reference codes. Finally, all the secondary sources of data 
utilized in the thesis and the financial support received during this study were properly 
acknowledged. 
 
1.13. Validity, reliability and rigor 
 
Validity and reliability are concepts that are commonly associated with quantitative studies. 
However, these terms are increasingly being applied to qualitative studies in recent years. 
While the reliability of a study relies on the ability of the study to replicate or reproduce its 
results or observations given similar or the same data, (Golafshani, 2003:598), validity is 
fundamentally concerned with ascertaining whether the researcher is committed to observing 
or measuring exactly what he/she sets out to study (Bryman, 2009). Less attention is paid to 
issue of qualitative study’s reliability due to the complex nature of such an endeavor. The 
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establishment of the reliability of a qualitative study is inherently difficult due to its 
subjective nature. 
 
Considering the diverse epistemological standpoints of qualitative and quantitative 
paradigms, it has been argued by various scholars and researchers that these concepts should 
be understood differently for each paradigm. Bryman (2009) and Srivastava and Hopwood 
(2009), for instance, argue that when considering the issue of validity and reliability, 
qualitative researchers ought to focus on ascertaining the trustworthiness and authenticity of 
their study. This was the understating of Morse, Barrett, Mayan, Olson and Spiers (2002) in 
their assertion that reliability of a research study rests with the researcher. In simple terms, 
the onus lies on the researcher to ensure the reliability of a study through his or her choices of 
methods and employment of necessary and relevant research strategies and methods. 
According to Bryman (2008), recording of interviews is one of the strategies that can be 
employed to enhance the trustworthiness and authenticity of qualitative research. In addition 
to recording of interviews, Watt (2007) suggests field notes and memos as a complementary 
strategy for improving the trustworthiness and authenticity of qualitative research. 
Additionally, it has been argued by Tuli (2011) and Erlingsson and Brysiewicz (2013) that 
the inclusion of experts amongst a study’s participants and the use of excerpts from 
interviews in qualitative research enhances its trustworthiness.  
 
Bearing in mind the aforementioned views and arguments, in an effort to ensure the validity 
of this study, the researcher tape-recorded all interviews to ensure that responses were 
accurately captured. Interviews were judiciously transcribed prior to and during the analysis 
of the data to enhance accurate and unembellished representation of participants’ views. 
Detailed notes about the researcher’s subjective experiences and observations during the data 
collection and analysis processes were also taken. The choice of face-to-face interviews 
enabled interviewees to expound on their views, clarification of their choices, convictions, 
values and attitudes and account for their behaviour. Given the matchless significance of 
interview excerpts in a qualitative study, the researcher made extensive use of excerpts from 
the interviews in presenting the findings of the research to convey the perceptions of 
participants. In so doing, the researcher could explore participants’ subjective experiences 
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and the meaning they attach to those experiences. Such methods draw particular attention to 
specific and local or contextual issues while elucidating the participants’ view(s).  
 
 
1.14. Anticipated limitations, scope and delimitations of the study  
 
It is understood that limitations in a study refer to the variables that will have certain 
consequences on a study over which the researcher has no control. Purposive sampling 
frequently adopted in a qualitative study is an example of such a variable with inherent 
limitations and weak points. One of the repeatedly employed criticisms against a purposive 
sampling technique is its susceptibility to researcher’s bias in the selection process. This 
study’s adoption of purposive sampling, rendered this study vulnerable to the 
abovementioned biased sampling.  
 
In addition to the above-mentioned point, the researcher acknowledges the possibility of 
biased responses from participants chosen for the study. This could happen when a 
participant chooses to incorrectly exaggerate the effort and activity of one party while 
demeaning the effort others. A Christian participant, for instance, may undermine the efforts 
of the Muslim community towards the enhancement of youth participation in the Jos peace-
building initiatives or vice versa. It is acknowledged that nothing can be done to ensure 
specific responses from the study’s participants, and more importantly an attempt of such 
nature will be deemed unethical in an academic study. It is considered unethical on the 
account that the “perceived biased information” may indeed be the participants’ personal 
“truth” given his or her subjective experiences. Regardless of the researcher’s awareness and 
sensitivity to the possibility of this limitation, the researcher is not in a position to actively 
prevent such bias from happening. 
 
Finally, the researcher’s concern for his security was a big challenge during fieldwork. At the 
time of data collection, evidence of a strong divide, especially along religious lines, among 
the residence of Jos were noticeable. One of the research assistants, for instance, declined 
accompanying the researcher to some of the interview venues on the account that they were 
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the “no go”30 areas for his religious group. Being of the same religious group with the 
research assistant, the researcher sorts such respondent’s consent for the relocation of the 
interview to neutral venues. The researcher’s failure to obtain the participant’s consent in this 
regard resulted in the withdrawal of the participant from the study. The cancellation of an 
interview was due to the researcher’s inability to guarantee the safety of the researcher and 
research assistant. Although such participants’ response may have contributed positively to 
the outcome of the study, it is nonetheless safe to assert that their non-participation does not 
significantly undermine the findings of the study as equally well- informed participants 
replaced them. 
 
The study explores the realities of youth participation in the peace-building endeavours in 
Jos. It commenced with some explication of the events of violent conflict in the city between 
the year 2000 and 2010. This was an epoch characterised by unceasing outbursts and 
continuation of conflicts in the city. A focus on the events of conflict in this decade enhanced 
the analysis of a variety of actors and the roles they played in those conflicts in this era.   
 
The second and very important part of this study is an appraisal of peace-building and the 
depth of youth participation in peace-building initiatives in Jos. The study unpacked various 
understandings of peace-building and some of the strategies or mechanisms that enhance 
youth involvement in other societies. In the exploration of the depth of youth participation in 
peace-building initiatives in Jos, the study identified the various peace initiatives in Jos with 
an explicit interest in a devised strategy aimed at enhancing youth participation in such an 
initiative. Although this is not a comparative study, genuine effort was made to elucidate 
various stakeholders’ perception of the depth of youth participation and the mechanisms that 
such stakeholders employed for the enhancement of youth participation in peace-building 
initiatives in Jos. This study notes that youth participation in Jos’s peace-building initiatives 
rests at the level of non-participation and tokenism given the stakeholders’ subjection of 
youth to mere information and consultation.  
 
                                                 
30
 “No-go” areas are sections of Jos that are occupied by a relig ious group and cannot be safely visited by 
individuals from another religious body. There are records of attacks and killing of individuals that drifted into 
sections dominated by the “other” religious group. 
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Ensuing from the aforementioned limitation with respect to the possibility and consequences 
of biased sampling embedded in purposive sampling, the researcher stipulates clear 
requirements that define the eligibility of respondents to participate in the research. The 
researcher was resolute in ensuring that all the “non-youth” participants had an in-depth 
knowledge and experience of peace-building initiatives in Jos. This was guided by such 
respondents’ participation, either directly as an individual or via his or her organization and 
portfolio. This explains the researcher’s choice of the leaders of non-governmental 
organizations with a strong interest in peace-building as research participants. Furthermore, 
the youth respondents in this study were equipped with adequate knowledge in peace-
building initiatives in Jos. Some form of involvement, as either participants or organizers of 
peace-building events, served as indicators of the adequacy of the youth’s knowledge and 
familiarity with peace-building initiatives in Jos. 
 
The researcher was sensitive to the possibility of a biased response from participants chosen 
for the study. The possibility of such a biased response will question the reliability and 
objectivity of the study. Although the researcher had no direct control over what the data or 
information received from the participants, adequate effort was made to mitigate the effect of 
this challenge through the participants’ and data triangulation. Triangulation was achieved via 
the gathering of data from more than two stakeholders of peace-building in Jos. Beyond the 
validation of data; triangulation was a unique technique that facilitated the gathering of rich 
and broad-based data which deepened the researcher’s comprehension of issues in question.  
 
It is worth noting that this study refrains from holistic evaluation of the effectiveness of the 
identified peace-building initiatives. However important and necessary such an evaluative 
study may be, it cannot be embarked upon in this study on the account that it falls beyond the 
focus of this thesis. It is a study that could be judiciously taken up in another research project.  
 
1.15. Structure of the thesis 
 
This thesis is structured into seven chapters around different but related themes to respond to 
the research objectives and questions identified in this chapter.  
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a. Chapter One: Introduction and background to the research 
 
This introduces the study and provides a background to understanding issues of violent 
conflict and peace-building with respect to the youth of Jos. In addition to this exposé, the 
chapter articulates the research problem, research objectives, the key questions to be 
responded to and a clear justification of the study. This chapter also, in brief, delves into a 
variety of possible theoretical lenses, such as Marxism, Dependency Theory, Behaviorism, 
Relative Deprivation and Structural Functional Theories, through which this study could be 
understood. However, a critical review of such theories in relation to the objective and the 
study’s research questions led  to the researcher to discard such theories. The chapter finally 
discusses the research methodology approach. It went about this with some discussion and 
justification of the chosen research paradigm. The chapter engages with the conceptual 
understanding of the interpretive paradigm while offering some rationale for the adoption of a 
qualitative methodology in this study. Furthermore, it elucidates the researcher’s motivation 
for the choice of research data collection methods and the technique employed in the 
purposive sampling of respondents. Additionally, the chapter demonstrates the researcher ’s 
compliance with University of KwaZulu-Natal’s ethics policy through a detailed outline of 
the researcher’s approach in obtaining consent of the various stakeholders and the protection 
of participants’ identity. The chapter concludes with an explication of the study’s anticipated 
limitations, scope and delimitation of the study.  
  
 
b. Chapter Two: Contextualizing youth’s participation in violent conflict and 
peace-building processes 
 
Chapter Two contextualises youth participation in violent conflict and peace-building 
processes. It examines the competing account of these key concepts in this study. The 
primary objective of this chapter is to engage critically with existing literature on the youth-
conflict relationship and the place of youth in a society’s peace-building endeavours. In 
addition to the dominant literature’s depiction of youth as violent oriented agents, this chapter 
further unpacks youth’s active roles in peace-building initiatives across the world via the 
exploration of youth-led peace-building initiatives.    
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c. Chapter Three: Reviewing the human security-peace-building nexus regarding 
youth participation 
 
Chapter Three discusses the theoretical and analytical framework of this thesis. It examines 
the human security theory along with civic participation theories and the comprehension of 
peace-building initiatives through these theoretical lenses. The premises and conclusions of 
the Human Security Theory rest on the centrality of a human person rather than a state-
centric approach to peace-building. Consequently, peace-building from the human security 
viewpoint advocates for a holistic security of the human person via various empowerment 
and development activities, programs, policies and initiatives. The Civic Participation Theory 
underscores the element and necessity of citizens’ participation in the discourse and addresses 
issues that directly affects them. With the aid of various participatory ladders, the Civic 
Participatory Theories provide broad analytical parameters for the appraisal of youth 
participation in peace-building initiatives in Jos.  
 
d. Chapter Four: Examining the youth involveme nt in the violent conflicts in Jos 
 
Chapter Four commences with a presentation of a historical context of the city of Jos and the 
study’s location. It presents the city’s socio-political history while highlighting its geo-
political importance to Nigeria at large. Insights into the strategic positioning of the city 
include its worth as the nexus between the Northern and Southern part of the Nigeria and its 
facilitation of economic activity in the region. The chapter further facilitates some reflections 
into some of the realities in Jos through its narrative of the various events of violent conflicts 
and peace-building. Such reflection enables a distinct grasp and appreciation of the realities 
in Jos, especially with respect to its history of violent conflict. It does this through its 
chronological review of the key conflicts in Jos between the year 2000 and 2010. Effort is 
made at unpacking the various elements and dimensions of these conflicts.  
 
e. Chapter Five: Assessing the multiple peace-building initiatives in Jos in support 
of youth participation 
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Chapter Five assesses the empirical component of this research. It fundamentally presents 
and discusses the findings from the empirical component of this research. Data gathered from 
the relevant stakeholders and participants during the fieldwork are assessed with a goal of 
offering a well-defined illustration of the nature and significance of the identified peace-
building initiatives in Jos. To achieve this objective, direct quotes from the transcribed data 
are utilized where relevant to retain the originality of respondents thoughts and experiences 
while elucidating various opinions held by various participants. The dominant peace-building 
initiatives highlighted by the participants include commissions of inquiry, formation of inter-
religious council, establishment of the peace operations and the various trust-building and 
capacity building programs.  
 
f. Chapter Six: Analysis and summary of research findings 
 
Chapter Six builds on the previous chapter by providing a critical assessment of the overall 
research findings. It goes about this through a detailed analytical discussion of the peace-
building initiatives. Central to this chapter is the analysis of the depth of youth participation 
in the identified peace-building initiatives. The analysis of the peace-building endeavor is 
done within the human security and peace-building framework. This is to enable a clear 
understanding of the authenticity and the quality of youth participation in Jos peace-building 
initiatives. The chapter concludes with a discussion of some of the key challenges hindering 
authentic youth participation in peace-building initiatives. Examples of some of these 
challenges include, but are not limited to the lack of peace-building and civic participatory 
policy and the dearth of political will for genuine participation of young people.   
 
g. Chapter Seven: Conclusions and recommendations  
 
Chapter Seven is the final and concluding chapter of the study. It summarizes the thesis while 
drawing conclusions from the research findings. The chapter also highlights the study’s 
significant claims in the thesis. In so doing, it sheds light on some of the deep-seated 
concerns that have kept the genuine and desired depth of youth participation in peace-
building at bay in Jos. Based on these findings and claims, this chapter provides some 
recommendations as well as suggestions for further research.  
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1.16. Conclusion 
 
Regardless of the perceived endorsement of the unique roles of youth agency in the peace-
building, this introductory chapter highlights the uninspiring and lethargic attitude of many 
stakeholders towards youth participation in peace-building initiatives. Although a few 
countries have made some strides in incorporating the youth, many other countries either 
struggle or lack the political will to adequately integrate the youth in peace-building 
processes. Thus, the youth continue to face enormous challenges and absence of an 
appropriate socio-political environment that encourages their genuine participation in peace-
building. Additionally, the chapter discussed the background, rationale of the study, the 
research approach, limitations and delimitations of the study.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
A Literary review contextualising youth participation in violent conflict and peace-
building processes 
 
2.1. Introduction 
 
It is a widely held view that youth are intrinsically inclined to conflict and violent activities. 
Scholars such as Frias and Finkelhor (2017), Sari and Camadan (2016) and Zimmerman et al 
(2017) acknowledge the view that youth run a high risk of being both victims and 
perpetrators of violence in the society. In addition to these scholars and other proponents of 
this view, the World Health Organisation, in a fairly recent study, firmly contend that “there 
is strong evidence that young people exposed to violence in early relationships are at higher 
risk of becoming victims and perpetrators of violence later in life (WHO 2015 :33). They 
went further to underscore the point that “in one United Kingdom study, half of males 
currently engaged in serious violence were victims of violence in the past, compared with 
only 12% of non-violent youth. Being a bully increases the risk of perpetrating violence later 
in life by more than half, and being a victim of bullying increases the risk of later becoming a 
perpetrator of violence by 10% (:10). Frias’ and Finkelhor’s (2017) assertion that “youth 
tended to be victimized by people in their inner circle” gives impetus to the notion the youth 
are agents and perpetrators of violent conflict since such youth circles are made up of youth. 
While it is evident that this perception of youth’s inclination to violence is not fully supported 
by contemporary debates, it is nevertheless strongly held by the policy makers and the elite in 
society and its consequences are reflected in the exclusion of youth from the design and 
implementation of various national policies (Arnett, 1999; Buchanan and Holmbeck, 1998). 
To better comprehend the discourse of youth’s agency in violence and in peace-building 
initiatives, this chapter reviews literature on the key themes, which revolves around the 
concept of violence, conflict and peace-building.  
 
Literature review is a systematic, explicit and reproducible method for identifying, evaluating 
and synthesising the existing body of completed and recorded work produced by researchers, 
scholars and practitioners (Fink, 2010:3).  Equally,  Machi and McEvoy, (2012:4) view 
 
 
52 
 
literature review as a written argument that promotes a research position by building a case 
from credible evidences based on previously researched information. These authors maintain 
that literature review provides the context and background about existing knowledge of a 
topic and lays out a logical case to defend the research position. In its simplicity, litera ture 
review facilitates the justification of the study’s area of focus as it interrogates and analyse 
existing literatures in the chosen field of study.  Kumar, (2014:48) defines literature review as 
an integral part of the research process that  makes a va luable contribution to almost every 
operational section of the study. In the final analysis, literature review helps to establish the 
link between what a researcher examines and what has already been studied, demonstrating 
the contribution of the study to the existing body of knowledge.   
 
The objective of this chapter is a critical analysis and the synthesis of key literature that 
engages with the central themes in this study. In view of this goal, the chapter explores a 
variety of scholarly material addressing issues of violent conflict and peace-building as they 
relate to youth participation in peace-building processes across societies, but with a special 
focus on Jos31, Nigeria. It does this through its presentation of a critical and an in-depth 
literary review and the theoretical underpinning of these concepts. In addition to the review 
of the various scholarly materials in this section, this chapter also unravels the rela tionships 
between conflict, peace-building and youth. Consequently, this chapter presents a critical 
appraisal of conflict, peace-building and youth with the aim of unpacking existing 
understanding of these concepts in available literature. This exercise is pertinent in the 
subsequent comprehension of peace-building initiatives and the analysis of such initiatives 
within the context of the adopted theoretical framework.  
 
The chapter commences with a review of a variety of comprehensions of the above-
mentioned concepts, the gradual evolution of their meaning and processes and their interplay 
with the youth in contemporary society. Commencing with Hobbes’ (1660) discourse of 
conflict within the context of man in the state of nature, the chapter reviews the evolution and 
progression in the comprehension of conflict. The multifaceted nature of conflict is 
highlighted through the appraisal of Galtung's (1969: 168) discourse of direct and indirect 
violence and other types of conflict in the form of ethno-religious conflict, bearing in mind 
                                                 
31
 The justification of Jos is exp licitly made in the fourth chapter of this thesis.  
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the significance of this form of conflict in Jos. The succeeding part of this section looks at 
youth engagement in violent conflict. This part deals with the conceptual definition of youth 
alongside the appraisal of the factors that compound youth engagement in conflict.  
 
The second component of this chapter delves into the evolution of peace-building and its 
processes in contemporary society. In this section, the concept of peace-building is 
extensively explored. This is set in motion with the acknowledgement of the UN’s 
recognition of peace-building through Boutros-Ghali’s (Boutros-Ghali, 1992) (1992 par 55) 
utilisation of the concept in his UN Report. This chapter further engages with renowned 
scholars’ (including Lederach, Galtung and McEvoly-Levy’s) reflections on peace-building 
whilst locating youth in peace-building processes. 
 
2.2. Unpacking the concept of violent conflict  
 
Conflict is a broadly defined concept and a widely understood phenomenon. Scholars from 
centuries past have struggled to arrive at a unanimous understanding of what conflict entails. 
Hobbes (1668), in the Leviathan, presented a detailed discourse of man in the state of nature. 
This state of nature, which he also calls “the condition of man”, was a state of absolute 
private judgement, with no independent agency, recognized authority or effective power to 
arbitrate dispute and enforce its decision. He attributes each person in the state of nature the 
liberty to do what he terms the “right of nature” - the right to do whatever one sincerely 
judges needful for one’s preservation. Hobbes’ (1668) understanding of the human person 
leaves humans in a perpetual state of tension, anxiety and friction, constantly inventing ways 
to promote their interest(s). Although humans are no longer be in the state of nature as 
construed by Hobbes, the highlighted social conditions of the state of nature beget the broad 
understanding of conflict as a clash of interests or ideas between two or more individuals or 
groups. From this point of view, conflict is a natural and inevitable phenomenon in human 
interactions. 
 
Hobbes’ conception of conflict is, nevertheless, found wanting due to its broad nature; it 
offers little help in the quest for a contemporary and a distinctive understanding of the 
concept. Scholars’ unrelenting efforts to better understand this concept or phenomenon has 
 
 
54 
 
given rise to a variety of definitions and comprehensions. Francis (2002:1), for instance, 
conceptualises conflict as the “friction caused by differences, proximity and movement”. This 
understanding emerges from the experiential reality of the human person as a social being 
(which is interactive and interdependent). These elements of interaction and interdependence 
ignite the inevitable clash of interests and competition for limited available resources in the 
pursuit of their incompatible goals. From the backdrop of this truism, Boulding (1962: 5) and 
Lucade (2012: 10) characterise conflict as a dissonance of antithetica l ideas or interests. This 
is a situation of competition in which the parties are aware of the ir incompatibility of goals. 
Butchart et al (2015), Coser (1956: 232) and Glasl (1999) further uphold similar views, 
defining conflict as a struggle over values and claims to status, power and scarce resources, in 
which the aims of the conflicting parties are not only to gain the desired values but also to 
neutralize, injure, or eliminate their rivals. These conceptions of conflict lead to a somewhat 
conventional view of conflict as the incompatible intersect of interest, opinion, goals and so 
forth arising from divergence in goals and scarce resources (see Mack and Snydey, 1957; 
Pondy, 1967; Schmidt and Kochan, 1972).  
 
These conceptions of conflict may provide a base or a starting point in the quest for improved 
understanding and analysis of this phenomenon, but it is found to be overly simplistic. 
Schmidt and Kochan (1972: 360-1), for instance, argue that such conventional definitions fail 
to acknowledge the distinction between conflict and competition32, hence treating the two 
phenomena as the same reality. Fink (1968: 431) advances this reservation in his claim that 
“competition is not regarded as conflict or a form of conflict, though it may be an important 
source of the latter....” Within the scope of this school of thought advocating for a narrowed 
definition, conflict is characterised by mutual interference among parties trying to achieve a 
goal in which simultaneous realization of such an objective is perceived impossible. 
Wellensteen (2015: 17), in a recent study encapsulate conflict as “a severe disagreement 
between at least two sides, where their demands cannot be met by the same resources at the 
same time”. For the time being, it is worth noting that incompatibility of positions, objectives, 
goals etc remains an enduring facet of most conflicts regardless of its nature or form.  
                                                 
32
 With reference to other supporters of a more narrowed defin ition of conflict such as Ross, (1930); Maclver, 
(1937); Simmel, (1955); and Cross, (1966), Schmidt and Kochan (1972: 361) understand competition as mutual 
interest in the same goal but with the actors doing nothing to obstruct the effort of their opponents. Whereas 
conflict is understood to arise when the behaviour of one of the participant is centred on blocking the effort of 
one or some of the actors from reaching their goals.  
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As a social and political phenomenon, conflict can serve as a force for positive change, but 
that is relative to the conception and approach in its management. Consistent with this line of 
reasoning, Lederach (2015: 2) argues that, “conflict is normal in human relationships, and 
conflict is a motor of change”. In harmony with the later part of the Lederach’s assertion as 
highlighted above, when constructively addressed, conflicts could serve as catalyst for 
transformation rather than destruction. This implies that conflict is not inherently violent or 
destructive and renowned scholars such as Galtung (1969), Anderson (2004) and Tolan 
(2012) have sustained this view over the years via their discourse of the distinction between 
violent and nonviolent conflict. The pictorial representation of conflict in Fig1, emphasizes 
its multifaceted nature and character within the broad comprehension of the complex nature 
of the phenomenon. Generally, conflicts are categorized as violent or non-violent conflicts 
and could be simultaneously analysed via ethnic, religious, social or political lenses. Below is 
a pictorial illustration of the complexity of the phenomenon.  
 
 Figure 1: Multifaceted nature of conflict 
  
 
Source: Designed by the Researcher (2017). 
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2.3. Violent and non-violent conflict 
 
The concepts of conflict and violence have, in some instances, been used interchangeably. 
Such transposable use of the term rests on the awareness that violence in the broad sense of 
the word is a manifestation of conflict. However, conflict is not subjected or limited to the 
exhibition or manifestation of violence (Demmers 2016). This is because there are various 
forms of conflict, some of which may not be violent in nature. Halvey (2004), in the study On 
Strategic Nonviolent Conflict, delineate nonviolence in conflict as: 
 
A general technique of conducting protest, resistance, and intervention without 
physical violence. Such action may be conducted by (a) acts of omission—that is, the 
participants refuse to perform acts that they usually perform, are expected by custom 
to perform, or are required by law or regulation to perform; or (b) acts of 
commission—that is, the participants perform acts that they usually do not perform, 
are not expected by custom to perform, or are forbidden by law or regulation from 
performing; or (c) a combination of both. The technique includes a multitude of 
specific methods, which are grouped into three main classes: nonviolent protest and 
persuasion, non-cooperation, and nonviolent intervention. 
 
 
This understanding of nonviolent conflict is applicable to the individual as much as it applies 
to the wider society. With respect to the individual, humans experience conflict non-violently 
to the extent that such a person navigates through irreconcilable values and incompatible 
interests. While Halvey’s comprehension as alluded to above explicates a public nonviolent 
form of conflict. Stephan and Chenoweth (2008:9) conceptualize nonviolent conflict as a 
largely civilian-based technique in conflict through social, psychological, economic and 
political means. This form of conflict has been employed across the globe in his tory having 
activists such as Mahatma Ghandi and Martin Luther King Jnr as its popular proponents. 
Both leaders subscribed to the philosophy of nonviolent33 confrontation of the social and 
political ills in their era.  
 
                                                 
33
 Nonviolence conflict, rather than the absence of violence, is understood as a form of civ il resistance against 
the structures and agents of violence in the society. It is a form of physically passive resistance to agents 
(personal and structural) of oppression and violence that does not aim to defeat or debase the opponent(s), but to 
bargain mutually acceptable guiding principles. Hence, nonviolence as an approach to conflict do not seek to 
assault a person, rather it attacks the ideas and structures that perpetuate violence. 
 
 
57 
 
Contrary to the nonviolent conflict, the World Health Organisation (WHO) defines violence 
as “the intentional use of physical force or power, threatened or actual, against oneself, 
another person, or against a group or community that either results in or has a high likelihood 
of resulting in injury, death, psychological harm, mal-development or deprivation” (1996:5). 
A closer look at this definition reveals various possible forms or types of violence ranging 
from violence against the self to violence against others and communities. Krug et al. (2002: 
1084) made some strides in the pictorial depiction of the forms of violence from various 
dimensions.  
 
 
Figure 2: Forms of violence 
 
 
Source: Krug et al. (2002:1084) 
 
Krug et al’s explication of violence in the above figure depicts the nature of violence and its 
manifestation at various levels. This suggests that the broad nature of conflicts is not 
restricted to particular levels of manifestation. Apart from sexual violence, which according 
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the figure, cannot be self- inflicted, the other three (physical psychological and deprivation) 
are capable of being self- inflicted34, interpersonal35 and collective36.  
 
According to Tolan, Gorman-Smith and Henry (2006), Lederach (2015), Rolston (2016) and 
Wellensteen (2015) there is substantial variation in what is included and the features that are 
considered critical in the definition of violence. Lederach (2015) suggests a multifaceted 
comprehension of violent conflict with the aid of a conflict map. In doing so, Lederach 
highlights the need to see the immediate situation of violence via a specific lens; while via 
another lens, we are able to see beyond the presenting or immediate problems towards the 
deeper patterns of relationship including the context in which the conflict finds expression. 
Lastly, Lederach alluded to the lens of a conceptual framework that enables the 
comprehension of the perspectives observed in the deeper patterns of relationship. Such 
conceptual framework he argues “permits us to connect the present ing problems with the 
deeper relational patterns. The comprehension and appreciation of these multifaceted lenses 
influence ones’ conceptualization of violence in conflicts” (2015: 4). In discussing other 
features that are considered indispensable in the definition of violence conflict, Tolan, 
Gorman-Smith and Henry (2006) highlighted some of the variations that are often 
emphasized including motivation; impact and action (see Tolan 2012). The element of 
intentional threat or utilization of force with the objective of inflicting harm (physical, social, 
psychological or economic) speaks to the motivation of actors in violent conflicts. Bearing in 
mind that the question of motivation is generally understood as the reason underlying 
behaviour, it is thus an internal and sometimes concealed phenomenon37. This therefore 
leaves us with questions and challenges about the extent to which an actor’s motivation could 
be satisfactorily discerned or understood within the context of violent conflict. The impact of 
violent actions are frequently measured by the magnitude of the pain and injury incurred or 
generated. Hence, an account of mortality and morbidity become relevant in the discourse of 
possible impact of conflict. Gorman-Smith and Henry (2006) hold that Tolan’s allusion to 
                                                 
34
 Self-inflicted violence is a form of violence against the self. This is when an individual inflicts some form of 
hostile behaviour on him/her self. In extreme cases, this could take the form of suicidal attempt.  
35
 Interpersonal violence is a form of aggressive behaviour towards the other including but not limited to 
murder. 
36
 Collective violence is manifested when an act of violence is perpetuated against a group of people rather than 
an individual. This is especially obvious in the structural forms of v iolence.  
37
 Such underlying motivations are concealed to the extent that the agent(s) of violence effectively deprive 
others the knowledge that brings about the act of violence.  
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these variations of conflict is considered important considering that such variations “carry 
forward important implications for how violence is understood, how its patterns are 
identified, how risk factors are related and which interventions and policies seem most 
appropriate” (Tolan 2012).  
 
The discourse of violence has evolved over the years. Such evolution, especially in the 
redefinition of the concept of violence, enhances the accommodation of various dimensions 
of violence – direct (personal) and indirect (structural) violence. WHO’s (1996) emphasis on 
the element of physical force in its explication of violence or violent conflict limits the 
discourse of violence in conflict. Such comprehension limits the discourse of violence 
conflict, it effectively exclude the phenomenon of non-physical repression from the scope of 
violence. To adequately accommodate the physical and non-physical repression, the appraisal 
and recognition of Galtung’s comprehension of violence is pertinent.  
 
Galtung (1969: 168) considers violence to be present when “human beings are being 
influenced so that their actual somatic and mental realisations are below their potential 
realisation”.  Hence, violence is considered present when a person is denied access to quality 
education, good and efficient health facilities, security and so forth; given that such people 
would be incapable of realizing their potential. Within the understanding of this framework, 
the reality of violence is not subjected to the agents of a particular deed; rather it’s about the 
effect and consequences of such actions on the people concerned. According to Allen (2011: 
22), “violent behaviour is the outcome of frustration, a condition or situation where legitimate 
desires of people (or an individual) are denied directly or indirectly because of the structure 
of the society or the political system”. The violence may be an action or an inaction, that 
awaken feelings of injustice, frustration, denial etc. Such violence may be directed at the 
persons or institutions that are perceived to be directly or indirectly denied the prospect of 
self-actualization or the realization of one’s potential.  Accordingly, the forces responsible for 
people’s failure in the realisation of their potential could be either personal or structural. The 
next section expatiates on the personal and structural forms of violence.  
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2.4. Personal and structural violence 
 
Building on the discussion of violence, the element of personal and structural dimensions of 
violence are the various forms of the manifestation of violence in a society. Some writers opt 
for concepts such as direct and indirect violence in the analysis of the same realities. Personal 
(also known as direct) violence is “when means of realization (of a goal, potential etc) are 
directly destroyed” (Galtung 1969: 169). This is the manifestation of a form of violence that 
is directed at individuals. Hence, when the act of killing takes place, a serious act of violence 
is committed against the diseased. Galtung (ibid) holds that “direct violence is inherent in the 
hurting of person since it certainly puts his actual somatic realization below his potential 
somatic realization38”.   
 
Prior to the Galtung’s publication of “Violence, Peace and Peace Research, most academic 
debates and writings about violence primarily attributed violence with direct violence, or 
violence as an intended human act, quick in execution. Galtung, during the course of his 
peace research, discovered that there were others  forms of violence in which human lives 
were being taken but sometimes, not as quickly as direct violence. This was expressed in his 
view that “human lives were nevertheless wasted through hunger and inadequate protection 
from the hazards of the environment. However, since this violence was not directly exercised 
another concept and approach to violence was needed, and the category of structural violence 
served some of that purpose” (Galtung 1969 :164). Structural violence (also known as 
indirect violence) is a form of violence that has no actor or face that commits violence against 
other(s) (Galtung 1969: 168). Anderson (2004: 107) was more explicit in his definition; he 
defined structural violence as “those social, economic and political conditions embedded in 
the social structure that systematically contributes to violence, inequality, injustice, or lack of 
access to social services that contribute to death, poor health, or repression of individuals or 
groups of individuals within a society”. Some of the conditions and forces that accelerate 
such violence include poverty, illiteracy and insecurity. These conditions are what Galtung 
(1969) illustrates as social injustice.  
 
                                                 
38
 Within the context of this discourse, somatic realizat ion represents the attainment of individual and communal 
tangible goals and objectives. Embedded in the direct violence therefore is the straightforward destruction of the 
means to the realizat ion of the somatic values, objectives and goals.  
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 Glasl (1999) further discusses violent conflict as  
 
[an] interaction involving at least two parties (individuals, groups, states) with at least one 
party experiencing differences (distinctions, contradictions, incompatibilities, etc.) in 
perception, thinking, imagination, interpretation, feeling (sympathy – aversion, trust – 
mistrust) and desires (needs, objectives, purposes, goals) to the other party in such a way as to 
make them feel that the potential for the realisation of their ideas is affected.  
 
This comprehension of violent conflict presents a suitable blend of the violence and conflict 
discussed thus far. It suggests the fact that some conflict may not be oriented towards 
violence and such conflicts may be necessary for human and social development. However, 
conflict become unsettling when they are violent – threatening the actualisation of potentials.  
 
While conflict could either assume an intrapersonal or interpersonal mode, it is also a 
complex reality involving multiple parties, for a variety of reasons. Depending on the 
dominant character of a particular conflict, it could be categorised as religious, ethnic, social 
or political. Scholarly debates and explorations, however, indicate that violent conflicts are 
often a web of ethnic, religious and political elements, rather than a solitary characteristic 
(Harrison 2003: 11). Some studies hastily attribute a singular causal factor to conflict. For 
instance, in Barnes-Holmes et al’s (2010: 55) reference to Irish historians and scholars John 
Hickey (1989) and Conor Cruise O’Brien (1994), highlight religious and doctrinal differences 
among Roman Catholics and Protestants as the primary causes of the Northern Ireland 
conflict39. Similarly, Kalyvas and Sambanis (2005:191), in their analysis of the origin and 
causes of the violent dimension of the Bosnian conflict, reduce the incident to ethnic conflict. 
This emerged from their conclusion that ethnicity played a significant role in the conflict.  
 
While genuine effort is being made to better comprehend conflict and its causes, there is a 
need to underscore the multifaceted nature of most conflicts. Contemporary violent conflicts 
are seldom understood or addressed from a solitary approach; rather they are simultaneously 
categorised and studied from multiple dimensions. Harrison (2003: 11) made this very clear 
in his assertion that there is no way that religion and politics could be kept separate or 
religion regarded as merely private. Similarly, politics, religion and ethnicity cannot be 
detached from each other in an analysis of conflict. A closer look at the above-mentioned 
                                                 
39
 The conflict between Protestants and Catholics over dominance of political power  
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conflicts reveals other dimensions to these conflicts beyond the conclusions of the referenced 
scholars. The Northern Ireland unrest for instance, may be largely religious in nature, but it is 
nonetheless equally political, given the conflicting parties’ competing interests for political 
dominance in the country.  Scholarly and holistic explorations of conflict, therefore, ought to 
account for these possible dimensions and how they interact in a conflict.  
 
Similar to other conflicts, the violence in Jos can be explored from multiple dimensions. Over 
the years, it has been categorised as both ethnic, religious and political conflict. Given the 
varied characteristics of the causes and agents40 of Jos conflicts, it is acknowledged that a 
strong argument could be made in favour of any of these categories. This study, however, 
does not yield to arguments in favour of any particular category in isolation of others; neither 
would it attempt to introduce, nor argue for other categories. Rather the study adopts the 
stance that the Jos conflicts cannot be labelled with a specific category, independent of other 
categories. It shall be made clear in the subsequent chapters of this thesis, that Jos conflict is 
composed of a web of actors, characters and dimensions. Entrenched in the conflict is the 
deep friction between the indigenes and non- indigenes over the ownership of Jos and the 
occupation of key political positions (Danfulani n.d.).  
 
2.5. Youths and violent conflicts 
 
The youth play significant roles in the planning and execution of violent acts in moments of 
conflict. Their activism, leading to the escalation of conflict, is a subject that has received 
somewhat close attention from scholars and practitioners across various fields, especially in 
conflict and peace studies. Conflict as a phenomenon is a reality that applies to all societies, 
regardless of race, gender, nationality, social or economic background. Scholarly discussions 
of conflict around the globe highlight the relentless contribution and involvement of youth in 
the escalation of violent conflicts. However, before delving into the explication of youth 
engagement in violent conflicts, effort is made to exhaustively scrutinize youth as a concept 
and its diverse understanding across different societies.  
 
                                                 
40
 Some of these we shall exp lore in the third chapter of this thesis. 
 
 
63 
 
2.5.1. Conceptual definition of youth 
 
The term “youth” is an everyday concept, yet, its fluid conception necessitates a clarification 
of what it denotes in this research study. The concept of “youth” is a social construct and its 
comprehension is shaped by the historical, economic and cultural realities of people. Just like 
many other social constructs or phenomena, its understanding varies from society to society. 
Several international organisations limit their understanding of the youth-category to the 
chronological age differences. The United Nation’s World Youth Report and World Health 
Organization, corresponding to the UN Secretary General’s first definition of youth, conceive 
youth in the light of their biological and chronological progression such as people from 15 to 
24 years old. (UN World Youth Report 2003:74). In the same vein, the Population Reference 
Bureau (2016) and Nigeria’s National Youth Policy document (2001), also using the age 
yardstick, regard people within the age of 10 to 24 and 14 to 35 years old, respectively, as 
youths. This chronological comprehension of youth, as an exclusive and identifiable category 
in the age progression of people, delineates the complexities in wrestling with other fluid 
realities and variables in the effort to better understand the concept. This perception of youth 
implies that a person’s classification within this age bracket affirm the youthfulness of such a 
person(s) irrespective of other variables and realities around such a person.  
 
Although this understanding of youth is quite straight forward, it nevertheless runs the risk o f 
undermining other socio-cultural dimensions and realities in other understandings of youth. 
With some sensitivity to the relevance of such socio-cultural components in the explication of 
youth, there is a gradual openness and acceptance of a broader appreciation of youth. 
UNESCO41 for instance, holds that “youth is best understood as a period of transition from 
the dependence of childhood to adulthood’s independence and an awareness of our 
interdependence as members of a community”. As it shall be further espoused, a broader 
appreciation of youth accommodates other relevant variables needed for a robust 
comprehension of youth.  
  
                                                 
41
 UNESCO’s engagement with the concept of youth in their attempt to enhance peaceful co -existence alluded 
to their disposition to and adoption of Members State’s or local specific understanding of youth 
(http://www.unesco.org/new/en/social-and-human-sciences/themes/youth/youth-definition/)  
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Unlike the biological and age-defined representations of youth’s understanding, which 
present a narrow and limited categorisation of youth, alternative views via the lens of socio-
cultural realities expound other vital points of reference in the discourse and comprehension 
of youth. In some societies, a person’s categorisation as youth or not depends on how far a 
person complies with the socio-cultural expectations of the society within which he or she 
lives (UNDP Jordan Human Development Report, 2000).  Hence, such societies consider 
people in their late thirties and early forties who lack and/or are yet to meet certain socio-
cultural expectations such as education, employment, initiation/rites of passage and family as 
youth, while youngsters in their mid-twenties (and below) who are successful in these areas 
of life are readily considered as adults. It is on this note, that Bucholtz (2002: 526) posits that, 
“in a given culture, preadolescent individuals may count as youth, while those 30s or 40s may 
also be included in this category. Hence, from the socio-cultural perspective, youthfulness 
often marks the beginning of a long-term, even lifelong, engagement in cultural practices, 
whether its practitioners continue to be included in a category or not”. A somewhat detailed 
explication of the socio-cultural comprehension of youth and their initiation or rites of 
passage to adulthood is articulated by Mazama (2016) in her discourse of African religion. 
Below is an extract (though improved by the researcher) of Mazama’s discourse relative to 
the conception of youth in Africa: 
 
The culturally oriented societies require that youth must die to their child self in order to be 
reborn into an adult self, one characterized by greater knowledge of the world, deeper 
consciousness, insight and wisdom. This entails the projection of youth as a category of a 
society without profound consciousness or wisdom relevant for a holistic appreciation of a 
society and its peoples. The notions of symbolic death and resurrection are therefore central to 
the youth’s rite of passage from youth-hood to adulthood as a symbolic expression of doing 
away with the youthful qualities while embracing and assuming the ideal qualities of adults in 
the society ... Initiation rites vary from community to community. However, they follow a 
general pattern. The first step is the separation of a group of adolescent novices from their 
usual surroundings to be secluded in an isolated place away from the community. There, they 
will be tested and taught by elders. The testing usually involves demonstrating physical 
endurance, mental strength, and intelligence. It is often the time when males are circumcised 
and females excised. They must undergo the whole operation without showing any sign of 
fear and without expressing any discomfort. Failure to demonstrate fortitude would bring 
shame and dishonour to them and their family. 
 
Among the people of Southern African communities, the Zulu, Xhosa and Ndebele nations 
are renowned enthusiasts of the cultural rites of passage from youth to adulthood. These 
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cultures’ categorisation of young people is inherently informed by whether or not the person 
has undergone the rites of passage to adulthood. Initiation rites usually involve forms of 
physical testing, seclusion, metaphorical death and rebirth and the demonstration of fitness 
for masculine approbation (Silverman 2004 found in Boys will be Boys (2008: 434). As 
Mazama further notes:  
 
After the period of seclusion is over, the initiates are reincorporated into their 
community, and this marks the time of their rebirth. Their hair may be shaved off, 
their old clothes may be thrown away, and they may receive new names, all symbolic 
gestures indicating that they have become new, mature individuals.  
 
Hence an in-depth appreciation of such rites of passage and their processes offer some degree 
of clarity into the transforming roles of the initiates.  
 
Among the Masai, for instance, the Eunoto ceremony, which lasts for a whole week, is the 
rite of passage that marks the transition from childhood into adulthood for males. This 
elaborate ceremony marks the end of a relatively carefree life and the beginning of greater 
responsibilities. The initiates are then expected to watch over the community's cattle (which 
are highly regarded as God's unique gift to the Masai), participate in cattle raids, and kill a 
lion. At the end of the Eunoto ceremony, the young man's ha ir is shaved, thus formally 
indicating the passage to manhood. In addition to having their hair shaved, they also have 
their skin painted with ochre in preparation for marriage. They then marry and start families.  
 
In Hammar and Karo societies, a youth does not enter manhood until he performs the 
ceremony known as the "Jumping of the Bull". If he completes this test of jumping of the bull 
without faltering, he earns the right to be called a man. Among the Twa, when a girl's first 
menses appear, which is considered a special blessing, the girl participates in a rite of passage 
known as Elima. Secluded in a house for at least a month with other girls who have also just 
started menstruating, the Twa girl is instructed by an adult woman about being a Twa 
woman. She is taught, among other things, the history of her people and how to be a good 
mother and a good wife. When the instruction is over, the girls come out dancing, and the 
whole community takes part in the Elima festivities. Having been properly instructed and 
trained, the girls are now eligible for marriage. Among the Anlo-Ewe people, female puberty 
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rites are known as Nugbeto. Like everywhere else in Africa, they are communal and provide 
the forum within which young women learn about the social responsibilities that come with 
womanhood. Highly regarded older women, who share and impart their wisdom and life 
experiences onto the young women under their care, conduct Nugbeto rites. 
 
In summary, the constructivist comprehension of youth and their transition to adulthood may 
vary from culture to culture and from society to society. However, the enduring denominator 
that runs through the aforementioned socio-cultural understanding is their insubordination to 
the age categorisation of youth. The successful fulfilment of the standard socio-cultural rites 
of passage is crucial and vital in the acknowledgement of people’s transition to adulthood.   
 
Although the socio-cultural component in the classification and understanding of youth 
enriches one’s comprehension of this category, it is nevertheless blurry in certain situations. 
For example, the socio-cultural yardsticks and rites of passage as illustrated above complicate 
the categorisation of a 17-year old married male who is unemployed, uneducated and unable 
to live-up to the expectations and responsibilities of a married man in his community. It 
might be difficult to categorise such an individual in some societies, bearing in mind the 
stated distinctions and expectations of youth and adulthood in most African societ ies. This 
becomes even more difficult where a person advanced in age (in the bracket of 40 years or 
more) is yet to undergo the relevant rites of passage according to the cultural norms of his or 
her people. Inconsistencies of this nature make any universal understanding of the term 
“youth” even within the socio-cultural dimension somewhat difficult to achieve.  
 
The differences in the various comprehensions of youth as a category are strongly informed 
by chronological42 facts and the functional43 and cultural44 requirements and expectations of 
people in a society. The undisputed understanding, however, is that youth is an intermediate 
class gradually adopting the status of an adult. The complexity of understanding youth as a 
stage of human development greatly lies in the reconciliation of the chronological, the 
functional and cultural components of this category, since they vary from society to society. 
                                                 
42
 “A period of age between certain ages” (UNDP 2006: 15)  
43
 This “involves a period of transition from childhood to adulthood, marked by rituals or physical changes” 
(Ibid). 
44
 “Pertains to the roles individuals play in a given social context” (Ibid). 
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Youth in Western society is primarily defined by age, while most African countries and some 
countries in the southern hemisphere hold a great appreciation for the functional and cultural 
implications in their comprehension of youth.  
 
Owing to the disparity in the definition of youth and the focus of this study, this study limits 
its definition of youth to people of all sexes between 18 and 35 years of age, as defined in the 
Nigeria National Youth Policy (2001). The socio-cultural and constructivist approach to 
youth as explicated above are endowed with enormous benefits in the scholarly discourse of 
youth. Regardless of such benefits, the constructivist approach to the comprehension of youth 
potentially opens up uncertainty and reservations about categories of people that are 
chronologically considered as adult but simultaneously suit the understanding of youth from 
the socio-cultural (or constructivist) perspective. This is easily applicable to a 50 years old 
individual who corresponds with a people’s socio-cultural understanding of youth. Secondly, 
the adoption of chronological approach to youth does not undermine the constructivist 
benefits of youth in scholarly discourse, rather it’s adoption serves to clarify youth as adopted 
within the context of this study. Accordingly, the concept of youth, within the context of this 
study, means a person in the abovementioned age bracket, irrespective of other social or 
cultural status.  
 
2.5.2. Youths engagement in violent conflicts 
 
Kustrin (2004: 131), in his reflection of Europe’s political upheaval of the 1930s, 
acknowledges the notorious use of violence by the youth in society. Kustrin emphasised the 
case of the Spanish Second Republic that saw a bizarre form of political mobilisation, in 
which violence was a prominent tool. Political violence was strongly justified by the public 
media in this era of Spanish history. As Kustrin (2004: 136) stressed, “On 4 November 1933, 
Renovacion  proposed that fascism had to be fought on its own territory – and with violence. 
Youth were exhorted to take up the fight...” Violence was deemed instrumental in the 
achievement of political and social objectives and young people were considered very 
important in this process. Their roles as demonstrators and activists in the recent Spanish 
crisis reiterate their significance in both conflict outbreak and conflict management. The high 
level of their involvement in Spain’s 2012 agitation for economic enhancement, however 
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nonviolent, once again demonstrates the significance of the youth in political and economic 
campaigns and demonstrations. Brett, Rachel and Margaret McCallin (1996), in their study of 
the Northern Ireland conflict, provide a statistical representation of youth involvement in 
violent conflict, with the claim that “23% of young men have been victims of sectarian 
assaults and are also more often the perpetrators of such attacks”. This was becoming a trend 
in the long- lasting clashes in Northern Ireland between the Catholics and Protestants sects.  
 
Unlike in Europe, where the involvement of the youth in conflict is predominantly political in 
nature, their involvement takes the form of gangsterism in Latin American communities. 
Booth (1974: 657) was of the opinion in his assertion that the wave of political conflict in 
Colombia between 1963 and 1974, which “embraced the dimension of guerrilla warfare, 
assassination, extortion, torture, and mass murder, was so intense that it became synonymous 
with its generic name la violencia”. Irrespective of the highly political nature45 of la 
violencia, researchers still consider it a composite of two separate conflicts. In Booth’s view 
(1974: 675), one of the conflicts emerged from allegiance to a political party, while the other 
was apolitical to a certain extent, involving banditry and gangsterism. Bailey’s (1995) 
findings support Booth’s (1974) opinion that la violencia was entirely in the hands of a 
highly-organised and institutionalised consortium of rural bandits and urban gangsters. These 
findings reveal the depth of the involvement of the youth in violent conflict. They were active 
agents in related political and apolitical conflicts in Europe and America. 
 
On the African continent, Omeje (2006: 22) considers Charles Taylor’s exploitation of the 
vigour of the youth as one of the primary explanations for his successful destabilisation of 
Sierra Leone and gaining access to the country’s diamonds (during the war). Young people in 
the society were Taylor’s tool for the disruption of the society and the acquisition of the 
diamonds. Abdullah (1995: 176) further considers politicians’ marginalisation of the violent 
element of the Rarray boys46, turning them into an electioneering asset (Abdullah 1995: 176). 
They were used as thugs and gangsters during electoral processes. Such exploitation deepens 
the violent and resistive tendencies of youths.  
 
                                                 
45
 It was a conflict between the two political parties: the conservatives and the liberals.  
46
 These were mostly unemployed young males on the edge of society... living by their wits (Abdullah 2005: 
175). 
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This, however, was not different in other parts of Africa. In Nigeria, it is claimed that the 
youth are at the heart of most violent conflicts in the country. According to Omeje (1995: ), 
“empirical studies suggest that the youths are prosecutors of 90-95% of violent conflicts in 
Nigeria”. Though the precision of this claim is open to further debate and scrutiny, the high 
presence of young people in violent conflict cannot be denied. This is reflected in the ever-
growing militia groups such as the Pan Niger Delta Revolutionary Militias (PNDRM), 
Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP), the Ijaw Youth Council (IYC), 
the Ijaw National Congress (INC), the Egbesu Boys of Africa (EBA), the Niger Delta 
Volunteer Force (NDVF), the Ijaw Nationality Rights Protection Organisation (INRPO), the 
Ogoni Patriotic Union (OPU) in Nigeria (Ojakorotu and Uzodike, 2006) and more recently 
the Avengers of Niger Delta. Some of these groups have become synonymous with young 
people, due to their dominance and active participation in such movements and violent 
conflicts in Nigeria. Over and above this, Ukiwo (2003:125) draws attention to the young 
people as key actors in the escalation of violent conflict in Nigeria. He reveals how, in the 
2001, the Jos and Kaduna crises deepened as Muslim youths took to the streets in celebration 
of the 11th of September terrorist attack on the United States. This celebration degenerated 
into riots, leaving hundreds dead, after a retaliatory attack by the United States on 
Afghanistan. A reflection on such events of youth participation in conflicts draws attention to 
the ease with which young people can be lured into violence. This is equally reflected in a 
WHO’s study, World Report on Violence and Health which offered a summary and profile of 
youth and violence through their focus on the culture of youth gangs. 
 
Youth gangs are in all regions of the world. Although their size and nature may vary 
greatly from mainly social grouping to organized criminal network, they all seem to 
answer a basic need to belong to a group and create a self-identity. In the Western 
Cape region of South Africa, there are about 90 000 members of gangs, while in 
Guam, some 110 permanent gangs were recorded in 1993, around 30 of them hard-
core gangs. In Port Moresby, Papua New Guinea, four large criminal associations with 
numerous subgroups have been reported. There are an estimated 30 000--35 000 gang 
members in El Salvador and a similar number in Honduras, while in the United States, 
some 31 000 gangs were operating in 1996 in about 4800 cities and towns. In Europe, 
gangs exist to varying extents across the continent, and are particularly strong in those 
countries in economic transition such as the Russian Federation. Gangs are primarily a 
male phenomenon, though in countries such as the United States, girls are forming 
their own gangs. Gang members can range in age from 7 to 35 years, but typically are 
in their teens or early twenties … Gangs seem to proliferate in places where the 
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established social order has broken down and where alternative forms of shared 
cultural behaviour are lacking. (WHO 2002: 35).  
 
Despite the one-dimensional47 approach of the above extract bearing in mind its singular 
focus on youth-gangsterism, it clearly accentuates the perceived 48 relationship between youth 
and violence. The association of gangsters is a phenomenon that is common amongst the 
youth with findings from the World Health Organisation’s study that noted that gangs are 
associated with violent behaviour. Consequently, the youth are easily associated with violent 
behaviour. Additionally, the extract throws some light on a couple of factors that are 
responsible for the easy disposition of youth to identify with and be members of gangs 
resulting in their violence activities. Included in these factors are the social marginalisation of 
youth, the obliteration of established social order, lack of opportunity for social or economic 
mobility, a deterioration of local enforcement of law and order and so forth. These 
highlighted factors shall be further discoursed within broader subject matters in the next 
section.  
 
2.5.3. Primary causes of youth involvement in violent conflicts 
 
Together with the youth’s involvement in violent conflicts, a variety of studies have been 
done in the effort to comprehend the factors responsible for the high representation of youth 
in violence. Large collections of available literature champion the view that the availability of 
youth bulges was the primary factor responsible for their participation in violent conflicts. 
Other authors and reputable Non-Governmental Organizations such as the Search for 
Common Ground and World Bank consider factors such as marginalization, gradual 
eradication of existing social order, a dearth of economic opportunities and social mobility 
and the deterioration of law enforcement as other contributing factors that explain the youth’s 
disposition and participation in violent conflicts.   
 
                                                 
47
 It is considered one dimensional on the basis that it focuses just on a single dimension or instrument of youth 
violence. It is worthy of emphasis that not all youth violence are gang related; however, the engulfing nature of 
this trend (gangsterism) makes it noteworthy in this thesis .  
48
 The concept “perceived” as employed here serves to underscore the view that youth -violence relationship is a 
human construct that is borne out of human experiences of youth over the years. Hence the articulation of such 
relationship does not accord any undue credit to proponents and ideologies that propagates youth’s inherent 
disposition to violence.  
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Although the term “youth bulge” was coined in the mid-1990s’, it has received wide 
recognition. Scholars such as Goldstone (1991, 2002), Collier (2000) and LaGraffe (2012) 
are strong proponents of the youth bulge arguments. Goldstone (2002:10-11), in the study 
“Population and Security: How Demographic Change Can Lead to Violent Conflict” argues 
that the swift escalation of a youth population does undermine existing political coalitions, 
resulting in in-stability. Regarding the high presence of youth in the English Revolution of 
the seventeenth century, the French revolution of the eighteenth century and most twentieth-
century revolutions in developing countries, Goldstone establishes the unhealthy relationship 
between youth bulge and violent conflicts. He asserts that “youth have played a prominent 
role in political violence throughout recorded history, and the existence of a "youth bulge" (a 
unusually high proportion of youths 15 to 24 relative to the total adult population) has 
historically been associated with times of political crisis” (2002:10-11). LaGraffe (2012: 67) 
echoed a similar view in his claim that “the youth bulge is a demographic phenomenon 
strongly connected to security challenges”.  
 
It is apparent that the strong presence of youth in violent conflicts cannot be reb uffed; it is 
nevertheless worth mentioning that the establishment of the direct correlation of youth bulge 
with instability and violence is a tedious task. In a study of the African youth bulge via the 
lens of governance, security and culture, Sommers (2011:5) initially expressed this view in 
his critical analysis of youth bulge and the instability theory. He holds that “a correlation 
linking a disproportionately high number of youth to political instability does not demonstrate 
a causal relationship”. In a similar fashion, Abbink (2005:14) argues, “no natural inclination 
of youth to behave violently can explain their presence in socially destructive move ments. 
The breakdown of a socio-political and moral order in wider society and the degree of 
governability of a certain type of state are more likely to precipitate this”. Contrary to the 
proponents of youth bulge instability suppositions, the availability of a large cohort of the 
young population has yielded a positive impact in other communities. Although the youth 
bulge and instability theory is not considered irrelevant, exceptions reflecting their positive 
impact to economic growth and stability in some other societies question the reliability of a 
direct correlation or connection between excessively high numbers of youth and instability.  
Evidence of such realities draws attention to other (and more pertinent) factors that accounts 
for the strong involvement of the youth in violent conflicts.  
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Unlike the youth bulge assumptions which maintains that the mere presence of “a large youth 
population lowers the recruitment cost for potential rebel and criminal gang leaders” 
(LaGraffe 2002: 67), some other writers including Ahmed (2014) argues that the 
consequences of a youth bulge is subject to the relevance of political and economic realities 
around such youths. This assertion thus suggests that the presence of numerous youths is not 
inherently problematic nor does it have a direct relationship with violent conflict. Rather the 
consequence of the youth bulge is conditional on the disposition of the hosting society to 
either draw on the potency of their presence or not. Bloom and Williamson’s (1998) 
extensive and systematic study of the youth population boom in East Asia brought to light the 
outcome of a society’s ability to effectively utilize the inherent potential of the youth bulge. 
The central point of their argument is that a smaller youth dependency on the state resources 
translates to a relatively higher number of workers, thus contributing positively to the East 
Asian economic miracle. This implies that a society’s ability to draw on the strengths of the 
youth through the various channels available to such a society enhances its ability to 
maximise the positive contribution and impact of the young people in such a society. Positive 
exploitation of youth’s agency will immensely contribute towards the maximisation of 
youth’s aptitudes and abilities. Nevertheless, this could be largely possible when the youth’s 
interaction with structural elements is taken seriously (Abbink 2005).  
 
Although the East Asian countries may have some positive tales about their engagement with 
the reality of a youth bulge in their societies, the same demographic dividends cannot be 
attributed to the youth demographic population increase in the Sub-Saharan Africa and other 
Asian regions. Building on the two dominant and competing (however not mutually 
exclusive) theoretical arguments of opportunity and motive hypothesis, Urdal (2012: 3-4) 
explains some of the secondary factors that problematise the youth bulge. Central to Urdal’s 
analysis of the various factors that heighten a youth bulge’s adoption of violence is the reality 
of their invisibility as public actors (consequent to slow economic growth, education and 
heightened expectation among youths) irrespective of their high representation in the society.    
 
 
 
 
73 
 
2.5.4. Invisibility as Public Actors 
 
The East Asian’s youth bulge success story is frequently employed as a point of reference in 
the ongoing effort to comprehend and harness the dividends of a youth bulge in other parts of 
the globe. Including the various strategies that the East Asian communities employed in their 
maximization of the strength of the youth bulge, was their conscious effort towards the 
realization of the potential embedded in the youth cohort both as individuals and as a group. 
This entails the repositioning of the youth in society through the development and facilitation 
of their leadership skills, business acumen and other self-determining opportunities. In some 
other parts of the world, with emphasis on the developing countries, a youth bulge rather than 
being a strategic instrument for development, has repeatedly been perceived as a threat to 
stability due to the indisposition or inability of political leaders and structures to create a 
thriving environment for their dividends. It is a common argument that youth are not offered 
adequate channels for their self-determination either via a high rate of unemployment or a 
deficient educational system. Tlou (2014) affirmed this view in the assertion that “the reason 
why there is a correlation between a high youth population and higher risk of violence is 
because the ageing leadership is reluctant to give opportunities to younger and [sometimes 
more] educated people”. Consequently, the youth are pushed to the margin, thus unable to 
actualize their potential and fulfil their rights as relevant actors in their societies. In T lou’s 
(2014) view, any effort towards their self-determination is regarded as an act of rebellion, 
leading in some cases to incarceration, treason or worse. Such realities, especially in 
developing countries have left more than 90% of youth to believe that they can only 
effectively express their grievances through violence (Corps, 2015).  
 
In two separate studies, Ngwane (2014) and Mulderig (2013) alluded to the reality of a youth 
bulge and the societal challenges that serve as a bedrock for the easy radica lization of a large 
youth population. Ngwane (2014) draws attention to the growing perception that disgruntled 
South African youths are increasingly becoming convinced that violence is the last resort that 
can attract the attention of relevant stakeholders to their plight. It is worth mentioning also 
that this idea is historically supported by the fact that “the youth get some response from the 
state when they demonstrate, protest, burn tires and eventually shed blood”. The South 
African xenophobic violence between the year 2008 and 2015 and the ongoing “fees must 
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fall” protests are evidence of selected youth’s easy adoption of violence as their final 
instruments for the expression of their grievances and to be visible public actor s in South 
Africa.  
 
Similarly, the unison of deep-seated societal ills and a youth bulge was one of the various 
possible explanations for the intensity and impact of the Arab Spring (Gat 2017 and Paciello 
and Pioppi 2018). According to LaGraffe (2012: 72) in the study title, Youth Bulge in Egypt: 
An Intersection of Demographics, Security, and the Arab Spring, he noted that “The Middle 
East is endowed with one of the youngest populations in the world; the population under the 
age of fifteen is over 33 percent. Most individual nations in the region have youth cohorts 
under the age of twenty- four that account for over half of their population”. LaGraffe (2012) 
went further to lay emphasis on the claim that “The Middle East claims one of the highest 
unemployment rates in the world with the youth populations experiencing a combination of 
economic hardship and too few political venues for voicing grievances”. As previously 
observed, the coming together of these realities of youth bulge and the various weaknesses, 
challenges and inadequate governance and management of state resources creates a perfect 
platform for abuse and misuse of the inherent strength and potency of youth bulge. It is in the 
light of these arguments that Mulderig (2013: 4) argues “that the contagion of the Arab 
Spring revolutions was largely caused by the realization of youth in Egypt, Libya, Syria, and 
elsewhere that their generation was living in an undignified subliminal state of pre-adulthood, 
and that the possibility of demanding access to education, jobs, and marriage was open to all 
Arab youth”.  
 
Having acknowledged and engaged with the reality and challenge of youth’s invis ibility as 
public actors, it is necessary to demystify specific factors that actively contribute towards the 
marginal status of the youth in most societies. A review of available literature on youth bulge, 
violence and instability identify the decline in economic growth, unemployment, education, 
urbanization and heightened expectations amongst the youth as the principal issues that 
render the youth invisible and thus, negating the potency of youth bulge.  
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2.5.5. Decline in Economic Growth and Unemployment 
 
Urdal’s (2012) citation of Braungart (1984:16) identifies unemployment in any society as a 
weakness and challenge to the legitimacy and stability o f that society’s political system. He 
holds that “such conditions produce a climate of radicalism particularly among unattached 
youth who have the least to lose in the gamble and struggle for revolutionary gain”. In the 
same vein, Collier (2000: 94) argues that “the willingness of young men [and women] to join 
a rebellion depends on their income-earning opportunities. If young people are left with no 
alternative but unemployment and poverty, they are likely to join a rebellion as an alternative 
way of generating an income”. One of the central points in these arguments is the pertinent 
relationship between unemployment and youth violence, not necessary youth bulge.  
 
It is also commonly known that an increase in population consequently results in the higher 
demands for goods and services, employment and social amenities and securities. An increase 
in the youth population has the same implications in any given society. The inability of a 
society to provide and ensure social assimilation and integration for this growing category of 
citizens in a society will undeniably have negative consequences in such societies. It is the 
trend across the globe that the reality of the youth bulge, often, results in the intensification of 
unemployment amongst a significant proportion of young adults in countries and societies 
that are unsuccessful in meeting or addressing the increasing demand for services due to the 
rising presence of youth in society. A further reference to the recent incidents of xenophobic 
violence, perpetuated by some of the South African youth, clearly illustrates this view. 
Narratives hold that some South African youth have become violent against immigrants with 
a common justification held by perpetrators and the public alike which is “they [foreigners) 
are taking our jobs and our women (Fuller 2008:9)”. Similarly, in a very recent study Akinola 
(2018: 9739-9740) unambiguously asserts, “violence has been entrenched as a means of 
political participation or creation of public awareness. Many South Africans perceive the 
influx of immigrants as a threat to their socio-economic attainments, thereby prompting them 
to resort to anti- immigration attitudes and behaviour to enforce the expulsion of ‘the others’ 
from their midst”. Abdelkarim (2017), Akinola (2014), Malueke (2015), and Williams 
(2008), maintain the view that South African’s economic expectations and perceived threats 
of the influx of immigrants explains the incidents of xenophobia in the country, which came 
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to the fore with the 2008 violent attacks on foreign nationals. Williams (2008: 4) for instance 
argues that  
 
“many South Africans continue to have high expectations of economic and social 
delivery following the advent of democracy. That these expectations have not been 
met in terms of the scale and rate at which might have been anticipated, is a fact that 
has been acknowledged. Many South Africans continue to be unemployed and poor, 
with little or no access to basic social, health and welfare services ... In the past, it was 
possible to blame poverty and the lack of development on a government that was 
unrepresentative and illegitimate. This is no longer the case and, as happens in many 
countries across the world, foreigners are often a scapegoat for taking away 
opportunities from South Africans”. 
 
Williams’ view establishes that in addition to the frustration emerging from the youth’s 
absence from the public spheres as actors capable of influencing public policies and decisions 
are the accompanying irritations and disgruntlement with their lack of ability to meet their 
economic challenges. An inherent implication of both Braungart’s and Collier’s views as 
expressed above is that the reality of large-scale unemployment either amongst certain 
categories of people or in an entire society, volatilizes such a society. Furthermore, the 
volatility and explosive characteristics of societies increase in intensity with the combination 
of a deteriorating economy, high unemployment and youth bulge. This view is apparently 
held by the global business and public sector leaders having dominated their debate in the 
recently held panel discussion in Davos, Switzerland. The panel discussion that was made up 
of top business minds such as Aliko Dangote (the wealthiest African), Fatima Muneer, 
Dominic Barton (Global Managing Director, McKinsey and Company) who bemoan the 
perception that “youth unemployment is more of a cocktail conversation right now”. They 
went further to assert the need to start considering youth unemployment as a pandemic and 
attend to it as such. According to Dominic Barton, youth unemployment around the world is 
growing in an uncomfortable proportion. He asserts that “In India ... 75 million youth are 
unemployed; in Saudi Arabia, some 70 percent of the population is under the age of 30 and 
they are not finding jobs; while in Nigeria youth unemployment is as high as 50%”. Such 
profound unemployment, which Hilker and Frazer (2009: 23), considers to be three times 
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higher than adults’ serves as a fertile condition for youths’ adoption of violence over other 
channels of self-actualisation and expression of their grievances.  
 
2.5.6. Educational attainment: heightened expectations among youth and 
urbanisation  
 
The overriding perception of education in conflict and peace literature is that educated 
citizens (specifically youth) or increased education reduces the volatility of a state or society 
to violence. This, in simple terms, suggests that the more educated people are, the less likely 
their disposition to join rebellious groups or adopt violence as the medium to address ing 
issues. Informed by this viewpoint, Barakat and Urdal (2009:5) in their study of the 
relationship between a youth bulge and political violence conclude that “countries that invest 
less in secondary education for young men are more likely to experience armed conflict in the 
context of large youth bulges and that large cohorts of young men with low secondary 
education levels increase the risk of conflict more in low and middle income 
countries...” Although Barakat and Urdal narrowed their findings to young men specifically, 
their argument is equally applicable to societies with large numbers of uneducated young 
men and women, bearing in mind that both sexes participate in violent conflict. 
Corresponding to this view, Collier (2006) maintains that “a country that has 10% more of its 
youth in school-example, 55% rather 45%=decreases its risk of conflict from 14% to 10%.  
 
However apparent these arguments may come across, there is a need to be on the lookout 
against sweeping statements and negligence of other factors that in essence, facilitates 
uneducated youths’ disposition to violence. Hence, like the advocates of the inherent youth 
bulge-violence relationship, this wide-ranging conclusion of the numerical presence of 
uneducated (or less educated) youth and violence is problematic. As aforementioned, it is 
problematic that such arguments have a tendency of undermining other structural issues that 
expose youth to violence. Some of these structural issues are expressed in Barakat’s and 
Urdal’s (2009) extended argument that the likelihood of a large youth cohort engagement in 
conflict is linked to the opportunity structure of the youth cohort in the society. Youths 
perceptions of such opportunity structures are determined by the economic status and 
educational attainment.  
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Some scholars such as Urdal (2012), Barakat and Urdal (2009) and Collier (2006 ) have 
claimed education as a viable approach to addressing the issue of people’s inclination or easy 
adoption of violence. The argument of a high educational attainment’s positive impact on 
people’s aptitude for peace will be brilliant in society where other causal factors are equally 
addressed. It is worth mentioning that an increase in the educated populace consequently 
translates to an increased demand on the state’s limited resources. It is concluded therefore, 
that the “inability of the state to meet its citizen’s increased demands and expectations, 
emanating from the youth’s increased education or the increase of educated people, results in 
increased grievances which could serve as a strong rationale for the adoption of and 
allegiance to violence and rebellion (Collier 2006). It is common knowledge that an increase 
in a person’s level of education simultaneously increases the value and expectation of such a 
person. The increase in the number of educated people therefore leads to an exponential 
increase in people’s expectations and demand on that society’s resources.  
 
With reference to the youth, the states’ failure in addressing their increased demands and 
expectations communicates the subjection of educated youth to a widening gap between their 
expectations and actual outcome. The Economic Commission for Africa’s (ECA) (2005: 170) 
report of the African economy offers a strong concern about the unhealthy correlation 
between the youth labour force and Africa’s economic growth rate. The ECA assert that “the 
youth labour force in Sub-Saharan Africa is projected to grow by 28.2 per cent between 2003 
and 2015 ... This sharp increase in the youth population will boost the supply of young people 
in the labour market, further constraining job creation”. A focus on the South African 
economy in the same study reveals that “a significant number of young people are 
discouraged by an unsuccessful job search and leave the formal workforce entirely. 39 per 
cent of unemployed young South Africans have almost given up actively searching for a job 
and 47.1 per cent gave up because they found no job opportunities in their areas”. A pertinent 
question that requires some form of response may be: what are the 47.1 per cent that gave up 
on a job search in South Africa currently doing? Although some of the people in this category 
might take the initiative to becoming entrepreneurs in constructive ventures, some others 
among the 47.1 per cent may choose to adopt violence as a means of survival. It is no surprise 
there that Urdal in reference to Kahl’s (1998:103) argument, noted that “the high expectations 
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among educated urban youth in Kenya caused frustration and anti-state grievance when 
unemployment hit this group at the end of the 1980s”. In a similar fashion, Braungart (1984: 
14–15) finds that “the most explosive episode of violence in Sri Lanka (1971) happened in a 
situation with a great increase in youth cohorts in the context of a rapid e xpansion of 
education and rising unemployment.”  
 
These findings do not necessarily deny the positive consequences of increased and improved 
education with respect to peace in the society. Rather, they in fact are in harmony with the 
argument that higher educational attainment in society does reduce the risk of violence. 
However, the question of educational attainment may turn out to be a double-edged causal 
factor in societies without sufficient economic growth to absorb the increased demands and 
expectations by the increased number of educated youth.  
 
2.6. The Emergence of the concept of peace-building: a focus on peace, and its 
building processes 
 
Peace, along with other concepts such as “truth,” “beauty,” and “love” is considered by 
Sandy and Perkins (n.d.), as the most frequently uttered word with multiple comprehensions. 
Like these concepts, there are numerous understandings and definitions of peace. The concept 
is endowed with an inherent ability to simultaneously represent different realities to various 
subjects or viewpoints.  
 
Peace is often considered as a state of tranquillity and quiet. It may be a state of internal or 
psychological tranquillity within a person or amongst a group of people or a state of security 
or freedom from civil disturbance in a nation-state (ISTEP 2009). Akin to concepts such as 
‘truth’ and ‘love’, peace is always employed to express human desire; that which is perceived 
as good and ought to be ultimately pursued. Peace, according to Galtung (1967: 6), “makes 
sense to many people precisely because it corresponds with their experiences and they can 
endow it with the meanings that to them are most important”. This approach to the 
comprehension of peace, according to Galtung (1967), has hardly furthered peace thinking. 
This is on the account that the likelihood of internal tranquillity within a conflict hit society 
evokes an element of inconsistency and difficulties in the systematic analysis of such a serene 
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state of mind in a dreaded socio-political state. Rather, “this approach in the comprehension 
of peace has probably contributed to the widespread idea that peace is something irrational, 
diffuse, intangible, which cannot be researched and hardly even analyzed – like some type of 
nirvana concept” (Galtung 1967: 6).  
 
The repositioning and improvement of peace-building processes in places like Jos 
necessitated a well-articulated conception of peace and the redefinition of its processes. This 
study upholds that efforts devoted to advancing a clear understanding of peace and its 
processes ought to address issues of human rights, social justice, employment opportunities 
and civic participation in relation to the youth category in society. Going forward therefore, 
some of these highlighted criteria shall guide our exploration of peace and its building 
processes. 
 
Renowned peace scholars such as Johan Galtung (1967), John Paul Lederach (1997), Bonisch 
(1981) and Schmidt and Kochan (1972) made some effort in offering much needed clarity 
with respect to the comprehension of peace. Johan Galtung (1967), a leading figure in peace 
studies, highlights different impressions of peace. He begins with an illustration of a long-
standing idea of peace as a synonym for stability or equilibrium. This conception of peace 
was widely embraced, as it sits well with the psychological/religious perceptions of peace 
which relate to the internal state of a human person. Some of the primary features of such 
perceptions are their subjectivity and compatibility with violence, given that an individual 
could be very stable or “at peace” inwardly, while submerged in a violent, conflict and tense 
environment. He further expounded this concept in the prelude to the first edition of the 
Journal of Peace Research (1969), where he engages the concept from two perspectives: 
negative and positive peace. 
 
Negative peace, he depicts as the “absence of organized or collective violence”.  It is “the 
absence of organized collective violence ... between major human groups; particularly 
nations, but also between classes and between rac ial and ethnic groups” (Galtung 1967: 2 and 
12). Within this school of thought, the end to violence is the supreme goal of peace 
initiatives, without much interest in scrutinizing the means to achieving this goal. Historical 
facts point to military actions as the default preference by national governments in an effort 
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to keep the peace. Such actions are, often, state-centric, with little or no interest in the welfare 
of the people. According to Richmond (2001), “the pluralist world-society/human-needs’ 
school argued that such state-centric approaches only replicate the very issues at the roots of 
the conflict and pointed to the need to include citizens in bottom-up peace processes”. 
Though inadequate, the principle of negative peace cannot be utterly undermined, given that 
absence of violence is a pre-requisite condition for the implementation of peace-building 
activities and the realisation of sustainable peace.  
 
“The essence of a true peace-building process, whether traditional or Western, is to attain 
durable or sustainable peace that can stand the test of time, irrespective of turbulences in any 
particular society” (Udofia 2011). Attainment of such sustainable peace can be scarcely 
realized within the framework of the negative peace, due to its inability to mount a viable 
campaign for establishment of sustainable peace-building mechanisms. Galtung and Fischer 
(2013) note (and I concur) that “the reduction of violence [or its absence as reflected in the 
negative peace theory] is a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for peace”. This is partly 
because a negative peace approach has not succeeded in drawing an adequate line between 
violence and other forms of behaviour. The threshold line of violence is, for instance, yet to 
be made clear in the chastisement of a child or student. The presence of violence or its 
absence in such a scenario would be a product of one’s subjective judgement, which of 
course, comes with its implications. This element of the negative peace makes the idea of 
positive peace a more appealing option in the quest for sustainable peace in society.  
 
Positive peace is understood as “the integration of human society” in harmony (Galtung 
1964). This idea of positive and negative peace was inspired by the health-disease interplay 
in health sciences. From the ‘negative’ perspective, health is understood as the absence of 
diseases; while it is also construed positively as making the body capable of resisting diseases 
(Galtung 1985). In like manner, positive peace aims at the prevention of vio lent conflicts 
through the integration of human society in all its dimensions.  
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Figure 3: Galtung’s perspectives of violence and peace  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Adapted from Grewal (2003) 
 
The idea of integration of human society introduces a paradigm shift, in the discourse of 
peace, from the mere absence of somatic or direct violence, which could be achieved via 
military deployment, to the absence of structural violence in all its forms as simplified in the 
figure 1 above. It is reasoned that positive peace is the “presence of the conditions for a just 
and sustainable peace, including access to food and clean drinking water, education for 
women and children, security from physical harm, and other inviolable human rights” 
(Anderson 2004: 106-7). Sustainable peace-building endeavours, therefore, ought to be 
guided by the principles of positive peace.  
 
2.6.1. The evolving nature of the concept - peace-building 
 
The idea of peace-building was pioneered by the United Nation’s (UN) former Secreta ry-
General, Boutros-Ghali, in his report – An Agenda for Peace – (1992). In this report, 
Boutros-Ghali proposed a couple of strategies through which the UN could manage and deal 
with issues of contemporary conflicts around the globe. Envisaged strategies in his proposal 
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include concepts such as preventive diplomacy49, peace-making50, peacekeeping51 and post-
conflict peace-building (Boutros–Ghali 1992: Par 20). It is understandable to consider 
Boutros-Ghali’s report as the revelation of the idea of peace-building in modern-day politics. 
Despite the significance of his contribution to wide acceptance of peace-building as a strategy 
for a harmonious society, it is still worth noting that the genesis of the peace-building 
discourse could be dated back to The Hague peace conference in 1899. According to 
Paffenholz and Spurk (2006: 16), the fundamental outcome of the conference was the 
acknowledgment of the need to “monitor and support world peace through mediation, 
facilitation, good offices and arbitration between s tates” (also see Paffenholz 1998 and 
2001a). The highlighted elements are core attributes of peace-building endeavours. However, 
the major difference between the Hague’s peace conference’s conception of peace-building 
and Boutros-Ghali’s rests in the place of the non-elite in the peace-building processes. The 
Hague peace conference understood states as key actors in the peace-building process with 
the exclusion of non-state actors (Ibid). Hence, the state was the protagonist in these 
processes.  The uniqueness in Boutros-Ghali’s conception lies in his re-conceptualisation of 
peace-building which makes provision for the identification and integration of non-state 
actors in peace-building processes. It acknowledges the significance of the non-governmental 
entities and the need for a coordinated collaboration between the state and such entities in the 
quest for effective peace-building strategies. This perspective to peace-building has enjoyed a 
widespread appraisal and reasonable effort has been made to comprehend its underlying 
assumptions and principles.  
 
Despite the growing interest in the concept, peace-building remains vaguely construed 
amongst scholars and practitioners. Haugerudbraaten (1998) and Tschirgi (2004) echoed this 
view in their claim, that despite the attention it enjoys, peace-building remains a less-than-
clear concept and that there is no commonly agreed post-conflict peace-building theory. 
Actors ranging from scholars and non-governmental organisations to government personnel 
have made a reasonable effort to develop a simple and unambiguous understanding of the 
                                                 
49
 Preventive diplomacy he defines as “action to prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent 
existing disputes from escalating in  conflicts and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur” (Boutros –
Ghali 1992: Par 20) 
50
 Peacemaking he understands as “action to bring hostile parties to agreement essentially through such peaceful 
means…” (Ibid) 
51
 Peacekeeping is the “deployment of a UN’s presence in the field, hitherto with the consent of all parties 
concerned, normally involving Un military and/or police personnel and frequently civilians as well” (Ibid )  
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concept. Contrary to expectations, the diverse interests and theoretical perspective of the 
various actors has led to greater ambiguity caused by significant differences in the actors’ 
interpretations of the concept. Going forward therefore, there is a need to make sense of the 
various definitions and understandings, while adopting a working definition within the 
context of this thesis. 
 
2.6.2. Demystifying peace-building and its processes 
 
The idea of peace-building has become fashionable in contemporary society for a variety of 
reasons. The reality of recurring violent conflict in a society creates a strong interest from 
international, national and local actors to support communities emerging from civil wars, 
societal breakdowns and a violent past (Barnett, Kim, O’Donnel et al 2007: 42). In some 
other cases, some actors capitalise on the conceptual adaptability52 of peace-building to 
establish their relevance in post-violent conflict activities. This implies that the core mandate 
of organisations influences its comprehension and application (:37). The UN embraced 
Boutros-Ghali’s idea of peace-building in an effort to achieve their objectives, in the UN 
Charter53. Boutros-Ghali considers peace-building activities as “comprehensive efforts to 
identify and support structures which will tend to consolidate peace and advance a sense of 
confidence and well-being among people” (Boutros-Ghali 1992 par 55). The introduction of 
this concept within the UN’s framework expanded the UN’s missions in conflict zones. 
Tschirgi (2004: 3) endorses this view in his assertion that peace-building, within in the 
structure of the UN, was initially understood as an extension of the UN’s existing 
peacekeeping and peace-making responsibilities. Embedded in this understanding was the 
principle that peace-building was an exercise of the elite and a nation-based enterprise. Thus, 
it was often restricted to diplomatic engagements between receptive nations and their 
counterparts. This understanding comes with difficulties, challenges and shortcomings. It 
denies non-elites and indigenous actors in a society the opportunity to participate and make 
meaningful contributions to the processes (Haugerudbraaten 1998: 22). Neither the masses at 
grassroots, level who are the recipients of these services, nor Civil Society Organisations 
                                                 
52
 This means its ability to simultaneously adapt to different understanding, background or viewpoint. It 
signifies the flexib ility of its interpretation.  
53
 UN capable of maintain ing international peace and security, of securing justice and human rights and of 
promoting social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom (Boutros  Boutros Ghali’s 1992 par 3)  
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(CSO) had such privileges. The UN’s adoption of Boutros-Ghali’s idea of peace-building led 
to the broadening of its mandate beyond military actions to include “traditionally defined” 
civilian activities, some of which include mediation, facilitation of reconciliation processes 
etc.  
 
Galtung equally considers peace-building activities as being beyond the state. He underscores 
the point that peace-building “has a structure different from, perhaps over and above, 
peacekeeping and ad hoc peace-making” (Galtung 1976: 297). His line of reasoning proceeds 
from his classification of violent conflict into three forms – direct violence, structural 
violence and cultural violence54 (Galtung 1969).  Unlike the viewpoint, which exclusively 
considers the elite and nationwide activities, peace-building amongst this group of scholars 
strongly relates to conflict prevention and resolution initiatives driven by the non-elite55 class. 
They also consider social, psychological and religious-oriented programmes to be essential in 
peace-building processes. Haugerudbraaten’s (1998:18) supposition that “a comprehensive 
theory of peace-building is for now a far- flung effort” still seems compelling years after its 
assertion. He claims that a very narrow or limited understanding of the concept runs the risk 
of excluding vital elements necessary for sustainable peace-building, while a very broad 
comprehension often encompasses more than the required elements, thus rendering it 
superfluous (:20).   
 
Irrespective of the conceptual dilemma embedded in the definition and redefinition of peace-
building, this thesis adopts Lederach’s (1997: 20) definition of peace-building as a 
“comprehensive concept that encompasses, generates, and sustains the full array of processes, 
approaches and stages needed to transform conflict towards more sustainable, peaceful 
relationships”. This definition is preferred over others because of the holistic nature of its 
approach in comparison with others. It allows the interrogation of some of the processes, 
approaches and stages in peace-building programs. Of equal importance is this definition’s 
vision of the transformation of conflict towards a more sustainable, peaceful rela tionship 
rather than bringing conflict to an end. Inherent in this understanding is the strong suggestion 
                                                 
54
 Direct violence refers to physical injury in flicted on another human being. Structural violence on the other 
hand is a form of violence that built into the structures of society; this form of v iolence is more indirect. Cultural 
violence involves any cultural norms, beliefs, and traditions that make other types of violence seem legit imate, 
acceptable, normal or natural (Galtung 1969).  
55
 Non-elite class here refers to people at grassroots level incorporating the local and commun ity members 
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that conflicts amongst the humans is inevitable. However, if adequately managed, conflicting 
moments and events could substantially contribute towards the reality of sustainable peace 
and relationships.  
 
Lederach’s acknowledgement of the necessity for the transformation of conflict in his 
conception furthers the admiration and adoption of his definition in this thesis. The concept 
of conflict transformation, according to Boulding (1962: 17) gained popularity from the 
recognition that conflict “moves through certain predictable phases, transforming 
relationships and social organization” and that social conflict has become protracted in nature 
(Azar, 1990). Ensuing from this comprehension is the conviction that a sustainably peaceful 
society requires the transformation of conflicts (which are inevitable anyway) for the 
betterment of people. Rupesinghe (1998) accordingly construes conflict transformation as 
flexible and comprehensive processes that supplant or displace the culture of violence and 
barbarism with non-violent cultures of negotiation and accommodation. In so doing, the 
typical or predictable violent outcome expressed in people’s response or attitude towards 
conflict are gradually transformed and replaced with a more humane and peaceful culture of 
peace, accommodation and understanding.  
 
The idea of conflict transformation adds substantial value to peace-building activities in 
general; it enhances peace-building programs. It is argued that skills and training in the 
transformation of conflict sensitize actors and agents on the causes and dynamics of conflict 
in the environment. Additionally, such skill acquisition further strengthens one’s ability to 
adequately manage a conflicting situation alongside their intended and unintended 
consequences (Bloomfield, D., Fischer and Schmelze 2006: 8). In Lederach’s (1995) view, 
“training in conflict transformation across all cultures must not only transfer techniques but 
aim for personal and systemic transformation and change”. Essential components of this view 
are the unparalleled requirement for the holistic transformation for a society. This includes 
the reform of the various elements of a society including the structures, cultures and 
individuals in that society56. Given the nature and expectation of Lederach’s comprehension, 
                                                 
56
 At the personal level, conflict negatively affects the individual physically, mentally and spiritually; therefore, 
conflict transformation calls for avenues to reduce situations that cause these negative outcomes (Lederach, 
2003). The relat ional mode deals with how communicat ion and interactions in relationships are affected by 
conflict and focuses on improving these by building understanding and improving communication between 
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peace-building is, and remains a highly complex and demanding endeavour. In summary, the 
principle of conflict transformation entrenched in Lederach’s idea of peace-building 
demonstrates the relevance of the much-needed reformation of people and the society in 
peace-building activities. Ensuing from the acknowledgement of the significance of such 
reformation that this study construes conflict transformation as an indispensable element for a 
sustainable peace-building endeavour. This view is in consonance with Reimann’s (2004:10) 
elucidation that conflict transformation refers to “outcomes, process and structure oriented 
long-term peace-building efforts which aim to truly overcome revealed forms of direct, 
cultural and structural violence”. This nexus between conflict transformation and peace-
building explicates the close knit relationship between the two concepts to the extent that one 
is the product of the other and vice versa.   
 
Many scholars have advocated for the transformation of entire segments of the society, where 
possible, in peace-building activities. Clements (1997: 10), for instance, holds that “for 
conflict transformation to occur through peace-building efforts, processes, programmes, and 
policies that benefit certain groups over others should be challenged and changed”. 
Consequent upon this press for the involvement of all sectors and stakeholders in the peace-
building activities, Kriesberg’s (2011: 55) citation of Paris (2004) holds that peace-building 
processes ought to embrace or adopt constructive conflict transformation that is strengthened 
by the creation of political structure and other shared institutions that provide legitimate ways 
to manage conflicts”.  
  
                                                                                                                                                        
groups (Lederach, 2003). The structural mode examines the systems that gave birth to the conflict, the vio lent 
patterns and behaviours that are expressed in that system and identifies the underlying causes in order to reduce 
these violent patterns and behaviours (Lederach, 2003). The cultural mode identifies the changes in group 
patterns as a result of the conflict and finds avenues through which these cultural resources can be used to 
handle conflict in a non-violent manner (Lederach, 2003). Conflict transformation thus offers an integrated 
approach to peace-building that focuses on producing long-term and constructive changes in these four 
dimensions (USIP, 2011) [Cited in Ettang 2015 :80].  
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Table 2: Levels of change in conflict transformation 
 
Vayrynen Miall Lederach Augsburger Galtung 
Actor 
Transformation 
Context 
Transformation 
Personal 
Transformation 
Attitude 
Transformation 
Global  
Issue 
Transformation 
Structural 
Transformation 
Relational 
Transformation 
Behaviour 
Transformation 
Social 
Rule 
Transformation 
Actor 
Transformation 
Structural 
Transformation 
Conflict 
Transformation 
Inter/intra 
personal levels 
Structural 
Transformation 
Issue 
Transformation 
Cultural 
Transformation 
  
 Personal 
Transformation 
   
Adopted from Ettang (2015: 81)  
 
The table above underscores the significance of the transformation or reformation of diverse 
sectors of a society to enhance the sustainability of acquired peace. It is somewhat evident 
from the table that even though genuine effort is made by various scholars to explicate their 
understanding of the key areas or sections that require such reformation, the highlighted 
categories demonstrate an overlap in their identification. Such overlaps further underline the 
significance of addressing relevant issues from these sectors. Some such issues range from, 
but not limited to, building and improving interactions, improvement of the resources each 
sector has for non-violent conflict management etc. Following this line of thought, Clements 
(2004: 14) argues that both conflict transformers and peace builders should identify avenues 
to develop the capacities of all citizens and society, where possible, so the y can transform 
violent relationships and cultures. Such transformation, he further argues, will ensure or 
promote economic, political and social institutions are developed in ways that minimise the 
prospects of violence in future and guarantee these processes through time. 
 
Fundamental to this close association between the concept of conflict transformation and 
peace-building is the need for the human as well as institutional transformation irrespective 
of the primary agency responsible for the innovation and implementation of the peace 
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initiative. Peace-building activities can be approached from various directions. It is an 
operation that is largely driven by the UN and national agencies, but with the recent 
engagement of CSOs in some parts of the globe. Lederach’s understanding of peace-building 
therefore enables this research study’s exploration of the depth of youth participation in the 
various peace-building initiatives, the glitches that hinders youth’s genuine participation and 
appropriate recommendations that enhance youth participation in Jos peace-building 
endeavors.   
 
Having engaged with the concept of peace-building through a critical analysis and synthesis 
of leading ideas and thoughts in this field, the next section of this chapter delves into the 
debate of youth participation in peace-building processes. It goes about this through its 
interrogation of how the relevant actors in a particular conflict area have made some effort in 
incorporating youth in their peace-building operations.  
 
2.7. Youths in peace-building processes 
 
Although there is a widespread perception of youth as a threat to sustainable peace that still 
lives on, there is a growing attention to youth’s potential capacity for peace-building with 
authors such Kemper (2005); Shepler, (2010); McEvoy (2000); Hilker and Fraser (2009); 
McEvoy-Levy (2001) and Biton and Salomon (2006) highlighting their contributions in this 
respect. Such awareness is also reflected in the UN’s youth agenda 57 that stresses the need to 
re-evaluate its accustomed understanding of the youth cohort as a problem in society. This 
was an effort to promote a more positive view of young people, considering them as 
“invaluable resources, as a positive force for change and as peace activists” (UNDP 2006:35). 
The Secretary-General’s report on the prevention of armed conflict, as indicated in UNDP’s 
report, advances this view in his assertion that “addressing the needs and aspirations of 
adolescence is ... an important aspect of a long-term prevention strategy and that youth can 
also be an important resource for peace and conflict prevention (ibid). Hilker and Fraser 
(2009:8) highlight findings from a youth mapping study sponsored by DFID in support of 
this approach. In their words, “the study found that DFID personnel at headq uarters and 
                                                 
57
 The UN’s youth agenda are evident in a number of policy instruments that directly or indirectly  provide 
guidance on youth and violent conflict  
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country- level are increasingly aware of the need to address youth issues through DFID’s 
work.” They conclude that “DFID needs a strategy to ensure its programme and development 
assistance serves to the benefit of youth, with youth and in support of youth as an asset” 
(ibid). In addition to the emphasised advocacy for a positive perception of the youth group 
and the acknowledgement of their potential contributions to national and international 
security and development, some national governments have designed their national youth 
policy as a practical step towards the acknowledgement and integration of youth in the affairs 
of the state. Though the enactment of such policies may be admirable, not much is seen with 
respect to the implementation of such policies. In view of the inactivity from of the 
government in support of these policies, Felice and Wisler (2007: 3) clearly assert that such a 
declaration is more rhetorical than substantive given the that there is very limited action-
oriented data to back up the declaration.  
 
Scholarly researchers, over and above the diplomatic peace and security reports, substantiate 
the necessity of youth’s active role in peace-building processes. Abbink (2005:3), in his study 
- problems of young people in Africa, - presents a pressing argument for youth integration 
into peace-building processes. He reasons that, given their demographic representation and 
their eagerness to take up anything that may relieve them of conditions of idleness, poverty or 
“ennui” (sic), youth are easily recruited by political parties, armed groups or criminal 
networks. Abbink (2005) further draws attention to youth’s utilisation of their autonomy as 
agents for societal development, both through their demand and formation of their own 
movement for positive change. This argument corresponds with “Seville’s Statement”, as 
presented in Felice and Wisler’s (2007:5) article Unexplored Power and Potential of Youths 
as Peace-builders. The statement claims that we (the youth) are not inherently violent or war-
oriented. Young people’s active roles in the development of music, theatre, fashion, 
indigenous NGOs, creative appropriation of ICT and sports are clear examples of their 
positive and creative contributions towards the development of a society. Seville believes 
“the perception that youth are all engaged in socially undesirable or criminal activities or are 
unemployable ... is erroneous” and unfounded (Wisler 2007: 3).  This is reflected in their 
creativity, music and their unrelenting quest to make an impact in their society. Such display 
of inspiration and resourcefulness emphasises the urgent need for the integration of the youth 
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factor as a necessary element in any social analysis of African societies, thus testing their 
relative autonomy as actors (re)shaping social relations and power formations (ibid).  
 
Ansell (2016, Bersaglioand Kepe (2015), Carter and Shipler (2005), Kurtenbach (2008) and 
Omeje (2006) echo this sentiment in various ways, with a unanimous recommendation for 
youth’s active participation in peace-building processes. Carter and Shipler (2005:148) 
argues his point through a narration of two young men (Junior and Randolph) that longed to 
impact their world, but found themselves involved in opposing forces in society (one for 
violence and the other for peace). The analysis of Randolph’s efforts to transform Junior from 
violence to a peace-oriented lifestyle results in their conclusion that “it is paramount to create 
opportunities for youth to participate in peace-building and reconciliation efforts”. Bekker  et 
al (2015), McEvoy (2001) and Rice and Felizzi (2015) believes that youth are the primary 
actors in grassroots community development/relations work; they are at the frontlines of 
peace-building. This presents an even a stronger argument for the institutionalisation of 
young people’s participation in peace-building processes.  
 
Widespread scholarly support and affirmation of this emergent initiative concerning youth’s 
active involvement in peace-building activities is a positive indicator of the significance their 
possible roles peace-building processes can play amid the prevailing violence and failing 
peace-building programmes. Hence, effort should be made to go beyond mere rhetoric to the 
applications and implementation of propositions from ongoing scholarly debates, reports and 
national/diplomatic recommendations.  
 
Some agencies and actors have made significant strides in adopting this evolving approach to 
peace-building. The next section discusses some of the agencies taking leading roles in 
actualising this model. 
 
2.7.1. Youth initiatives and activities towards peace-building  
 
The acknowledgement of young people’s potential for peace and their active participation in 
the peace process gained popularity after Boutros-Ghali’s report to the UN Security Council 
in 1992 even though the idea of young people’s involvement in peace-building was arguably 
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conceived prior to the report. A Russian diplomatic ambassador, Nikolai Firjubin, in 1989, 
set the interest in youth participation in peace-building into motion with his initiative to 
assemble young people from four continents. This eventually led to the formation of the first 
peace-oriented international youth organisation called the United Network of Young 
Peacebuilders58 (UNOY).  
 
The UNOY, according to their 2011 annual report, is a non-religious and non-governmental 
organisation that welcomes youth-oriented peace initiatives. Their vision is to groom youth 
committed to building a world in which peace, justice, solidarity, human dignity and respect 
for nature prevail (UNOY 2011:3). The organisation takes the lead in epitomising youth’s 
potential for peace-building through its advocacy role, pushing for the recognition and 
support of youth endeavours in peace-building (Felice and Wisler 2007:20). Felice and 
Wisler (2007) draw attention to other activities embarked upon by UNOY, such as 
networking for peace, information dissemination and peer-to-peer support. Besides several 
contributions by UNOY to peace-building activities since its inception, its strategic plan of 
action for 2011 to 2015 demonstrate youth’s dispositions, maturity, relevant knowledge of the 
issues and willingness to learn and grow. These strategic plans include the desire: 
 
a. To facilitate the build-up of the capacities of members to mobilise more 
young people to be effective contributors to the creation of peaceful 
societies;  
b. To develop positive youth engagement in international and national 
processes related to peace-building and conflict transformation;  
c. To strengthen the effectiveness of the UNOY peace-builders as a network 
based on democratic principles and shared feelings of ownership that 
utilises opportunities for its members, and  
d. To strengthen UNOY’s public image.  
 
Despite the possible criticism and reservations that could be directed at youth’s inexperience 
and lack of “required maturity” to engage with other stakeholders and peace agencies, an 
                                                 
58
 It was initially called United Nat ions of Youth, but subsequently renamed United Network of Young 
Peacebuilders in the year 2003 
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organisation of young people with such pertinent priorities for contemporary society ought to 
be applauded and taken seriously. These strategic priorities not only demonstrate young 
people’s desire to acquire the necessary capabilities to impact their society, but are also 
capable of dispelling reservations and uncertainties about the significance and impact of 
participation of young people. 
 
Similar to UNOY, other youth- led organisations have evolved over the years, complementing 
the activities of UNOY. Authors of the report, “A toolkit for Setting Up European Youth 
Peace Projects in Partnership”, gave a succinct synopsis of youth related organisations. 
Examples of such organisations are Yeritac Youth NGO and U Move 4 Peace. While these 
are European-based examples, Shministim, Middle East Children Association (MECA), 
Otpor and Rosario are examples of other youth- led organisations, operating from other 
continents. Within Africa, youth organisations such as Youth for Peace-building and 
Development in Africa (YOUPEDA), Young Peace Builder, (YPB), Young Peace Brigades 
(YPB) and Coalition for Peace in Africa (UNOY: 10-12) came into existence with the 
primary aim of contributing towards peace, development and stability in Africa. According to 
Bangura (2015), the founder and Executive Director of Young Peace Builders, the Young 
Peace Builders represents young people’s commitment and disposition to the restoration of 
peace in affected society. It is an organisation made up of youth from various countries in 
West Africa that have been affected by conflict. It deals with post-conflict issues including 
restoration of ethnic cohesion, reintegration, reconciliation, and structural reforms in 
democracy and leadership, in an attempt to lay a foundation that will prevent future violence. 
Young Peace Builders bring together people with a shared history and desire to use non-
violent means to transform history into a peaceful and prosperous present and future.  
 
It is evident that the youth possess so much desire and enthusiasm to positively contribute to 
society. Such zest was apparent in the invaluable role that young people played by calling for 
calm through different social and print media (Facebook, Whatsapp, Twitter, Online News 
media, Local Radio Stations and Local Newspapers) during the recently experienced 
constitutional crisis in Sierra Leone (Bangura 2015:106). It is understood that without such 
efforts, the country could have plunged into serious unrest, considering the highly charged 
and sensitive political atmosphere. This aspect of youth’s disposition could be positively 
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exploited to combat violence and extremism on the African continent and the world at large. 
In so doing, there will be a higher prospect of restoring more sustainable peace, while 
advancing genuine community development through the empowerment of human resources.  
 
2.7.2. Endeavours of governmental and non-governmental agencies towards 
youth participation across the globe  
  
The aforementioned point demonstrates youth’s energy and willingness to enthusiastically 
participate in the development and peace-building processes irrespective of the challenges 
and hurdles they are confronted with in the process. In addition to these evolutions and the 
advent of youth organisations and their initiatives in peace-building endeavours across the 
globe, their recognition as relevant actors in peace-building is yet to be satisfactorily 
acknowledged by relevant stakeholders.  
 
Despite the unsatisfactory nature of the stakeholders’ recognition of young people ’s 
contribution to peace and the need for their active and genuine participation in peace-building 
processes, it is still worthy of note that some national governments have made some strides in 
this respect. Some such efforts are expressed in the enacted youth related policies and 
projects or programs aimed at boosting the involvement of young people in peace-building 
activities and decision-making processes. The UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon in 2015 
demonstrated his recognition of youth via the assertion that he places great hopes in youth’s 
power to shape our future. He further demonstrated his commitment to youth recognition and 
development through the establishment of a youth envoy. Barack Obama, the former US 
President launched a Young African Leaders Initiatives that is having a positive impact and 
continues creating a platform for the exposure and development of African youth. According 
to Bangura (2015: 107) “These initiatives are geared towards creating opportunities, 
promoting cross-cultural exchange, learning and networking and ultimately to keeping youth 
positively engaged in peace-building and developmental processes”.  
 
In addition to Ban Ki-moon, the gradual affirmation of the importance of youth and their 
participation is also reflected in other national UN Youth Agenda’s recommendations. 
Nigeria and some other states/non-state agencies development of youth-related policies are 
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examples of the growing confidence in youth’s potential and contributions to peace-building 
endeavours. Through the broad activities of the United Nations Development Programmes 
(UNDP), various nations across the globe play relevant roles in the active participatio n of 
young people in peace-building. The UNDP appears to be committed to the ideal of skills 
development and employment generation for young people. This is evident in their organised 
rehabilitation, reconstruction and development (RRD) programmes aimed at the 
reinforcement of Bougainville reconciliation and peace processes. The UNDP’s (2006) 
review of youth and violent conflict has it that RRD programmes in the Bougainville 
engineered the establishment of a variety of projects as instruments for the realisation of their 
primary objective, which is the reinforcement of their reconciliation and peace processes. 
Examples of such projects include the establishment of Arewa Women’s Vocational Training 
Centre, which runs a 26-week course, with a curriculum covering 14 subjects, ranging from 
guesthouse management to gender awareness and empowerment skills for women. The 
programme saw the graduation of ex-combatants from different factions after participation in 
an eight-month training course in metal fabrication and welding. They further organised a 
Bougainville Youth Officer Congress. The congress brought District Youth Co-ordinators 
together to exchange experiences and engages in joint programme planning. The UNDP 
currently engages with the next generation of African Youth Leaders through its Africa 2015 
advocacy campaign aimed at equipping young people with the necessary skills to tackle the 
development challenges facing the continent. A Pan-African Youth Leadership Summit held 
in June 2004 in Senegal (a part of the African 2015 initiative) is an indication of the UNDP’s 
commitment to the empowerment of youth for peace-building activities.  
 
Such summits, programmes and activities advancing the development and leadership 
acquisition skills are capable of redefining individual’s priorities, from violent-motivated 
activities to a more constructive and productive engagement. Stretching this view a little 
further is the conviction that such redefinition of priorities has a strong potential for 
reorienting the targeted actors from a violent and destructive orientation to a peaceful 
disposition. In so doing, the chances of such people engaging in violent activities is reduced.  
 
Regardless of this growing confidence, national governments’ commitment to the 
implementation of such policies remains a serious point of concern. Besides the national 
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youth policies of some states, available literature suggests that CSOs stand out in their effort 
to incorporate the youth in peace-building activities. Kurtenbach (2008: 7) summarises this in 
his assertion that “in most wars, the state is either unwilling or unable to perform functions 
that are basic for the personal development of children and youth. In these contexts, CSOs 
face specific challenges to complement and compensate basic functions of the state if they 
want to detach youths from violence and war”. This is especially so in the city of Jos, where 
the government’s commitment towards the incorporation of the youth as active agents in 
peace-building activities is open to question. The unease and apprehension ensuing from the 
government’s commitment to youth participation in peace-building processes is arguably 
consequential upon the insignificant and trivial roles of youth in Jos peace-building 
initiatives.  
 
Moreover, issues closely related to youths’ participation in peace-building in Jos are yet to be 
adequately researched. As clearly highlighted in section 1.3 of the preceding chapter, a larger 
pool of available literature deals with issues of ethno-religious conflicts, resource control and 
conflicts, issues of indigenes and settlers’ relations without a focus on the discussion of youth 
and their roles in peace-building. The closest study to the investigation of youth and peace-
building in Jos limited its inquiry within the confines of non-governmental organisations 
peace-building initiatives. This leaves a major gap with respect to literature that holistically 
engages with youth’s participation in all peace-building endeavours. This research study 
therefore endeavours to bridge this existing gap through its appraisal of youth’s participation 
in all peace-building initiatives in Jos. These include initiatives spearheaded both by the civil 
society organisations, non-governmental organisation, a government parastatal, and even 
youth- led peace-building initiatives. Accordingly, it is apparent that the originality of this 
study is embedded in the very nature of the study. Its novelty is demonstrated in the direct 
focus on youth’s participation in all peace-building activities led by any stakeholder as a 
subject of inquiry. Given the dearth of scholarly research and studies about youth 
involvement in peace-building initiatives in Jos, this study makes a substantive contribution 
to how the youth could be integral agents of peace in the city of Jos. Besides, unlike many 
other studies on Jos, this study offers youths the opportunity to make their ideas and visions 
heard in the quest to better comprehend the hindrances to their genuine participation and the 
advancement of their active and constructive participation in the peace-building processes.  
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Furthermore, the hybrid framework that combines human security, conflict transformation, 
peace-building and civil participation adds to the originality of the study. This fusion of 
frameworks in combination with the analysis of the studies’ empirical data aid the thesis 
contribution of novel ideas and arguments with respect to youth’s roles and challenges as 
agents of peace in Jos, and possibly beyond. According to Baptista et al (2015) “originality is 
not only related to an outcome or product, but also to the overall process of producing an 
outcome”. They also argued that originality could be achieved by applying existing methods 
to new data, resulting in incremental additions to the knowledge base; while the application 
of new methods, new questions, or new ideas could generate more substantial shifts in 
knowledge. Along this line of thought, this thesis’ blend of theories makes the study unique 
in its interrogation of youth involvement in peace-building initiatives.  
 
Additionally, the outcome of this thesis which are partly evident in its recommendations, 
published article and pending publications has a potential of making lasting contribution to 
the practice of peace-building activities as it relates to youth involvement in such initiatives. 
The thesis, for instance, recommends the institutionalization of youth participation in peace-
building activities via the design of satisfactory and implementable policies that guide their 
genuine involvement and participation. The adoption and implementation of this 
recommendation will significantly and positively transform youth as agents of peace-building 
in the city of Jos, Nigeria and beyond.  
 
Finally, it was established in the theoretical framework chapter that the thesis’ adopted 
participatory theory is predominantly theorized and employed within the field of nursing and 
public administrative research. Its application as a principal theory of study is arguably not 
widespread in the field of conflict transformation and peace studies. The adoption of 
participatory theory in this study is  Atypical 
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2.8. Conclusion  
 
This chapter has interrogated youth participation in violent conflicts and peace-building 
across the globe. This commenced with a review of the concept of violent conflict within the 
scope of peace studies. It was noted from the reviewed literature that although there is no 
universally accepted definition of conflict, a somewhat conventional view of conflict 
understands conflict as intersection of interests, opinions, goals and values arising from 
divergent goals and scarce resources. It was noted in this chapter that though violence is, 
more often than not, a demonstration of conflict, conflict may not be equated or limited to the 
manifestation of violence. This led to the engagement of the various manifestations of 
conflicts (violent and non-violent) which were further discoursed in this chapter.  
 
Given that this study centres on youth participation in peace-building initiatives, adequate 
effort was made to clearly unpack the concept of youth in the second section of this chapter. 
It is important to recap that the literature interprets the concept of youth as a social construct 
that is strongly influenced by the economic, social, historical and cultural realities of people. 
Hence various geopolitical regions and cultures uphold diverse conceptions of youth. Youth, 
in Western society, is primarily defined by age while most African and Asian countries give 
credence to the functional and cultural implications in the comprehensions of youth. In the 
usual course of events, the undisputed understanding of youth is that of an intermediate class 
gradually adopting a status of an adult.  
 
The chapter went further to interrogate the nexus between youth as conceptualized in this 
study and violent conflicts. It was noted that some literature encompasses narratives that 
perceive the youth as agents inherently disposed for violence. However, there is a 
progressively developing trend among recent authors to reconceptua lise the link between 
youth and violence. This chapter interrogated this debate and underscored the primary factors 
accountable for youth participation in violent conflicts. Some of the highlighted factors 
include violence as a reaction to their invisibility as public actors, the rising decline in 
economic growth and unemployment and the high educational attainment amongst youth 
which has heightened expectations among them. 
 
 
 
99 
 
Finally, this chapter surveyed the literature on the concept of peace and peace-building 
processes. Delving into Galtung’s concepts of positive and negative peace, the various forms 
of violence and peace (direct/personal and indirect/structural violence) were comprehensively 
discoursed. Contrary to the common narrative of youth’s agency in violent conflicts, this 
chapter interrogated youth’s agency in peace-building processes. It reviewed and 
acknowledged youth’s unique roles in peace-building processes through the interrogation of 
their initiatives and activities towards peace-building.  
 
The next chapter discusses the human security approach to peace-building and civic 
participation dynamics in peace-building. Through its engagement with these theories, it 
establishes the theoretical lenses through which the discourse of youth participat ion in peace-
building will be understood.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
A Synthesis of the human security and participatory theories in peace-building  
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
The purpose of Chapter Three is the presentation of the conceptual and theoretical overview 
underpinning the conception of peace-building processes within the context of this research 
study. The synthesis of the conceptual and theoretical frameworks substantiates the reasoning 
underlying the propagation for human-focused peace-building processes or initiatives. 
Writers such as Schmid and Muldoon (2015); Abdullah (2005);  Abbink and Kessel (2005) 
and  Salawu (2010); Omoju and Abraham (2014) are widely published within the field of 
conflict analysis. In the main, they identify youth as both perpetrators and victims of violent 
conflict in a society. This perception is strongly reflected in their unrelenting assertions 
highlighting young people’s involvement in violent conflict across the globe. A good number 
of such studies, as reflected in the previous chapter give credence to youth as constructive 
agents, spearheading political, cultural and religious transformation across the globe while 
simultaneously underscoring their ‘destructive’ approaches evident in the apolitical and 
rebellious movements in society. The role of young people in the resistance against apartheid 
in South Africa and youth’s participation in the violent demonstrations that challenged the 
tradition and authoritarianism of the Senegalese political scene as well as other countries are 
examples of well researched areas in this field (Bundy, 1987; Hyslop, 1988 and Marks, 2001)   
 
It has been repeatedly echoed that young people constitute the majority of the global 
population and are at the centre of interaction and transformation in Africa (Filip and 
Alcinda, 2005 and Surajo, 2016) and other parts of the world of course. However,  despite the 
implications (potential and actual) and the impacts of their demographic dominance, they 
have been relegated to the margin of political and economic decision-making processes in 
society. According to Abbink (2005: 1) “they face tremendous odds and do not seem to have 
their future in their own hands. They are also marginalised in national state policies and have 
a weak legal position”. This concern has been articulated by the youth themselves declaring 
that “they receive too little attention from those in power – both in rural society (chiefs, 
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ruling age grades) and in the cities (political leaders, party bosses, teachers etc)” (Abbink 
2005: 3). Such negligence and side- lining galvanize their desire and quest for the exercise of 
their human agency and relative autonomy in the world around them. In the absence of 
constructive channels through which their autonomy can be expressed, violence becomes an 
attractive and feasible tool for the actualisation of their agency.  
 
This study concurs with Sen's (1999: 53) view that “people have to be seen [...] as being 
actively involved (or at minimal given the opportunity) in shaping their own destiny, and not 
just as passive recipients of the fruits of cunning development programs”. Youth, in Jos, are 
yet to be recognized and accepted from this perspective given the dearth of their involvement 
in the city’s peace-building endeavours. This study therefore argues for a substantive 
involvement of youth in Jos’ peace-building processes as a viable option for sustained peace 
and its building processes in Jos. Such incorporation demands the need to move beyond the 
dominant perception of youths as agents of violence to the acknowledgement of their agency 
as peace-builders.  
 
As highlighted in the introductory chapter, there are competing theories that can provide 
some rationale for youth engagement in violent conflicts and subsequent peace-building 
endeavours. Below are examples of such theories, which include Marxism, dependency 
theory, behaviourism, relative deprivation theory, structural functional theory and the 
frustration-aggression theory. Although these theories are generally useful in the analysis and 
comprehension of the root causes of violent conflicts and peace-building initiatives, they are 
considered inadequate in this study for the illustrated reasons.  
 
3.2. Overview of selected peace-building theories  
 
This section discusses some of the relevant theories in the conceptualization and 
comprehension of the arguments about the socio-political conflicts and peace-building in 
society. Although these issues could be understood from a variety of and unlimited 
theoretical lenses, this study illustrates a few such related theories that provide a multiplicity 
of channels through which issues of conflict and peace-building could generally be analysed. 
However, as apparent in this section, some of the discussed theories, though noteworthy in 
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the discourse of conflict and peace-building are not applicable in this study for various 
reasons highlighted below. Some such theories include Marxism’s theory of conflict analysis, 
dependency theory behaviourism, relative deprivation theory and the structural functional 
theory.  
 
3.2.1. Marxist class theory of conflict analysis 
 
The Marxist class theory of conflict analysis presents another framework that can aid in the 
understanding of the various elements of violent conflicts in Jos. Some of the key points of 
this theory rest on the argument that society (which is capitalist in its setup) comprises of two 
primary social classes, the bourgeoisie and the proletariat (the owners of the means of 
production and labourers respectively). According to Edward (2000), “Marx views capitalism 
as a deceptive object, one in which there is a discrepancy between its ‘essence’ and its 
‘appearance’”. It is held that the discrepancy within the capitalist system lies in the 
underlying law of value, the proletariat’s value of the labour over the labourers. Through such 
misplaced value, the human person becomes alienated from his or her essence as a human 
person (species-being). Alienation here is distinguished by the state of affairs in which labour 
is solely directed towards the production of commodities rather than the self- realization of the 
labourers. Rosen, in the introduction of Marx in the Routledge Encyclopaedia of Philosop hy, 
better illustrates this view; it reads:  
 
i. There is first the separation of the worker from the product of labour. It is the labour 
process that it involves ‘appropriating’ the external world. But, when labour is 
alienated, the sensible, external world becomes an object to which the worker is 
bound, something that is hostile to him, instead of being the means to his self-
realization. 
 
ii. At the same time, the labour process itself becomes alien to the worker. Because the 
imperatives according to which labour takes place come to the worker ‘from an act of 
self-realization. It becomes, from the worker’s point of view, ‘an activity directed 
against himself, which is independent of him and does not belong to him.’  
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iii. Finally, Marx says, the consequence of these two forms of alienation is to alienate 
man from what he calls his ‘species-being’ (Gattungswesen) ... Man, says Marx, is a 
species-being ‘because he looks upon himself as the present, living species, because 
he looks upon himself as a universal and therefore free being (Edward 2002: 7-8 and 
Marx 1863). 
 
The concept of species being of man entails man’s awareness of himself and the relationship 
or expression of himself based on the knowledge of himself as a human person. To the extent 
that labour is performed according to a division of labour that is dictated by the market and 
partaking in the material fruits of capitalism such as cars, boats, campers, and motorcycles, 
man is alienated from himself. Essentially, Marx supposes that it is only “in the individual 
expression of my own life, I would have brought about the expression of your life and so in 
my individual activity I would have directly confirmed and realized my authentic nature, my 
human and communal nature” (ibid). This means that man’s recognition and harmony with 
himself is subject to the repossession of its traits of enhancing the species being as illustrated 
above. 
 
Essentially, Marxism as an analytic tool, by and large, understands the society to be in a state 
of perpetual conflict with itself, the ruling class against the subject class59. This conflict 
ensues from the persistent ruling class exploitation of the subject class via their ownership 
and control of the means of production. Although many political scholars have not attempted 
analysing the events of conflict in Jos from the Marxist perspective, that is however not an 
impossibility. It is quite comprehensible to adequately categorise the populace of Jos to two 
various classes, the indigenes and the settlers; the dominant Christians and the minority non-
Christian classes or dominant ethnic groups and minority ethnic groups (the ruling and the 
subject classes accordingly). According to Raico (2012: 20 and 21), “Marxism contains two 
related views of the state: most conspicuously, it views the state as the instrument of 
domination by exploiting classes that are defined by their position within the process of social 
                                                 
59
 It is worthy of note at this point that the youth are essential components of this subject class. As 
aforementioned, they are a part of the highly marginalized group in the society of Jos. The Marxist description 
of alienation and frustration explicitly describes the youth of Jos as they are a group that solely offer their labour 
for the rewards without much (if any) fulfilment or relationship with the product of their labour. In fact, the 
experience of most of the youth noted unemployment as a common trend amongst the majority of the youth. 
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production, e.g., the capitalists” [:20] and the view of the state as “a parasite feeding upon, 
and clogging, the free movement of soc iety.” [:21]. From an extended comprehension and 
interpretation of a Marxist viewpoint60, the various events of conflict in Jos could be 
understood as the expression of the subject class’ (the masses, the non-Christian or settlers 
class) frustration over the status quo and the youth as illustrated in above footnotes are 
inherent members of the mentioned categories of people in the society. Some of these events 
of conflicts are informed by the people’s frustrations which are embedded in the alienation of 
the people from their labour, the society in which they live and ultimately alienated from their 
human-specie. This is evident in the people’s (settler’s) quest for appropriate recognition of 
their status and the allocation of relevant benefits beyond mere settlers’ identity and the 
exclusion they are subjected to.  
 
Within the framework of Marxism, sanity, genuine stability and peace could be restored to 
society primarily via the abolition of private property, which ultimately translates to the 
abolition of capitalism. Such abolition according to Engels (1959) will only materialize when 
they collectively overthrow the ruling class due to their inability to attain their objectives of 
self-actualisation (specie-being).  
 
One of the challenges and limitations in the adoption of this theory as a theoretical and 
analytical tool in this study is the absence of socialist revolutions in currently advanced 
capitalist societies, the reality of a less class-consciousness and a less critical outlook of the 
capitalist system. Rather, the subject class are equally adopting the values of the capitalist 
system through the accumulation of properties and material gains of capitalism in the absence 
of the human-labour relationship as envisaged by a Marxist theoretical lens. Additionally, and 
more importantly, Marxism as a theoretical lens does not offer much guidance with respect to 
substantial peace processes other than the abolition of the capitalist system. Such a 
framework is not adequate in either assessing the depth of youth participation or proffering 
strategies for their genuine participation in peace-building initiatives in Jos.  
 
                                                 
60
 This extended understanding of Marxism builds on some recent studies’ argument that the terms of the 
classical Marxis m does not explain everything about social mobility and income attainment and that Marxian  
theory alone does exhaust all that we need to know about social stratificat ion and their economic and 
uneconomic consequences in the society. 
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3.2.2. Analysis of conflict and peace-building via the lenses of dependency 
theory      
 
Dependency theory is an approach that is traditionally employed to understand a society via 
the examination of dealings and associations between the core and periphery61 states. It is 
generally argued within this framework that periphery countries are unremittingly reliant on 
core countries for various business and economic support as well as technological resources. 
Haslam, Schafer and Beaudet (2012) noted that the dependency theory was a reaction to an 
earlier theory – modernization. According to Matunhu (2011: 65) modernization is about 
Africa following the developmental footsteps of Europe (largely the former colonizer of 
Africa). It holds that “all societies progress through similar stages of development, that 
today’s underdeveloped areas are thus in a similar situation to that of today's developed areas 
at some time in the past, and that therefore, the task in helping the underdeveloped areas out 
of poverty is to accelerate them along this supposed common path of development, by 
various means such as investment, technology transfers, and closer integration into the world 
market” (Haslam, Schafer and Beaudet 2012). Consequently, Truman (a former United 
States’ president) declared “we must embark on a bold new programme for making the 
benefits of our scientific advances and industrial progress available for the improvement and 
growth of underdeveloped areas” (Allen and Thomas, 1992: 06 cited in Matunhu 2011)”.  
 
Although there are some elements of truth in the modernity views, the theory was strongly 
rebuffed by the proponents of the dependency theory with the claim that the periphery 
countries are not merely on a similar track towards being developed but that there exists 
unique structures orchestrated by the core states to keep the poor and weak states dependent 
on the core states.  
 
It was argued by Matunhu (2011:67) that the “ideas of modernization impoverished Africa. 
The theory failed to recognize the creativity and initiative of the Africans. Instead it places 
value on externally sourced aid without attending to the inhibiting conditionalities attached to 
such aid”. In summary, the proponents of dependency theory argue that developed countries 
                                                 
61
 The core states represent states in the Global North often wealthy and resourceful while the term periphery 
denotes states in the global south frequently considered as undeveloped and poor.  
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had never been in analogous position. For instance, they never had to exist in relation to a 
block of more powerful and economically advanced countries than themselves. Hence, Viotti 
and Kauppi (2013: 521) depict dependency as a situation in which the “low-income countries 
of the South are economically subordinated to the advantage of high- income countries of the 
First World or North. While in class analytical terms, workers and peasant subordinates are 
exploited by capital-owning classes, the bourgeoisie”. A principal argument of the 
proponents of the dependency approach to understanding reality projects the view that 
international relations are designed in a manner that keeps the under-resourced states 
perpetually dependent on the wealthy states. Haslam, Schafer and Beaudet (2012) for 
instance assert that “the central contention of dependency theory holds that the poor states are 
impoverished and rich ones enriched by the way poor states are integrated into the world 
system”. Along this line of thought, it is arguable that the relationships amongst the core and 
periphery states are inherently designed to benefit and enhance the activities and development 
of the core states. Dependency theorists such as Matunhu (2011) perceives international 
relations amongst these two categories of states to be intended and dominated by s tratified 
international systems in which the core countries achieve the autonomous self-sustaining 
growth while others (the periphery) are so dependent on the growth of the core that they 
cannot be as developed as the core states.  
 
Similar to Matunhu’s depiction of international relations, the relationship and conflicts 
amongst the various actors in Jos could adequately be understood through the lens of a 
stratified socio-political system. Akin to the core and periphery relationships, Nyerere (1973) 
and Gabriel (1991) argued that the relationship at the different levels in the socio-economic 
structure of an economy is based upon regional control of the economic and political 
resources between regions, sectors of the economy and different social groups. Thus, while 
the dependency theory elucidates Europe and America’s strategic exploitation of Africa, the 
theory also throws light on the rich people exploitation of the poor segment and the 
privileged exploitation of the less-privileged in the society. By the same token, dependency 
theory can further the analysis of Jos conflicts through an understanding of the indigenes’ 
“marginalization” of and battle with the settlers or the dominant groups’ “oppression” of the 
subordinate groups in the city of Jos. In this way, this theory may be casually understood as a 
linear and multi-staged way of comprehending relations in each society. Within the context of 
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the geographical focus of this study, some of the primary factors responsible for the various 
events of conflict in Jos remain the differences and grievances between the so-called 
indigenes and settlers in Jos and the deep-seated feeling of social, economic and political 
marginalisation of the non-Christian minorities by the dominant Christian groups. Analyzing 
these factors and the various events of violent conflict in Jos via the lens of dependency 
theory, it is arguable that the economic activities such as trade relations and political 
activities such as who is eligible to be voted into power in Jos have been effect ively skewed 
to keep the subordinates (the peripheries) dependent on the indigenes or dominant group (in 
this case the core) in the city of Jos. Snyder (1980) further buttressed this in a study titled 
Law and Development in the Light of Dependency Theory where it was noted that the 
capitalist international division of labour (which keeps the peripheral states at bay) and the 
changes within it distorted all of social, political and economic structure in the periphery in a 
way that concentrates power in the hands of a small minority whose outward orientation 
serves to further entrench the countries in a dependent quagmire. The various accounts of the 
Jos’ conflict suggests that the periphery’s resistance or refusal to accept such structural 
constraints and the prevention of autonomous or self-sustaining economic growth patterns 
always results in violence conflicts in Jos.  
 
The dependency theory, as demonstrated above, may enhance a different understanding of 
some of the factors responsible for Jos conflicts, especially with respect to the people 
resistance to the structures and instruments of suppression and marginalization. That 
notwithstanding, the focus of this study which interrogates the depth of youth’s participation 
in both the conflicts and the peace-building processes raises serious concern about the 
adoption of dependency theory as a theoretical framework in this thesis. Such concerns ensue 
from the inability of the theory to adequately interrogate the quality of relevant actors’ 
participation in the peace-building processes. Proponents of the dependency (and the African 
Renaissance) theories, such as Korten (1990: 4-5) advocate for the transformation of the 
future through the transformation of institutions, technology, values and behaviour consistent 
with the ecological and social realities in Africa. Some of these transformations may be 
achievable with or without the participation of relevant actors in the society. Hence, though 
the dependency theory may be appropriate in the analysis and prognosis of resolutions, 
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conflicts and peace-building initiatives, it is neither equipped nor adequate for the 
interrogation or facilitation of actors’ participation in peace-building initiatives. 
 
3.2.3. Behaviourism as a tool for the comprehension of conflict and peace -
building  
 
An alternative theoretical approach to comprehending and analysing the conflicts and peace-
building initiatives in Jos could be via the lens of behaviourism. Behaviourism is considered 
a systematic approach to the analysis of human and animal behaviour. Endowed with an 
ancient history, the earlier version of behaviourism was called “methodological 
behaviourism” which was established on the precept of realism, holding that all experiences 
are caused by an objective real world outside of and apart from a person’s subjective inner 
world (Baum 2017: 1). A more recent form of behaviourism, known as radical behaviourism, 
is built on pragmatism62 rather than just realism. A noteworthy aspect of radical behaviourism 
is their rejection of mentalism. Along these lines, more contemporary behaviourism focuses 
primarily on environmental factors notwithstanding their general acceptance of the important 
role of the internal or inherent traits. In relation to this, Baum (2017: 4) and Sammons (n.d.) 
noted that “some nineteenth-century psychologists were uneasy with introspection (also 
understood as mentalism) as a scientific method. Introspection or mentalism, as the case may 
be, seemed too unreliable, too open to personal bias, too subjective”. Rather, they undertook 
the understanding of human behaviour through the measurement of observable behaviours 
and events. It is understood that Watson (1913), the founder of behaviourism, argues for the 
omission of the subjective or mental elements on the premise that behaviour can be treated 
scientifically. In this way, he suggests that just as the other sciences cast out hidden essences, 
forces and causes from their scientific processes, so should the process of analysing 
behaviour omit such mysterious factors. Although it is worthy of note that there are 
contrasting arguments with respect to the omission or inclusion of the mental state amongst 
behaviourists, a deeper engagement with such ideological differences may not further the 
objective of this study; but it introduces a new element – determinism - in the discussion of 
behaviourism. According to Sammons (n.d.:2) “the behaviourist approach is deterministic as 
people’s behaviour is assumed to be entirely controlled by their environment and their prior 
                                                 
62
 This is determin ism, the notion that behavior is determined solely by heredity and environment. 
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learning”. This however, does not undermine the reality and importance of freewill in 
behaviourists’ analysis of human behaviour. Freewill, in this context is understood as the 
ability to choose. Baum (2017: 11) noted that: 
  
Despite inheritance and despite all environmental impacts, a person who behaves one way 
could have chosen to behave another way. Behaviourism asserts something beyond merely 
experiencing that one has choice ... free will asserts that choice is no illusion, that individuals 
themselves cause behaviour. 
 
Corresponding to the behaviourists’ comprehension of reality, it is reasonable to argue that 
the experiences of conflict or peace-building in Jos are largely caused by an objective real 
world. These include the environment outside of and separate from a person’s subjective 
inner world. In other word, the events of conflict are consequences of people’s reaction to the 
objective world out there rather than an outcome of their internal disposition to any form of 
mental or introspective realities in them. This means tha t people’s behaviours are controlled 
or determined by their environment. However, it is also strongly argued that irrespective of 
the deterministic nature of people’s response to their environment, they are equally endowed 
with the freewill to choose a particular reaction as opposed to another reaction. This implies 
that even though the actors of Jos conflicts choices are greatly determined by their 
environment and history, they have the freewill to choose a specific reaction rather than 
others. This unreservedly suggest that choosing violence as oppose to peace or vice versa is a 
question of a people’s choice though those choices are greatly influenced by the external 
environment.   
 
According to Baum (2017: 12), if we can analyse our democratic institutions to discover what 
makes them work, we might be able to find ways to make them (our institutions) even more 
effective. Similar to this assertion, it is the conviction of behaviourists that adequate effort 
will facilitate our understanding of how effective institutions (which are part of our 
environment) will also influence choices or freewill in making the right decisions. A bad or 
unhealthy environment is commonly accused of causing such behaviour as alcoholism, drug 
addiction and other delinquencies in society. Equally, the reality of a healthy society and 
environment will enhance positive values. In simple terms, behaviourists uphold the view that 
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“a scientific understanding of behaviour could be used to increase political freedom and a 
peaceful society”. Within the framework of this understanding, peace could be enhanced 
through a thorough comprehension of people’s behaviour and simultaneous creation of a 
peace enabling environment. Regarding Jos and its socio-political environment, behaviourism 
will recommend the management of its violent conflicts through adequate understanding of 
the behaviour of its people. It is expected that such comprehension of people’s behaviour will 
inform and influence the effort to creating peace enabling environments. Voors, N illesen, 
Bulte et al’s (2012) examination of the effects of exposure to violence on people’s behaviour 
with respect to timing, riskiness and social consequences in Burundi, found that conflicts 
affect behaviour of individuals exposed to violence. They ascertained, such people display 
more altruistic behaviour towards their neighbours, more risk seeking and have higher 
discount rates. Similarly, Bellows and Miguel (2009), Gilligan, Pascuale and Samii (2011) 
and Bauer, Cassar and Chytiloya (2011) report positive correlations between violence and 
political and social behaviour in Sierra Leone, Nepal and the Republic of Georgia, 
respectively. Going by the behavioural experiments, they demonstrate how exposure to 
conflict and war contributes to a greater propensity to invest in trust-based transactions and to 
contribute to the public good. Consequently, they uphold the view that violence affects the 
behaviour of both kids and adults, and the effects are both immediate and persistent. Building 
on the behaviourist premise that people’s behaviour is assumed to be utterly controlled by 
their environment and their prior learning, it is comprehensible therefore, that the creation of 
an appropriate and ideal post-conflict environment is sufficient in evoking the right and  
proper attitude from the people in the post-conflict environment of Jos.  
 
The recent studies about the effect of the environment on human behaviour demonstrates a 
strong relationship between people’s exposure to violent conflict and their positive 
disposition to acceptable political and social behaviour. Similar to Burundi, Nepal and the 
Republic of Georgia, Jos is arguably in a post-conflict phase of its development. Accordingly, 
the adoption of the behaviourist principles may enhance a deeper understand ing of conflict in 
Jos and its peace-building processes. Adoption of the behaviourist principles entails a 
favourable reception of the beliefs and values. This includes a careful study and 
comprehension of the people’s behaviour in Jos and the creation of a favourable environment 
that evokes a desired behaviour from the people. By and large, behaviourism has the strong 
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potential of offering a deep understanding of the conflicts and peace-building initiatives in 
Jos. Despite this undeniable potential, behaviourism as a theory does not have much to offer 
with respect to people’s participation; rather it dwells on how the environment influences 
people’s participation or non-participation. Essentially, behaviourism neither proffers 
principles of participation nor deals with issues of genuine or superficial participation. Given 
that this study focuses on the assessment of youth participation in peace-building processes, 
behaviourism does not advance the participatory focus of this study. It is on this account that  
this theory is considered unsuitable for the actualization of the objective of this study; hence 
it is not adopted for this study.  
 
3.2.4. Understanding conflict and peace-building initiatives through relative 
deprivation theory  
 
According to Davis (1959), the theory was firstly and informally used in a text The American 
Soldier (3) to depict the experience of American soldiers during World War II. Although the 
theory in these pioneer texts was undefined, it broadened the comprehension of the American 
soldiers’ experiences of deprivation while on national duty. Later exploration of the theory 
led to its understanding as “actors’ perception of discrepancy between their value 
expectations and their value capabilities. Value expectations are the goods and conditions of 
life to which people believe they are rightfully entitled while value capabilities are the goods 
and conditions they think they are capable of getting and keeping” (Gurr 1974: 24). Such a 
discrepancy between a value and reality or the actual experiences of people was vividly 
expressed by the American soldiers as it was noted that “with higher levels of aspiration than 
the less educated, the better educated man had more to lose in his own eyes and in the eyes of 
his friends by failure to achieve some sort of status in the Army. Hence, frustration was 
greater for him . . . (AS I, p. 153 cited in Davis 1959: 285). Unlike their less educated 
counterparts, the higher educated American soldiers were highly deprived of their potential, 
objectives, dreams and values based on their skills and capabilities. This was a demonstration 
of an intrapersonal or personal vs structural frustration leading to internal conflict that is 
capable of subsequent outrageous and despicable consequences.  
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Richardson (2011: 5) also conceptualizes relative deprivation as the “gap between expected 
and achieved welfare”. Considering the illustration of the American soldier’s dissatisfaction 
and Richardson’s conceptualization of the concept, it is safe to concur with Davis’s (1959) 
view that a group’s level of sensitivity, consciousness and dissatisfaction increases as the 
deprivation expressed in the correlation or gap between their social category and desired 
status increases, while their consciousness decreases as total deprivation decreases. The 
concept of deprivation within the context of this theory is systematically used to express 
feelings of individuals or groups that lack some value, status or conditions that they think 
they should have (Gurr 1971: 24). It is maintained by proponents of this theory that such 
deprivation leads to a sensation of anxiety, frustration, terror, depression, aggression and 
rage, which eventually creates collective discontent and translates to violence (Gurr 1971 and 
Richardson 2011).  
 
Deducing from the succinct illustration of relative above, it is reasonable to argue the existing 
and increasing gap between their reality and their desired and entitled condition amongst the 
various groups in Jos accounts for at least some of the violent conflicts in Jos. To be more 
specific, it implies that the unemployed, educated and skilled youth, for instance, have chosen 
to tread the path of violence due to the existing and increasing difficulties in acquiring their 
desired and entitled condition of being employed; a form of employment that correlates with 
their status and skills. Richardson further cemented this view in his claim that the strong 
relationship between deprivation, frustration and violence suggests that countries with fewer 
employment opportunities are more likely to experience terrorist attacks as well as events of 
planned or sporadic violent conflicts. He sums up this idea with the declaration “'relative 
deprivation' is the term... used to denote the tension that develops from a discrepancy 
between the “ought” and the “is” of collective value satisfaction, and that disposes men to 
violence.” This gap between an individual's expected and achieved welfare results in 
collective discontent (Richardson 2011:5). Within the framework of this theory and the 
context of this paper therefore, it is expected that reduction in the undesired gap via a positive 
and successful response to associated deprivations among the deprived will diminish events 
of violence while enhancing peace in a society. But, contrary to this idea is the fact that not 
all violent conflicts may be consequences of deprivation, whether relative or absolute. 
Religious, ethnic and ideological conflicts are examples of conflicts that sometimes emerge 
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from the differences or incompatibility of certain religious, ethnic or ideological beliefs and 
values. As a theory, the relative deprivation theory is capable of an in-depth analysis of the 
underlying causes of some events of violent conflicts. Despite that, the focus of this study 
makes the adoption of the relative deprivation theory inadequate in the realization of the 
objectives of this study which broadly rests on the assessment of youth participation in peace-
building processes in Jos. It may adequately throw light on some of the fundamental factors 
responsible for the events of violent conflict in Jos, but will not be of much help in exploring 
the depth of youth participation in the various peace-building initiatives and how their 
participation could be enhanced. Additionally, the relative deprivation theory is incapable of 
furthering understanding or providing a deeper explanation of conflicts that ensues from 
ideological differences and values rather than certain forms of deprivation. Hence, this theory 
is considered unsuitable for this study due to its insufficient allowance for the exploration of 
young people’s participation in the peace-building processes. 
 
3.2.5. Structural-functional theory 
 
From the outset, there are a variety and sometimes differing comprehensions of the structural-
functional theory. Davis (1959: 757), in his work The Myth of Functional Analysis as a 
Special Method in Sociology and Anthropology presents a broad view of structural functional 
theory; he holds that “consensus on the definition of structural functional analysis does not 
exist, but that examination of the features most commonly mentioned and of the work 
actually done under the label shows it to be, in effect synonymous with sociological 
analysis”. It is a theory that comprehends a society as a complex system; it therefore e xplains 
the cohesion of the various components of these systems. These components comprise of the 
various individual segments or categories that fully enhances the functioning of the system 
(society) including realities such as family, the different developmental stages of a person, 
government, business, values etc. Proponents of structural functional theory see society as 
“composed of differentiated interrelated structures reacting to one another and constitutes an 
integral whole on a psychosocial level” (Davis 1959: 761). As previously mentioned, 
businesses, government and even the various human developmental stages are some of the 
interrelated structures in the society relevant to this study.   
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The structural- functional theory as a conflict analytical tool explicates conflict through a 
“generational” prism. It focuses on the age or generational differences which result from 
man’s biological nature. The fundamental postulation of this theory is that “as young people 
mature and move into adult social positions, their attitudes and behaviour must change 
accordingly” (Goertzel 1972: 328). Youthful unrest, within the structural- functional theory, is 
therefore considered a troublesome but temporary problem resulting from the personal 
traumas of adolescence (Goertzel 1972: 328). Given this understanding, the reality of youth 
involvement in violent conflicts may be considered a normal process in their development 
and integration into the adult world. From this viewpoint, their involvement and role in 
conflict is nothing to worry about, given that it is an indispensable phase of life that they must 
go through. Beyond this understanding, Goertzel (1972) highlights the interpretation of 
Parsons and Eisentadt of the youth culture “as arising from a situation of anomie, where there 
is a lack of consistent norms to govern behaviour. Bearing in mind that all the sectors of the 
system need to work harmoniously for the stability of society, Parsons, Eisentadt and other 
functionalists consider the element of youthful unrest as  an abnormal situation which will 
inevitably be corrected when the society works out some of its inconsistencies”. Implicit in 
their interpretation is the belief that youths are mere reactors to stimuli and inconsistencies in 
society that necessarily result in unrest, while the society’s amendment of such 
inconsistencies will ultimately redress their focus.  
 
The structural- functional theory, though not flawless, provides a psychosocial account of 
young people’s disposition to conflict. It does throw some light into the political and 
psychosocial discussion of societal conflicts. Irrespective of the relevance of this contribution 
to a better understanding and management of violent conflict, it does not offer much room for 
the discourse of peace-building and how such peace-building could be sustained from the 
angle of youth participation in peace-building processes. Being cognisant of the central place 
of cohesion and well- functioning individual segments of a system in the structural functional 
theory, some structural functionalists contend that a society (system) is best analysed through 
the lens of social distribution. This includes the availability and unequal availability of 
resources and the structures through which people may gain access to them. In so do ing, 
some of the structural analysts “considered more fully, how power over access to resources 
affects relationships and to examine linkages between large-scale units as well as between 
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persons” (Wellman n.d.: 30 and 33). The theory takes it for granted that absence of conflict 
through structural reform and enhanced network amongst the various segments improves 
stability and ultimately peace in a society. Beyond these assumptions, this study 
acknowledges the relevance of peace-building processes/initiatives and the dynamism of 
young people’s participation in these processes for the attainment of sustainable peace in the 
society. In view of the primary focus of this study, which is the assessments of youth 
participation in peace-building processes, the structural functional theory does not further 
deeper comprehension of youth participation in the identified initiatives. The structural-
functional theory is, therefore, considered unsuitable for this study because it neither 
enhances our understanding of peace-building processes nor does it provides room for 
adequate discourse of peace-building processes and the participation of the youth in these 
processes. 
 
Although the abovementioned theories are valuable in the analysis of conflict and violent 
phenomenon, they are not suitable for the pursuit of the objectives of this study. This is 
largely due to their inability to contribute constructively towards achieving the set objectives 
of this research study. 
 
Following a careful review of literature addressing issues of conflict and peace-building, 
human security conceptual framework and civic participatory theory are adopted as the 
theoretical prisms through which this study is embarked upon. They are employed with a 
central focus of establishing and facilitating detailed comprehension of the conflict and 
peace-building processes in Jos. Particular attention will be paid to ascertaining the nexus 
between human security and peace-building whilst the suitability of civic participatory theory 
as an appropriate lens to engage with the incorporation of youth in Jos’s peace-building 
processes is also analysed. Human security is employed as the conceptual base from which 
the arguments for youth participation in the peace-building process ensue. Conceptual 
framework63 according to Egbert and Sanden (2014: 5) is considered as an overall worldview. 
It is an individual perspective defined not only by values and perceptions, but also the sum of 
one’s experiences, beliefs and knowledge from every facet of life...” Eboh (2009) defined a 
                                                 
63
 It was strongly suggested by Egbert and Sanden (2014), that the conceptual framework of a researcher be 
made exp licit, however briefly, in order to help the reader better understand the research un dertaking. 
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conceptual framework for research purpose as a schematic description and illustration of the 
causative mechanisms and relationship deducible from the research problem. It spells out the 
context and forms of relationship or interactions between phenomena, as well as the process 
or flow associated with the interactions. Imenda (2014) and (Chukwuedo and Uko-aviomoh 
2015) further posit that a conceptual framework is an end result of bringing together a 
number of related concepts to explain or predict a given event, or give a broader 
understanding of the phenomenon of interest or simply, of a research problem. Implicit in 
these three comprehensions of conceptual framework, especially within the context of 
academic research, is the influence conceptual framework on the researcher’s choice on the 
various components of the study. It is argued by the cited authors that a researcher’s 
conceptual frameworks impacts his/her choice of key concepts that the research focuses, the 
choice of research methodology, theoretical framework and other components of the study, 
with the aim of explaining or giving a broader understanding of the phenomenon. In the same 
disposition, human security as a conceptual framework provides a platform that facilitates 
discussion aimed at arriving at a better understanding of the largely state-centric disposition 
of existing peace-building initiatives in Jos while advocating for the re-orientation of peace-
building initiatives to human or individual focused.  
 
The choice of this framework is strongly guided by its centrality and advancement of 
people’s protection against a broad range of threats via the empowerment of people to act on 
their own behalf (Human Security, 2003: 2). The dominant military approach to security in 
Jos and Nigeria generally highlights the government’s allegiance to the traditional and state-
centric approach to peace-building and security in general. The persistent reoccurrence of 
violent conflict despite their uncompromising adoption of this state-centric approach, evident 
in the militarisation of the security process, reveals the inefficiency of this approach to peace-
building.  
 
Prior to the attenuation of the East-West ideological tensions, security was largely construed 
from the viewpoint of security that gave priority to the state. According to Booth (1991: , this 
form of security “tended to be equated with State security and was thus viewed only from a 
State-centric and militarist point of view with State as the sole actor”. This was generally 
referred to as traditional or national security. Embedded in this approach to security was the 
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conjecture that threats to national security were primarily external which required a military 
response. It further led to the development of policies promoting “preservation of territorial 
integrity, respect for the sovereignty of States, non- interference in the domestic affairs of 
States and sovereign equality of States” (Akokpari, 2007: 8). These principles were widely 
accepted by States and organisations, consequently leading to the UN Charter’s definition of 
security primarily in regards to the State (Oberleitner, 2005: 189) and its call for collective 
action among States to promote collective security.  
 
However, the inherent weaknesses and limitations of this security approach necessitated a 
paradigmatic shift in the deliberation of security issues. As alluded to by McKay (2004), 
issues of poverty, violence, denial of basic human rights and the State’s failure to protect its 
citizens remain unsettled inadequacies of the traditional approach to security. The idea of 
human security, therefore emerged in response to the debate of issues of security and peace-
building. Axworthy (2001: 19) Canada’s former Minister of Foreign Affairs, was candid in 
his assertion that 
 
Security, traditionally, has focused on the state because its fundamental purpose is to 
protect its citizens. Hobbled by economic adversity, outrun by globalization, and 
undermined from within by bad governance, the capacity of some states to provide 
this protection has increasingly come into question. This capacity is particularly 
obvious in war-torn societies. The state has, at times, comes to be a major threat to its 
populations rights and welfare.... This drives us to broaden the focus of security 
beyond the level of the state and toward individual human beings, as well as to 
consider the appropriate roles for the international community.  
 
According to Poku et al. (2007: 1158) the AU’s Non-Aggression and Common 
Defence Pact of 2004, gives emphasis to this view through their declaration that, “In 
Africa, state security is often threatened not by conventional threats of armed attack 
from other countries, but by more insidious dangers, many of which arise from the 
weakness of the African state itself”. Hence, they define security in Africa to mean  
 
The protection of individuals with respect to the satisfaction of the basic needs of life; it 
also encompasses the creation of the social, political, economic, military, environmental 
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and cultural conditions necessary for survival, including the protection of fundamental 
freedoms, access to education, healthcare, and ensuring that each individual has 
opportunities and choices to fulfil his/her own potential (ibid).  
 
The popularity of human security theory and its easy adoption by various institutions 
and states as the alternative to the traditional model of security and peace-building 
insinuates its potentials and strengths in addressing some of the weaknesses inherent 
in the traditional approach. Prior to our analysis of the relevance of these potentials 
and strengths to the discourse of peace-building, it is pertinent that we demystify the 
concept of human security via our interrogation of recent debates and interpretations 
of the theory.  
 
3.3. Recent debates and interpretation on human security  
 
The concept of human security precedes the United Nation’s Development Programme’s 
(UNDP) report of 1994, despite the perceived unanimity among scholars and practitioners in 
the claim that the idea of human security gained popularity through the UNDP’s persuasive 
presentation of the concept in their Human Development report in 1994. The concep t has, 
since this popularity endured a variety of conceptual and operational debates. Just like many 
other concepts, its comprehension differs. The U.N (1994: 23) articulation of human security 
portrays it as  
 
Safety from such chronic threats such as hunger, disease and repression. It means protection 
from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the pattern of daily life – whether in homes, in jobs or 
in communities.  
 
This understanding of human security is a shift away from the traditional state-oriented 
security approach that gives rise to the employment of military power based on the quest for 
state security. The idea of human security draws attention to the people, both as individuals 
and groups, who live within the state. Rather than the defence of the state at the expense of 
the human person, this approach to conflict advances people’s security both as an end in itself 
and as means towards the enhancement of state security. Newman (2001: 239) upholds this 
view in his assertion that “human security places the individual as the referent object of 
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security rather than – although not necessarily in opposition to – constructions such as state 
sovereignty and national security.” It is arguable therefore, that the notion of the human 
security approach is not in opposition to the traditional or state-centric approach to security. 
Rather, a successful application of the values of the human security approach to security 
would in the long run result in state security.  
 
This understanding of peace-building calls for a move from state to individuals or a people 
oriented approach and from a military response to a more holistic approach to security and 
peace-building. A review of Newman (2001)  and  Cockell (2002) brought to light that the 
human security theory is built on the conviction that there is an ethical responsibility to 
reorient security and peace-building around the individual in a redistributive sense. In 
contrast to this approach, a review of peace-building efforts in Jos reveals an enormous 
reliance on military intervention and setting up of a judicial commission of inquiries. 
Notwithstanding the continuous deployment and the significant presence of the military and 
previous judicial commissions in Jos, the frequent reoccurrence of violent conflict in the city 
highlights the inefficiency of these mechanisms in ensuring sustainable peace in Jos. The 
identified ineptness is rooted in the exclusion of the actual people these mechanisms were 
designed to serve. Consequently, the lack of substantive participation of youth in the 
establishment of such initiatives threatens the realization of its objectives and the 
sustainability of such an objective if achieved (U.N, 2009a:19). The human security 
approach, on the other hand, inherently has the safety of people as the focal point. It is a 
theory that argues for protection of people from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the pattern 
of daily life and also advances the goal of stability within and between states through the 
protection of people’s socioeconomic status and human rights (Newman, 2001: 241). Hence, 
embedded in the theory are other distinct and well-articulated units or areas of human 
security:  
 
 Health security 
 Environmental security 
 Community security 
 Food security 
 Economic security 
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 Political security  
 Personal security 
 
3.3.1. Sources of human security or insecurity 
 
Inherent in the discourse of human security therefore, is a deep concern for the previously 
mentioned areas of security. Similar to Galtung (1973), a multi-sectoral analysis of conflict, 
the Human Security Unit of the U.N (2009b:7), conceives the human security as a “multi-
sectoral and prevention-oriented approach” to peace-building. The ‘multi-sectoral’ nature of 
the human security approach is reflected in its multi- layered understanding of the several 
forms and sources of threats to the human person including the individual, institutional and 
structural forms and sources of human insecurity.  
 
a. Individual form 
 
The individual form of human insecurity according the United Nations denotes the  
“lack of ability to protect one’s self from physical violence, whether from the state or 
external states, from violent individuals and sub-state actors, from domestic abuse, or 
from predatory adults”(U.N, 2009b:7). This is a form of insecurity that is felt at a 
personal or individual level; it could be either an individual person or an individual 
community. Insecurity at the individual level includes threats or harmful actions 
directed against individuals or people and their properties, which may or may not 
result in visible and immediate consequences (Tschirgi 2003 and Conteh-Morgan 
2005). Such threats present direct or indirect menaces to one’s egos, a community’s or 
society’s sense of self- image and self-worth. 
 
b. Institutional sources 
 
The institutional sources of human insecurity are concerned with triggers of 
insecurity that originate from the mismanagement of state institutions and their 
failure to adequately meet the needs of the people. These include the politicization 
and neglect of the medical institutions (hospital, clinics and even pharmacies) going 
for a lengthy period without drugs and medications, and a serious shortage and 
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mismanagement of educational facilities (ill-equipped libraries and laboratories, 
deaths of qualified Staff etc.). Of equal importance is the government’s inability to 
meet the employment needs of its citizen and the needless retrenchment of qualified 
staff.  The reality of these elements in a society, according to Conteh-Morgan (2005: 
71) breeds “oppression, corruption, torture, paramilitary brutality, state repression...” 
 
c. Structural and cultural sources: 
 
Scholars such as Conteh-Morgan (2005) and Lederach and Maiese (2003) have 
echoed the relationship between human insecurity and social/cultural elements of a 
society across the globe.  This is about the ways people construct and organize their 
social, economic, and cultural relationships to meet their basic human needs. A 
society’s inability to build adequate conditions for the management of the various 
groups interests amicably will easily threaten existing peace and security in such a 
society. Hence, Lederach and Maiese (2003) argue that the ways in which social 
structures, organisations and institutions are built, sustained and changed, highlight  
underlying causes of conflict and insecurity in a society. Building on this view, 
Conteh-Morgan (2005:76) argues that the consequences of such structural 
weaknesses are easily translated into “poverty, hunger, avoidable inequalities, 
unemployment and so forth. 
 
It may be worth noting that the concept of human security has received its fair share of 
criticisms in the academic debate. Paris (2001:88), for instance, highlights its conceptual 
weakness in his claim that the “existing definitions of human security tend to be 
extraordinarily expansive and vague, encompassing everything from physical sec urity to 
psychological well-being, which provides policymakers with little guidance in the 
prioritization of competing policy goals...” This has led to further slating of the concept with 
the view that it is a slippery slope by design and that its cultivated ambiguity renders it an 
effective campaign slogan (ibid). Despite these reservations, this theory serves a fundamental 
role in uncovering some of the inherent limitations embedded in the state-oriented 
conceptualisation of security. Additionally and more importantly, Christie (2010:170) affirms 
one of the constructive elements of this theory in her assertion that “human security appears 
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to offer a little something to everyone ... it provides a framework for disparate communities 
[such as Jos] to talk about issues of security in ways that were not possible when security was 
understood to relate directly to the State”. In a similar line of reasoning, this theory provides a 
reliable platform for an in-depth engagement and interaction with the youth in peace-building 
processes in Jos. It throws light on the injustice and various forms of violence that youths 
have been subjected to, while highlighting possible options for the incorporation of youth 
peace-building processes. This theory is therefore adopted for this study based on its potential 
contributions in providing a peace-building framework through the eradication or diminution 
of the sources of threats and insecurities to the people of Jos both at individual, institutional 
or structural/cultural levels.  
 
3.4. The Human security–peace-building nexus 
 
The adoption of the human security necessitates the establishment of the nexus between 
human security and peace-building for better comprehension and appreciation of its worth in 
this research study. Scholars such as Conteh-Morgan (2005), Tschirgi (2003), McKay (2004) 
and Ogata and Cels (2003) have grappled with these concepts and their relationship to 
various degrees. Whilst Conteh-Morgan (2005) and McKay (2004)  employed the 
constructivist and feminist perspectives in their review of the relationship between peace-
building and human security, Tschirgi (2003) positions peace-building as a link between 
human security and development. A common trend in these discourses are the quest for better 
comprehension of the link between the concept of human security and peace-building, and 
the maximisation of their potential and benefits in a society. In this section of the stud y, a 
similar effort is made to unravel the inherent symbiotic relationship embedded in these 
concepts and how its adoption in Jos’s peace-building processes will enhance sustainable 
peace in society.  
 
The adopted understanding of peace-building in this research study establishes peace-
building as a “comprehensive concept that encompasses, generates, and sustains the full array 
of processes, approaches and stages needed to transform conflict towards more sustainable, 
peaceful relationships”. An evident attribute of this comprehension is its invitation for the 
exploitation of all possible avenues through which peaceful relationships can be encouraged. 
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This view is not very different from the objectives of human security. This is evident in Poku 
et al's (2007: 1164-5) assertion that  
 
Security defined in terms of human security requires positive peace: that is, the active creation 
of structures and agencies to address the developmental sources of injustice that promote 
conflict and focus security back onto issues of state failure and the political economics of 
conflict.  
 
In a similar line of thought, the United Nations’ Commission on Human Security’s (2003: 2), 
comprehends human security as “a response to new opportunities for propelling development, 
for dealing with conflicts and for blunting the many threats to human security”. Conteh-
Morgan (2005: 72) defines human security as “a situation/condition free of injury/threats to 
an individual’s, group’s or community’s well-being, including freedom from threats and/or 
direct attacks on physical and psychological integrity”. This definition of human security is 
somewhat unanimous with Galtung's (1973)  reflection of negative and positive peace64. Poku 
et al (2007) and other scholars’ highlighted conceptions of peace-building and human 
security as an integral relationship between the two concepts. It is safe to argue that genuine 
attempts and initiatives in the effort to ensure sustainable peace in a society will require a 
deep understanding and confrontation of key issues underscored in the discourse of human 
security thus far. This argument is put forward on the supposition that the elimination of both 
direct and indirect threats to both individuals and communities will lay some foundation 
needed for the transformation of conflicts towards a more sustainable and peaceful 
relationship. Hence, a peace-building effort attempts to unravel the threats and insecurities in 
a society in terms of those who experience them, what makes them vulnerable to those 
threats, the sources or perpetrators of these threats and their motivations, and mechanisms 
through which all the identified variables could be addressed.  
 
In highlighting the nexus between human security and peace-building, it is necessary to assert 
the UN’s Commission on Human Security’s and Conteh-Morgan’s (2005) account of human 
security which portrays the human security as an adequate lens through which our quest for 
                                                 
64
 Negative peace, he depicts as the absence of direct violence (organized or collective violence or threats) 
directed at indiv iduals or groups of people while positive peace is understood as eradication or adequate 
management of the source of indirect v iolence.  
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sustainable peace and its building processes could be interrogated. It is perhaps a framework 
for a systematic engagement with the goals of peace-building initiatives as stipulated in 
Lederach’s (1997) interpretation of peace-building and its processes.  
 
The civic participation theory, within the context of this study, serves as a lens that enhances 
discussions around youth participation in the adopted conceptual framework of human 
security in relation to peace-building. The participatory theory advances strategies and 
mechanisms that enhance the youth involvement. In so doing, the opportunity for the youth to 
directly benefit from the peace-building is amplified while they simultaneously play 
significant roles in the peace-building initiatives. Before further explication of the 
participatory theory, it is important unpack the concept of a theory. This will be followed by 
the discourse of participation as a theory and how it is applied in this research.  
 
In general term, a theory is considered as an abstraction of some observable fact, though it 
could be sometimes imagined in a form that makes the simplification or abstraction clear. 
Evident in the writings of Fox and Bayat, 2007; Jabareen, 2009; Kitchel and Ball, 2014 and 
Imenda, 2014, the basic components of a theory are concepts, and it consists of statements, 
each of which expresses a relationship between or among concepts. Hence they consider a 
theory is an abstract generalization that systematically explains or predicts the relationships 
among phenomena. More specifically, Chukwuedo (2015: 91) construes a theory as “a theory 
as a proposed explanation for how a set of natural phenomena will occur, capable of making 
predictions about the phenomena for the future, and capable of being falsified through 
empirical observation”. In essence, a theory serves the purpose of explicating, predicting and 
furthering the comprehension of phenomena. In some cases, a theory is used to challenge and 
extend existing structures or knowledge. According to Creswell, “theories could be categorise 
into three types based on the degree of the theory’s generality or specificity. These include 
grand (Macro- level), middle-range (Meso-level) and substantive (Micro- level) theories” 
(Creswell cited in Chukwuedo 2015: 92).  
 
Grand (Macro- level) theories “are used to explain major categories of 
phenomena and are more common in the natural sciences” (Chukwuedo 2015: 
92). These theories are not geared towards abstracting from particular 
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phenomenon but concerns the operations of larger aggregates of reality such as 
cultural system, social institutions etc. Grand theories are at the borderline 
paradigm, and more often than not, they are fertile ground for the development 
of meso- level and substantive theories. Middle-range (meso- level) theories are 
the links between macro and micro level theories; they are more specific in 
certain phenomena than grand theories” (ibid) and they operate at an 
intermediate level. Substantive (micro- level) theories “offer explanations in a 
restricted setting and are limited in scope” (ibid). Substantive theories are often 
utilized for the explanation and comprehension of specific issues dealing with 
limited category of people and with limited space and time.  
 
3.5. Theorizing Public (Civic) participation 
 
Wengert (1976: 31) in a piece titled  Citizen Participation: Practice in Search of a Theory 
remarked “... ideas on citizen involvement and public participat ion might benefit from 
specific attempts to relate them to theories”. Embedded in this observation is the conviction 
that public participation, as a theory of governance has not been effectively theorized and that 
its formulation and critical analysis is seriously needed. In the same piece of work, Wengert 
(1976: 40) further asserts, “citizen involvement and public participation must also meet the 
test of public interest ... hence the need for a theory of participation which can be related both 
to normative and empirical conceptions of our democratic ...” 
 
Consequent to the aforementioned need for an adequate theory of public participation, the 
second half of the 20th century saw the concept of civic participation65 widely studied and 
supported by both scholars and practitioners. Writers such as Arnstein (1969),  Amundsen 
(1982), Finkel (1985), Rowe and Frewer (2000) and Wong, Zimmerman and Parker (2010)  
are outstanding figures in this field. Arnstein (1969: 2), in an influential and a widely-cited 
article titled, “A Ladder of Participation,”66 discourses participation through the meso-
theoretical lens of power. She conceptualizes participation as: 
                                                 
65
 Civic participation within the context of th is work shall be used interchangeably with similar concepts such as 
public participation, cit izen participation, community participation and grassroots participation. 
66
 Have been reprinted in "The City Reader" (second edition) edited by Richard T. Gates and Frederic Stout, 
1996, Routledge Press and in the year 2004.  
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The redistribution of power that enables the have-not citizens, presently excluded 
from the political and economic processes, to be deliberately included in the future. It 
is the strategy by which the have-nots join in determining how information is shared, 
goals and policies are set, tax resources are allocated, programs are operated, and 
benefits like contracts and patronage are parceled out. In short, it is the means by 
which they can induce significant social reform, which enables them to share in the 
benefits of the affluent society. 
 
It is worth noting that Arnstein’s proposed “ladder of participation” was a critic of the limited 
extent of local control in U.S urban development programs (Bruns, 2003: 3). Hence, she 
advocates for citizen control and maximum feasible participation of the masses in the United 
States development programs. It is specifically a guide to analyzing how power is distributed 
when significant decisions are made. Bruns went further highlighting Arnstein’s revelation of 
how “the legislative mandate for ‘maximum feasible participation’ in urban development had 
frequently been ignored, or applied in ways that resulted in little or no genuine power for 
local communities” (ibid). Arnstein’s understanding implies that participation goes beyond 
the simple presence of actors and stakeholders in a particular process. Rather, it includes an 
active involvement in a decision-making process, which may involve the evaluation of 
existing mechanisms and policies, active contribution in the agenda setting and an influential 
voice in policy decisions. It is the people’s actualization of their ability to constructively 
influence a policy decision in their society. To simplify the complexities embedded in the 
notion of participation, Arnstein (1969) outlined a typology of eight levels of participation as 
reflected in figure 1 and further splits this classification into three broad categories for easy 
analysis.   
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Figure 4: Degrees of citizen participation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Arnstein (1969) 
 
Although this ladder of citizen participation is comprised of some limitations due to its 
simplistic outlook and its challenges to explicitly account for the complex factors responsible 
for the differences in the various stages of participation, the ladder, nonetheless, is effective 
in enhancing a good understanding of the various forms and depths of participation. 
 
The theory of participation according to Amundsen (1982: 25) “was structured around the 
concepts of ‘representative’ as well as  ‘participatory’ democracy”. According to Aragones 
and Sánchez-Pagés (2009:) “Participatory democracy is a process of collective decision-
making that combines elements from both direct and representative democracy: Citizens have 
the power to decide on policy proposals and politicians assume the role of policy 
implementation.” Similar to the concept of participatory democracy, Rowe and Frewer 
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(2000:6) citation of Smith (1984), intimate that public participation includes a group of 
measures designed to “consult, involve, and inform the public to allow those affected by a 
decision to have an input into that decision”. Such depth of participation, as indicated in the 
Fig 4 is understood as citizen’s power. This is the degree of participation that allows citizens 
the opportunity to make an active impact on the decisions that affect them and their society. 
The table below briefly elucidates the eight ladder of participation according Arnstein under 
the three broad categories.  
 
Table 3: Levels of participation 
 
Source: Arnstein (1969) summarized and redesigned by the author (2016) 
 
Arnstein’s ladder of participation has been adopted and re-defined by different scholars and 
practitioners since its formulation. As reflected in Bruns' (2003) study titled: “Water Tenure 
Reform: Developing an Extended Ladder of Participation”, Connor (1988)  and (Potapchuk, 
1. Nonparticipation 2. Tokenism 3. Citizen Power 
Manipulation Therapy Informin
g 
Consultation Placation Partnership Delegated 
Power 
Citizen 
Control 
The bottom stairs of the 
ladder compressing of 
manipulation and therapy 
are broadly categorised as 
non-participation. This is 
because this level of 
participation does not 
enhance genuine 
involvement from the 
participants; rather 
according to Arnstein 
(1969: 2) it provides power 
holders a platform to 
“educate” and “cure” the 
participants.  
 
This is a level of participation may allow 
some form of participation from the 
people. It enables the have-nots (the 
masses) to hear and have a voice; 
however, they lack the ability to ensure 
that their views will be heeded by the 
powerful or decision makers. 
At the topmost level are various levels 
of participation categorised as the 
citizen power. Within this category of 
participation, people are endowed 
with increased decision-making 
influence. The people can enter a 
form of partnership that enables them 
to negotiate and engage in trade-offs 
with traditional power holders. Unlike 
the “nonparticipation and the 
“tokenism” category, in the citizen 
power, the people or have-not citizens 
are capable of obtaining most 
decision-making seats or even full 
managerial power.  
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1991) remodelled Arnstein’s ladder in an attempt to address potential drawbacks in her 
model. In addition to Arnstein’s ladder of participation’s simplistic nature, Bruns (2003: 3-4) 
term her deliberate provocative critique of low level of participation inadequate and 
unsatisfactory on the basis of the strong negative connotations embedded in it. Hence, 
Connor (1988) and Potapchuk (1991), in an effort to address these issues, proposed the “New 
Ladder of Participation” and “Levels of Shared Decision-making” respectively: 
 
 
 
 
Source: Connor (1988)    Source: Potapchuk (1991) 
 
Connor’s model of participation uncovers some other possible ladder or level (mitigation and 
litigation) of people’s participation with the aim of a better reflection of a logical progression 
from one level of participation to another. In so doing, he anticipates the avoidance and 
resolution to public controversy about certain issues with an existing ladder of participation 
(Connor, 1988: 250-1). However, it is worth noting that many questions about the impact of 
Government consults with 
individuals and decides 
Government Decides 
Government works with a 
Representative and they jointly 
decide 
Government consults with 
representative group and decides 
Government delegates decisions to 
others 
Figure 6: A new ladder of citizen 
participation  
 
Figure 5 : Levels of shared decision-
making 
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this modification remains unresolved. Bruns (2003) for instances, remains sceptical about the 
ways the introduction of mitigation and litigation have positively impacted the quality of 
participation. He categorically holds that “shifting to mediation or litigation does not, 
however, raise the level of participation by citizens. The scale does not include delegation of 
authority or other shifts toward citizen control as an option” (Bruns 2003: 5).  
 
Potapchuk (1991) on the other side, through his Levels of Shared Decision-Making, suggests 
that while consultations are typically staff-driven processes, joint and delegated decisions 
would be citizen-driven.  He advocates for an early incorporation of participatory principles 
in decision-making processes with an aim of developing “positive, open and collaborative 
civic culture”.  
 
The Department of Community Health Sciences’ research team led by Wilfreda Thurston 
from University of Calgary, made a significant stride through their contribution to the quest 
and effort to develop adequate theory on public participation. They uphold the view that to 
build comprehensive claims about public participation, there is a need for some consistency 
in the comprehension of its theoretical variables. They argue that such a framework ought to 
“encourage clear articulation of an initiative that would help describe its components, specify 
the public participation techniques (e.g., advisory councils, public forums, citizen juries, 
partnerships), the resources used, the objectives pursued, as well as the target of change or 
desired outcomes, and the environment in which that target is situated” (Thurston et al 2005: 
239). Hence building on the existing discourse of public participation, they employed 
grounded theory to develop a theoretical framework for understanding public participation in 
the context of regionalized health governance (:239). With the aid of the figure below, they 
presented a theory that further explicates specific comprehensions of factors that are 
evaluated in the processes and outcomes of public participation.  
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Figure 7: Public Participation in Local Health Policy 
 
 
In brief, application of this theory to youth and their participation in peace-building initiatives 
in Jos would seek to grasp the participatory status of the youth in political space and within 
the policy community. The theory further enables constructive discourse about the nature and 
depth of youth participation in the various peace-building initiatives at the identified various 
levels (Local Government, Other Levels of Government and Nongovernmental level). To 
facilitate these objectives, a number of themes and variables relevant to analysing the 
processes of public/civic participation, as highlighted by Thurston et al (2005) are as follows:  
 
The public participation technique or techniques employed: This zooms-in on the 
adopted medium of participation. Some highlighted examples of possible technique 
include the use of standing committee, task force, focus group, inter-sectoral 
committee, inter-organizational partnership); 
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Public participants involved: This variable focuses on the kind of participants that 
involved in a particular initiative with goal of establishing the profiles and credibility 
of such participants. In doing so, there is a need to assert how and why such 
participants became involved and who they represent;  
The actual functions of the initiative: This component delves into the defined 
responsibility of the adopted participation technique. It reflects on the formal 
mandates of the technique and participants. Some of these mandates include  
advocacy; informing management and/or the board; monitoring of the health care 
sector’s performance; acting as a liaison between a community and the health region; 
capacity building and community development).  
 
It is worthy of mention that the comprehension and application of public participato ry theory 
in this study resonates with the understanding of substantive theory as discussed above. 
Accordingly, this theory is employed to aid the explication of the specific issues dealing with 
the potential of youths as agents of peace through adequate participation in peace-building 
initiatives in Jos.  
           
3.6. Understanding Civic participation in peace-building process within the 
conceptual framework of human security 
 
The citizen participatory approach to peace-building complements the human security theory 
in this study. It is a theory that elucidates strategies for various stakeholders’ participation in 
decision-making processes. It is evident from the previous chapters that youth are an 
invaluable stakeholder in matters of peace-building in any society. The demographic 
advantage of youth and their roles in the society have been widely studied with a high degree 
of consensus in their perception as agents of violence even though recent studies advocate for 
a more optimistic attitude of their agency. It expected that adequate exploration of citizen 
participation theories will enhance and highlight ways through which youth participation67 in 
                                                 
67
 It is worthy of note that youth participation has been closely employed with the concept of youth 
development. The Oregon Commission on Children and Family, for instance, holds that “positive Youth 
Development is a policy perspective that emphasizes providing services and opportunities to support all young 
people in developing a sense of a competence, usefulness, belonging and empo werment. While individual 
programs can provide youth development activities, the youth development approach works best when entire 
communit ies including young people are involved in creating a continuum of services and opportunities that 
youth need to grow into happy and healthy adults. Youth Development is not a highly-sophisticated prescription 
for “fixing troubled kids.” Rather, it is about people, programs, institutions and systems who provide all youth, 
“troubled” or not, with the supports and opportun ities they need to empower themselves. Youth Development 
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the human security approach to peace-building can be enhanced. Haider (2009: 4), in his 
study titled “Community-based Approaches to Peace-building in Conflict-Affected and 
Fragile Contexts” advocates for the empowerment of “local community groups and 
institutions by giving the community direct control over investment decisions, project 
planning, execution and monitoring, through a process that emphasises inclusive participation 
and management”. This approach to peace-building calls for sufficient recipients’ 
participation in peace-building initiatives. It is an approach to peace-building which holds 
that “participation by the affected beneficiaries and local counterparts is vital to the 
successful implementation and sustainability of any human security programme. This is built 
on the underlying premise or philosophy that such youth participation is indeed genuine and 
holistic, focusing on the development of assets and competencies in all young people. Human 
security and peace-building programmes ought to be informed by inputs through the 
participation of the local population in order to be sustainable, legitimate and ensures 
effective achievement of the objectives of the affected community” (U.N, 2009a: 19).  
 
Bearing in mind that the youth are, often, positioned at the grassroots level in societal strata, 
the UN’s line of reasoning, as demonstrated in their report on “Human Security and Peace-
building in Africa”, necessitates the inclusion of the youth in existing and subsequent peace-
building programs since they are both perpetrators and victims of violent conflicts. In 
addition to the arguments about the element of legitimacy and effectiveness that are closely 
tied in with genuine local community participation, Farthing (2012), further stresses the 
relevance of youth participation. He contends “the concern about participation appears to 
reflect a deeper concern about the role of young people as ‘active citizens’ in society. This is 
underpinned by an implicit assumption that young people’s active engagement in democracy 
is an intrinsically good thing” (p.74). It is important to highlight that Farthing’s view as 
highlighted above does not exclude the inclusion of other marginalised stakeholders from the 
enterprise of broad or holistic participation. He rather emphasises the importance and 
“irreplaceability” of youth in the discourse of public participation due to their intrinsic value 
in such processes. The Innovation Centre for Community and Youth Development (ICCYD 
2005: 3) articulates one such value of youth participation in societal activities via their 
                                                                                                                                                        
strategies focus on giving young people the chance to form relationships with caring adults, build skills, exercise 
leadership, and help their communities”. 
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citation of Zeldin et al’s (2000) conviction that “… the mutual contributions of youth and 
adults can result in a synergy, a new power and energy that propels decision-making groups 
to greater innovation and productivity”. The ICCYD’s conception of youth participation 
revolves around the “citizen power” level of participation espoused in the preceding section. 
ICCYD (2005: 3) construes youth participation as “a process through which young people 
and adults work as partners to examine their community, create a vision for the future, and 
implement an action plan that leads to desired change.” Below is a pictorial illustration of the 
Shier’s pathway to participation.  
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Figure 8: Shier’s Pathway to Participation 
 
Source: adopted from Shier (2001: 111) 
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As highlighted in the above figure, participations are in a variety of degrees. At its minimal68, 
people are listened to, but there may not be an obligation on the listeners (adults in this case) 
to consider their input in decision-making. While at the highest and desired level, the people 
share power and decision-making responsibility with the people in authority. A phrase 
worthy of note in the ICCYD’s previously mentioned explication of youth participation is 
that young people and adults work as partners. This intimates that youth as stakeholders in a 
participatory process ought not to be relegated to the side- lines nor only allowed minimal 
involvement. This comprehension of youth participation consequently implies that anything 
below partnership as reflected in Arnstein’s ladder of participation is problematic and 
unsatisfactory.  
 
It is from the background of ICCYD’s (2005) and Arnstein’s (1969) comprehension of youth 
participation and the magnitude of their importance in the participatory processes that the 
Heads of Government in the recent Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting 
(CHOGM) unanimously admit the unique place of youth in the discourse of peace and 
security. They recognised that the “young people, who comprise sixty percent of the 
Commonwealth’s population, have an important role in building stable, secure and 
prosperous societies, and that Commonwealth programmes can help raise awareness of the 
risk of radicalisation and prevent young people from embracing violent extremism, 
radicalisation and terrorism in all its forms and ramifications. They undertook to promote 
youth participation in national development and peace-building, and to encourage partnership 
                                                 
68
 The minimal degree of participation according to Shier’s pathway to participation is the Level 1 which is 
also categorized into three various stages termed as “openings”, “opportunities” and “obligations”. He noted at 
Level 1, stage one s imply requ ires that the worker/ tea m is ready to listen . Stage two  requ ires that  
they  work in  a way that  enab les them to listen . Th is  might invo lve, fo r e xample, hav ing access 
to a qu iet t ime and p lace to talk th ings over, hav ing an arrange ment fo r staff to cover for one 
another so that a worker can take t ime to listen to an ind iv idual ch ild , o r hav ing train ing in listen ing  
skills fo r all workers. Stage th ree requ ires that listen ing to ch ild ren beco mes the stated po licy o f the 
organ is at ion, thus making it an ob ligat ion , the duty o f all staff, to listen carefu lly to what ch ild ren  
have to say. While at Level 5 ch ild ren are actively involved in a decision-making process, and share some 
real power over the decisions that are made. This occurs when young people are given reasonable number 
of seats and  vo t ing  po we r on  d ec is ion - ma king  committee. They are fee to articulate their viewpoint 
and such viewpoints are generally listen to with respect. However, the full realization of the Level 5 requires an 
explicit and uncompromising commitment on the parts of adults on the committee to share their power with the 
young people. The youth ought to be able cast their votes and make their voices heard with pressure and 
interference from the adult. 
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activity with Commonwealth youth networks to help counter the appeal of violent 
extremism” (CHOGM 2015: 2). Included in the CHOGM’s report were the resolutions and 
declaration by the Heads of Government in the above-mentioned meeting of Commonwealth 
leaders. They resolved to build  
a) A Young Commonwealth’, and foster the vital role that young people will play in 
shaping their societies and in the fulfilment of the Sustainable Development Goals. 
Heads reiterated their commitment to empowering young people as partners and 
agents of change, including investment in meaningful participation in national 
decision-making, support for youth-led initiatives, and expansion of employment and 
entrepreneurship opportunities. Heads undertook to protect and strengthen the rights 
of young people, as set out in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (CHOGM 2015: 6). 
 
b) Heads recognised the important leadership role of young people. They agreed to 
continue supporting youth-led approaches that add value across the Commonwealth 
and globally, and to promote, support and work in partnership with the 
Commonwealth Youth Council as well as regional and national youth bodies. Heads 
applauded the Youth Development Index and the growing regional networks of 
alliances of young entrepreneurs (CHOGM 2015: 7).  
 
Such is the relevance and uniqueness of youth participation in peace-building and other social 
issues that it receives a global recognition and support by relevant stakeholders. In addition to 
the CHOGM reports, other relevant documents straightforwardly reaffirmed “communities’ 
need to affirm and recognize the voices of youth in community decision-making, facilitate 
youth participation in research and problem solving, and develop and fund youth leadership 
training and life skills through positive youth/police collaboration and interactions”69.  
 
It is from the backdrop of the above comprehension (i.e. the relevance and uniqueness of 
genuine youth participation) that this theory of youth participation is embraced within the 
broader framework of civil participation and human security for the analysis of youth 
participation in the various peace-building initiatives in Jos. The application of this theory 
will facilitate the comprehension of the depth or genuineness of youth participation in the 
                                                 
69
 President’s Task Force on 21st Century Po licing. (2015. Final Report of the Presiden t’s Task Force on 21st 
Century Policing. Washington, DC: Office of Community Oriented Policing Services. (2015: 3).  
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identified initiatives. It is expected that this study’s unravelling of the genuineness of youth 
participation in the peace-building initiatives in Jos will help enlighten the public of the 
possible relationship between the youth’s participation or non-participation in such initiatives 
and their roles as agents of peace or violence respectively.  
 
One of the short falls of this theory, however, is its time-consuming nature. It is claimed that 
engagement with local community or similar actors has proven difficult and very slow in its 
nature. Although time is a scarce resource in implementation of projects, the benefit of local 
participation outweighs this highlighted limitation. The quality of legitimacy and sense of 
ownership gained from such participation could go a long way to define the success or failure 
of such a program, hence its necessity in peace-building programs. The citizen participation 
and community oriented approach to peace-building enables this study to make a case for 
youth’s substantive participation in peace-building processes. Youth participation in peace-
building process via the community-based approach will not only enhance the human security 
theory’s advocacy for capacity-building and empowerment strategies but it will also help 
overcome mistrust and set a precedent for peaceful and constructive management of local 
conflicts (Haider, 2009: 4-5). 
 
3.7. Conclusion 
 
This Chapter principally presented two theoretical approaches to peacebuilding. The first 
section of this chapter engaged with five theories with the potency of providing theoretical 
frames through which issues of conflicts and peacebuilding could be understood. However, 
the highlighted weaknesses of such theories rendered them less appropriate for this study in 
comparison with the adopted human security and civic participation theories. Discussions 
therefore focused on how the quest for peace in Jos could be informed by the human security 
and civic participation theoretical conceptions. One of the key arguments in this chapter was 
that the human security is perhaps a framework for a systematic engagement with the goals of 
peace-building initiatives while the civic participation theory, within the context of this study, 
serves as a guide or a model that enhances youth participation in the adopted human security 
approach to peace-building. It advances strategies and mechanisms through which youth 
could play significant roles in the peace-building initiatives. Furthermore, literature explored 
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in the chapter demonstrated that the effective implementation of these theories would 
additionally bring about the enhancement of trust and the formation of a formidable peace 
alliance between the youth and other key stakeholders in Jos peace processes.  
 
Chapter Four will present an overview of the youth’s involvement in the Jos conflicts. 
Commencing with a clear depiction of historical and chronological accounts of conflicts in 
Jos, the chapter goes further to interrogate the socio-economic and socio-political realities 
that disposed easy involvement of youth in the conflicts.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
Examining the youth involvement in the violent conflicts in jos  
 
4.1. Introduction 
 
Drawing on the available literature and the study’s primary data, Chapter Four seeks to 
provides an overview of the historical perspectives of Jos as a metropolitan city with a 
fundamental objective of engaging with the various conflicts and the factors responsible for 
youth’s participation in these conflicts. In so doing, the research study responds to the study’s 
second research objective which centres on analysis of the primary factors that influence 
youth’s involvement in violent conflicts in Jos.  
 
Drawing on literature from the economic significance of Jos, the first section discourses the 
significance of Jos to the Middle-belt70 geopolitical region of the Nigeria. It acknowledges 
the city’s popularity for its wealth in tin, which consequently declared Jos the economic hub 
of the Middle-belt region, attracting settlers and entrepreneurs from various parts of the 
country and the world at large. The section also presented the chronological account of 
violent conflicts in Jos with a focus on the violent conflicts that took place between the 2000 
and 2010. It explores and analyses the dynamics and causal factors of such conflicts with the 
goal of providing a clear account of the actors, the proximate triggers and the lethal impact of 
the conflicts.  
 
The second section of the chapter unpacks the subject of youth involvement in Jos conflicts. 
Although youth’s participation in violent conflicts across the globe is substantially discussed 
in various narratives, this chapter helps further the credibility of the nexus between youth and 
Jos conflicts amongst scholarly discourse. It identifies economic insecurity, une mployment 
and the culture of socio-political instability and violence as the fundamental factors 
responsible for Jos conflicts. The chapter concludes with an endorsement of the view that 
exposure to violence breeds antisocial behaviour amongst youth, though with necessary 
                                                 
70
 This is a centrally positioned geopolitical region of Nigeria that promotes the interest of the people in this 
territory. Some of the States that makes up the Middle-belt region include the Federal Capital Territory (Abuja) 
Plateau State, Kogi State, Kwara State, Taraba State etc.  
 
 
141 
 
acknowledgement of the uncertainty about the extent of the impact of such exposure to 
violent people. 
 
4.2. Historical context of the conflict in Jos 
 
Jos is the capital city of Plateau State – one of the 36 states in the Federal Republic of 
Nigeria. The city was renowned for its wealth in tin production, genuinely attracting the name 
“the tin city”. In the 1940s, Nigeria was recognised as the sixth largest producer of tin in the 
world, with Jos accounting for 80% of Nigeria’s tin ore production Plotnicov (1967: 35) and 
Danfulani and Fwatshak (2002b: 244). This status placed Nigeria and particularly Jos, on the 
world map and attracted foreign miners to the city. The geographical location of Jos and its 
commercial and political importance as the administrative capital of Plateau State since the 
creation of the state, places it in a unique position in the North Central region (commonly 
known as the Middle-Belt) of the country. Aside the Federal Capital City (FCT-Abuja), Jos 
remains one of the few cosmopolitan cities in the Middle-Belt and serves as the nexus 
between the northern and southern regions of Nigeria. These qualities stress its uniqueness 
and importance as the commercial centre of the Middle-belt region and a point of connection 
between the northern and southern part of the country. Unlike other cities in the region, the 
city of Jos is embedded with a diverse potential for its indigenes, while attracting an influx of 
immigrants from the different parts of the region, the country and the world at large. On the 
page below is a geographical map of Nigeria for easy appreciation of the city.  
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Figure 9 Map of Plateau State  
 
 
Source: (Krause, 2011) 
 
Jos was renowned for its relative peace until the 1990s. This recognition accorded it the status 
“land of peace and tourism” (Danfulani and Fwatshak, 2002a: 243) and (Ambe-Uva, 2010: 
42). However, the ongoing events of frequent conflicts and violence in Jos since the mid-90s 
question this status. The rapid degeneration of Jos from its peaceful nature to a conflict-prone 
city is strongly reflected in recent scholarly reflections and reports. Reports from the Human 
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Rights Watch (HRW) and International Crisis Group (ICG) working to analyse and prevent 
further violent conflicts worldwide clearly articulate such degeneration. Their reports of some 
of the conflicts in Jos since 2001, for instance, reveal that more than 1000 people were killed 
in the September 2001 inter-communal clashes in Jos (Tertsakian and Smart, 2001). More 
than 775 people lost their lives in the sectarian conflict in Yelwa, Jos, in 2004 (Tertsakian, 
2005), while two days of inter-communal clashes on 28 and 29 November 2008, following 
local government elections, left at least 700 people dead (Dufka, 2008). The 2010 Christmas 
Eve explosion of two churches in Jos saw about 120 people dead and a minimum of 250 
people lost their lives in other minor conflicts between December 2010 and March 2011 
(Human Rights Watch 2011)71. 
 
This chapter facilitates some reflections into some of the realities in Jos through its narrative 
of the various events of violent conflicts and peace-building initiatives. Such reflection 
enables a distinct grasp and appreciation of the realities in Jos especially with respect to its 
history of violent conflict. It does this through its chronological review of the key violent 
conflicts in Jos between the year 2000 and 2010. Effort is made at unpacking the various 
elements and dimensions of these conflicts. In so doing, the dominant dimensions of the 
conflict are discussed while highlighting some of the factors responsible for youth’s high 
representation in Jos conflicts.  
 
4.2.1. Chronological account of conflicts in Jos between 2000 and 2010 
 
Although Jos may have experienced different forms of crises in the late 1980s and early 
1990s, the ethno-political conflict of 1994 where a reaction to the appointment of a non-
indigenous candidate as the chairman of a local government marked the beginning of intense 
and recurring violent conflicts in Jos (ICG, 2012: i). While several studies allude to a 
religious motive as the underlying factor responsible for the Jos crises, a historical review of 
Jos points to a web of issues in this respect (Obaje and Uzodike (2013). The discovery of tin 
ore by the British in the 19th century necessitated the immigration of labourers 
                                                 
71
 Though arguments may be raised questioning the reliability of the Human Rights Watch data, the researcher, 
consider their statistics more accurate and reliab le representation of these conflicts in comparison with statistical 
findings by other national institutions and committees. This is due to such bodies’ tendency to understate the 
figure with the intention of the belittling the depth and significance of conflicts in the country.  
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(predominantly northerners) to work in the tin mines. This led to an influx of the Hausa-
Fulani as well as other ethnic groups such as the Yoruba and the Igbo. However, unlike the 
latter two groups, the Hausa-Fulani staked claims to political positions, land and other 
resources in the city and in Plateau State as a whole (Ambe-Uva, 2010: 43) and (Danfulani, 
2006). Such claims manifested themselves in the form of increased appointment of Hausa-
Fulani settlers to key political offices in Plateau State. Hence, counter-reaction from the 
“indigenes” over the appointment of “Alhaji Aminu Mato, a Hausa-Fulani, as Jos North 
Local Government (LG) Chairman of the Caretaker Committee by the military” and also 
“when Alhaji Muktar, a Hausa-Fulani was appointed co-ordinator of the Federal 
Government- initiated Poverty Alleviation Programme (NAPEP) in 2001” led to the 1994 
violent conflict in Jos (Danfulani, 2006). The conflict in Jos could therefore be understood as 
a struggle over the ownership and domination of the geographical location through the 
politics of participation72 by both “indigenes” and “non- indigenes”73. Events surrounding the 
various conflicts in Jos consistently point towards the struggle for the dominance and 
ownership of Jos as the causal factor in Jos crises. This remains so even though some of the 
conflicts are easily categorised as religious conflicts due to the entrenched religious animosity 
between the indigenes (largely Christians) and the non-indigenes (largely Muslims). Below is 
a tabularised and chronological review of the violent conflicts in Jos between the year 2000 
and 2010. 
 
Table 4: Chronological events of violent conflict in Jos 
 
Year Proximate Trigger  Extent of Violence 
1994 Appointments of lay leaders’ 
prompt protests and counter 
demonstrations. 
Four killed. Several city markets, an 
Islamic school, and places of worship 
destroyed. 
2001 Appointment of local 
administrator of welfare 
An estimated 1,000 to 3,000 killed. 
Violence expands across plateau state. 
                                                 
72
 This understanding, however, does not negate the uniqueness of conflicts which is contingent upon the events 
surrounding them. 
73
 According to Prof. Shadrach Gaya Best, “the Hausa maintain that they established Jos and nurtured it into a 
modern city without help from any of the indigenous ethnic groups in Jos”. This, in their view, justifies their 
claims as indigenes of Jos. 
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allowances leads to weeks of 
demonstrations, tensions rise, 
resulting in violence. 
 
Attacks by youth groups in Muslim and 
Christian neighbourhoods, on mosques 
and churches, and at the university of Jos. 
Sporadic attacks continue through 2002-
2003, killing hundreds and destroying 72 
villages. 
2004 National elections held but 
postponed in Plateau State. Local 
officials are appointed, resulting in 
disputes. 
More than 1,000 killed in attacks against 
Muslim and Christian villages from 
February to May, and 250,000 are 
displaced. Federal government removes 
state governor and appoints temporary 
replacement. 
2008 Local government elections: 
 The first in Jos since 2002 
 Are scheduled then delayed 
three times. Disputes 
emerge over party 
nominees and results. 
 
Nearly 800 killed in gang attacks and 
riots from November to December.  
2010 A dispute over reconstruction of a 
home destroyed by clashes in 2008 
leads to violence in January and 
reprisals in March and throughout 
the year. January: up to 500 
residents killed over 4 days in 
January. Many villages and homes 
destroyed. March: up to 500 killed in an 
oversight attack. December: nearly 80 
killed following twin car bombs. 
Hundreds more die in frequent 
intermittent attacks. 
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a. Events of Violent Conflict in Jos between the year 2001 and 2004 
 
Following the 1994 crisis, 2001 saw widespread and recurring events of conflict in Jos; the 
city was becoming synonymous with its new description - “scene of mass killing and 
destruction” (Ostien, 2009: 13) The 2001 event of violence in Jos had close similarities with 
the previous conflicts in  1994. It is widely reported that the conflict began over an 
appointment of a Jasawa74 as the new National Poverty Eradication Coordinator (NAPEP). 
According to the International Crisis Group (ICG) report, which is strongly supported by 
other studies and observers in the field, “the immediate cause of the September 2001 violence 
was the appointment of another settler, Mukhtar Usman Mohammed, by the civilian 
government of Olusegun Obasanjo on 20 June of that year. Mr Mohammed was appointed as 
a Coordinator to the office of the National Poverty Eradication Programme (NAPEP) and as a 
Chairman of the Local Government Monitoring Committee75 (LGMC) (ICG, 2012); (Krause, 
2011:35); (Human Rights Watch, 2011:5) and (Danfulani, 2006).  Mr Mohammed’s 
appointment to this public office drew wide criticism from the indigenes of Jos with the 
youth of these communities taking a very strong and formidable stance against it. It is 
understood that there were clear indicators of potential violence emanating from exchange of 
repulsive letters and leaflets between the youth of diverse camps and issues of suspicion and 
mistrust between indigenes and non- indigenes (settlers). Some of the research interviewees 
underlined some of these possible factors responsible for the initial conflicts. Rspd20 a 
renowned Professor at the University of Jos, in the course of one of the interviews, asserts, 
“most of these conflicts have one thing in common, it is obvious that there has been some 
mistrust and mutual suspicion between ethnic groups and between religious groups as well. 
Without mentioning names, these mistrust, this suspicion have led to situations that people 
seem to bear it in mind that at any given opportunity, they would quote and unquote (sic) 
show them76. These people are doing these and that; we shall show them. If you take the 
beginning of the conflict of 2001 as an example, you will that different groups seem to have 
had certain grievances, which were waiting for opportunities to come out (Rspd 6).  
                                                 
74
 An individual from one of the supposed non-indigenous groups in Jos commonly known as settlers  
75
 It is worthy of note that the coordinator of the poverty eradication program is a federal appointed given that it 
is a federal program; the appointment is usually made on the recommendation or advice of the state governor. 
The local government area of Jos North includes the main commercial area of the town; hence, this appointment 
is seen as important and influential.  
76
 The expression, “we shall show them”, is commonly used in the context of Jos and Nigeria as a whole by 
individuals or groups with deep resentment about the other.  
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Similarly, interviews conducted by the Human Rights Watch and their Report on the 2001 
conflict reveals the depth of some exchanges between the youth of the opposing parties 
involved in the conflict: 
 
Some groups seized the opportunity to launch personal attacks on Mukhtar 
Muhammad, posting death threats at his office, such as “Trace your roots before it is 
too late,” “Run for your life,” “You are warned once again not to step in,” “This 
office is not meant for Hausa-Fulani or any non-indigene,” “Mukhtar Muhammad is a 
wanderer. If you want to stay alive don’t step in.” Tensions were further inflamed by 
leaflets, which began circulating in the name of an organization called Hausa-Fulani 
Youths (Under 25), which contained explicit threats towards “indigenes”, such as: 
“Yes, the loss of a few families wouldn’t bother us. After all, for every single 
Anaguta’s [indigene] life and their allies; there are thousands of other Hausa-Fulanis. 
Let’s see who blinks first.” “Death is the best friend of Hamas. Be rest assured that 
we will do it even better.” “The seat is dearer to us than our lives. In that case, do you 
have the monopoly of violence?” “Blood for blood. We are ready.” Anonymous 
leaflets propagating the extension of Sharia law in P lateau State were also circulated. 
A man distributing some of these leaflets, who was arrested, reportedly confessed to 
being a Christian in disguise. Similarly, some Hausas alleged that a compilation of 
documents attributed to Hausa groups had effectively been forged and that a Christian 
group had attached an unrelated list of signatures of Muslim leaders to the leaflets, 
apparently in a bid to incriminate prominent individuals.  
 
At a more formal level, there was an angry exchange of correspondence addressed to 
the Plateau State governor by Christian and Muslim groups. The language used by 
both groups revealed deeply-held grievances caused by the divide between 
“indigenes” and “non-indigenes.” In a letter to the governor dated August 20, the 
Jasawa Development Association complained about the Christian protests that had 
described Mukhtar Muhammad as a “non-indigene”; the letter also protested about 
the refusal of the chairman of Jos North Local Government “to issue Indigene 
Certificates to members of our community. We met the Chairman and explained our 
position. He resisted vehemently and insisted we must go back to wherever we 
originated.” The (Christian) Plateau State Youths retorted on August 28 with a letter 
to the government entitled “Enough is enough.” Protesting at the actions and 
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propaganda of Hausa organizations, the letter gave the governor an ultimatum: “We 
are finally giving you sir and the security operatives 48 hours to call these so called 
Jasawa to order OR we will SURELY call them to order.” In a press conference on 
August 31, the Plateau State Youth Council stated: “The constitution of Nigeria 
allows ‘any’ citizen of the country to live in any place of his/her choice, therefore any 
person or group of persons is/are welcome to stay in Plateau State. Equally, the 
constitution recognizes the rights of the indigenes place as the owners of that given 
place. Funny and insulting that a Hausa/Fulani man from Bauchi, Kano, Katsina etc . 
who is looking for pasture and trade ‘settled’ in Jos among the indigenes of Afizere, 
Anaguta and Berom only to wake up one day to lay claim to a place leased to them 
for peaceful co-existence […]”. The letter went on to call for the position of poverty 
eradication coordinator to be given exclusively to indigenes and for all Hausa-Fulani 
chieftaincy titles to be scrapped and replaced by indigenous traditional t itles. It also 
called for the “immediate renaming and re-organization of all our Electoral Wards to 
indigenous names and original interest of our people” (Tertsakian and Smart, 2001: 5-
6). 
 
Other respondents, though without necessary contradiction to the aforementioned accounts, 
provided further and different explanation to the genesis and causal factors of the earliest 
major conflicts in Jos. In the words of Rspd 26 from the Plateau State Radio, “I remember 
that the beginning of the conflict of 2001 was about a Christian lady who wants to pass in 
place where the Muslims were praying on Friday. It is not unusual in place of worship in Jos 
to have places blocked when its time for the prayers, either for Muslim prayers or even for 
the Christians. On this particular day this young lady was there and wanted to pass when 
people were already on the road. These religious bodies have their security aids like the 
equivalent of the boys scouts and boys brigade, so in an attempt to stop her by the security 
aid, fighting ensued”. On a similar note, other interviewee from Plateau State Peace-building 
Office (PSPBO) and a Youth/Community Leader, offered similar accounts of the first trigger 
of 2001 conflict. Rspd19 from PSPBO holds that “the immediate escalation in 2001 was 
about the issue of a lady trying to cross a private worship place which was used and the 
worshipers extended to the access road leading the home of the girl and that infuriated the 
girl on a Friday, 7th September 2001. Surprisingly, this episode engulfed the town before you 
knew you it and it started a decade old or a very long conflict in Jos” while Rspd14, the 
youth and community leader further affirm this in his assertion, “actually, I think the conflict 
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started about 2pm on a Friday. What actually happened was that a girl was passing by a 
mosque during the Friday Juma prayers; and it is like some of the youths confronted her and 
that triggered the violence” (Rspd19 and Rspd14).  These extracts once again underscore the 
deep-seated tension and strain between the indigenes and settlers in Jos. As advanced by 
some of the study’s respondents, “the way arms began to flow suggest that certain group of 
people were ready and even the incidence of the lady passing in itself seems to be arranged 
or pre-planned. So in that way, it seems to be an expression of existing grievances between 
the demarcated indigenes and settlers”(Rspd 26). The highlighted threats and 
correspondences eventually developed into a full-blown conflict, which according to the ICG 
(2012: 11) resulted in the death of over 1000 people while several thousand victims were 
internally displaced within a week of violence.  
 
Just about three years after the deadly conflict of 2001, violence broke-out again in 2004 
leaving more than 700 people dead. It is generally claimed that “between September 2001 
and May 2004, 5,000 people perished in the clashes and over 250,000 people were displaced 
from their homes” (ICG, 2012: 12). Expressed more vividly and unmistakably, Rspd4 ( a 
government personnel and academic emphasized, “... it was echoed that certain group’s in 
villages were massacred; people including children and women were killed and thrown into 
wells”. Unlike the previous crisis, the 2004 violence in Jos was described as inter-communal 
clashes. This was due to the presumed overrid ing causes responsible for the conflicts that 
were dominated with struggles between indigenes and non- indigenes.  
 
The issue of indigenes vs. non- indigenes is a national problem and its root causes are 
frequently linked to the Federal Republic of Nigeria’s (FRN) Constitution. The Constitution’s 
definition of citizenship as, “every person born in Nigeria before the date of independence, 
either of whose parents or any of whose grandparents belongs or belonged to a community 
indigenous to Nigeria” (FRN Section 25 [1a]), is considered the genesis of the indigene 
verses non- indigene phenomenon. This view has received wide support from peace 
advocates, civil society organisations and researchers alike. As opined by Omotoso (2010: 
14), “one would have thought the crisis on the notion of citizenship would have been put to 
rest by the constitutional provision of Section 25 (1a), rather; its usage of the phrase 
“belonged to a community indigenous to Nigeria” is understood as a concession to the idea of 
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indigene/non-indigene phenomenon in the society. Rspd24 further established a clear 
relationship between conflict situation and concept of ind igenisation in Nigerian Constitution. 
He was critical about the concept and it’s usage as he holds that “indigeneship or 
indigenisation among the people is terms of an identity is very prominent in Jos. The so-
called natives lay emphasis on indigenes in every appointment or privilege that comes to the 
state...”(Rspd24).  One of the many reasons that could be put forward for the adoption of this 
phrase in the constitution is that it was a deliberate move by lawmakers to enhance 
government’s effort towards nation building through the injection of some sense of belonging 
and ownership amongst the citizens of the country. Just like many other concepts embedded 
with multiple interpretations and consequences, the word “indigene or indigenous” has been 
largely interpreted and employed as a tool for exclusion of the people it aimed at 
amalgamating. The inevitable implication of this claim is its direct or indirect exclusion of 
“non- indigenes/settlers” in such localities. Rspd24’s further engagement with the question of 
indigenes led to his rumination of his encounter with a senior citizen in the Jos:  
 
I remember I was having a conversation with someone who is 82years, he 
was born in Jos, in a small place outside Jos. But he said, he is being 
addressed as a settler.  And this is a constitutional lacuna, because our 
constitution is not explicit with regards to what it mean when you find 
yourself in a geographical location for more than 10years. What is your 
status? This is not explicit enough in the constitution and of course, it has 
placed many other people who have been in Jos for over five decades, yet, 
they are not treated as belonging and contributing to that state.  You pay your 
tax and everything in that state, but because you do not belong to any of those 
ethnic groups that have been identified in that particular state, you 
considered either a settler or a non-indigene (Rspd24). 
 
According to Edevbie (2000), “one of the most common claims to legitimacy is predicated in 
indigenousness, with the implication that a group that is indigenous to an area “owns the 
area” even if that group comprises a small minority of the population of the area”. Such 
claims have resulted in recurring cases of conflict in various parts of Nigeria prior to the large 
violent conflict in Jos with “settlers” demanding more inclusion and benefits from the 
geographical location they consider as theirs. The Zango-Kataf conflict of 1999 in Kaduna 
state and Warri crises of 1997 and 1999 in Delta state typifies indigene vs settler’s conflict in 
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Nigeria are a few examples of some the indigenes/settlers’ motivated violence (Edevbie, 
2000) and (Osaretin and Akov, 2013).   
 
An outstanding trait common in most of the indigenes/settlers’ phenomenon, Jos has religious 
and ethnic disparities between the indigenes and settlers. In the city of Jos, the majority of the 
supposed settlers are Hausa and Muslims while the indigenes are dominantly Christians77. 
Hence, most of the conflicts comprise of some religious or ethnic dimension to them, 
however political their underlying courses may be. Although the primary causes of the 2004 
conflict were deeply rooted in the political appointment of ‘non- indigenes’ to some strategic 
position in the state, the February-May 2004 conflicts were mostly described as religious 
conflicts due to the Christian and Muslim undertone in the conflict. It was for instance vividly 
described by the ICG (2012: 12-13) and the majority of the study’s participants that “in 
February-May 2004, massive killings took place in Yelwa, an important market town and 
commercial centre in the Muslim-majority Shendam LGA. In February, many Christians 
were killed in COCIN. Reprisal killings of Muslims followed in May. Some 1,000-people 
died in the reprisal attack, with over 700 Muslims killed in two days”. Similar to Rspd4’s 
aforementioned assertion, Rspd20, a Professor from the University of Jos remarked, “... It got 
to a situation where Jos was virtually divided on religious and ethnic grounds and so on. 
People of a particular religious group dear not go to certain places and vice versa. I think 
the event of January 2004 and 2010 in particular resulted in cruel secret killings and massive 
killings in villages. This was because people believe that certain groups had an upper hand in 
the previous conflict as certain groups and villages were massacred resulting in reprisal 
attack that led to revenge killing of people including children and women some of which 
thrown into wells in their numbers. So people who were at the receiving end at that time now 
had new grievances and were determined to retaliate which was responsible for the killings 
in the village”. These descriptions and accounts of the initial episode of conflict underscore 
people’s perception of the roles of religion and ethnicity as defining factors or character s of 
these conflicts.  
 
 
                                                 
77
 This fact does not deny the reality of mult iple relig ious identities amongst the various groups. 
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b. Events of Violent Conflicts between 2008 and 2010 
 
On the 27th and 28th of November 2008, another episode of conflict was set off. Once more, 
its root causes were political in nature. In responses to questions about the nature and causal 
factors of the conflicts between 2008 and 2010, Rspd24, a religious leader and founder of an 
NGO, upheld politics as the root causes of these conflicts. He argues 
“... when I said politically motivated, you’ll discover that some of the violence 
occurs immediately after an election or a political appointment like the ones 
we have experienced in Jos. The first one began when someone was appointed 
as the poverty alleviation coordinator for Jos, a Muslim. So an there was 
reaction from the so called indigenes and the indigenes are predominantly 
Christians, claiming that no we don’t want this guy. For me, it was because of 
the appointment and that appointment was a political appointment and the 
subsequent violence that we have experienced were as a result of elections, 
that a candidate won and the other group is saying no. But you’ll discover that 
destruction is targeted at religious institutions. So for me, I will not say that it 
is politically motivated but political, meaning that if there was no election or 
appointments there wouldn’t have been violence”. 
Another interview with an individual youth, for the purpose of this study, threw light into the 
perception and comprehension of the ordinary people’s opinion and attitude towards the 
various events of conflict. Rspd1, one of the individual youth interviewed, claims that  
“this crisis started when the so called democracy came into place, that was 
when the crises started. Before, in Nigeria, you know we were practicing 
military administration. There was nothing like that (this depth of conflicts), 
even if the crises was there, it was not the way you and I can see it. It was at 
the top level, those at the top in government knew what was going on, but an 
ordinary person like you and I do not know anything about that. When this 
administration came in then politician and the so-called elders hide under the 
umbrella of religion trying to achieve their own personal interest not for the 
benefit of the religion or those people that they are saying they are 
backing. They only hide under the umbrella of religion for them to get 
sympathy because in Nigeria. As a Nigerian you know we practice religion, if  
you are a Christian, you practice your religion the way you like it; likewise we 
Muslims. But for them to get sympathy it's when they inject religion into it  
(politics and it processes) that is when they get sympathy. So, it is political 
crisis; I don't see it as a tribal crisis. In all the tribes in Plateau, there are 
Muslims inside and the Christians in all the tribes, so if you are talking about 
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tribes, will your fellow Christians, let's put an Birom for example,  will fight a 
Muslim that is the Birom?”(Rspd1)  
Although the above extract may seem long, it serves to convey profound disposition, 
understanding and attitude of the ordinary people about the conflicts in Jos. Regardless of the 
religious undertone and the ethnic expression of the conflicts, the dominant perception of the 
ordinary citizen was that the event of conflict in 2008 in particular was politically driven. 
Furthermore, literature from ICG and HRW, two international organisations for the 
protection of human rights, offered supporting narratives with respect to the development of 
and the actual violent conflict in Jos in 2008. It was alleged by ICG (2012)  that increased 
suspicion and tensions about the expected outcome of the 2008 local council elections in 
Plateau State presented an ideal  platform for the occurrence of conflict among the occupants 
of Jos.  Ostien (2009: 26) drew attention to the postponement of Plateau S tate’s local council 
election due to the volatile and angst-ridden nature of the political space. The deferment of 
this election from 2002 to 2008 in Plateau State was not sufficient for the adequate 
management of people’s concerns and anger against each other. It was the dominant 
perception by observers that the election was for the most part peaceful, however, its 
compilation and counting was greatly mismanaged leading to the violent conflict of 2008. 
The ICG (2012:)  holds that “while the 27th of November local council election, in the 
seventeen Local Government Areas (LGA) was generally peaceful and credible, some Hausa-
Fulani viewed it as an attempt by the Plateau State Independent Electoral (PLASIEC) to alter 
the votes in favour of the ruling People Democratic Party (PDP) sparked violence”. Hence, 
violence erupted after the central collation centre was changed from the Hausa/Fulani 
dominated area without adequate notification to relevant agents and the public at large. “But 
where were the returning officers? Where was the central collation centre?” These were the 
words of the public, according to (Ostien, 2009: 31), with deep conviction that the centre was 
changed to enable rigging of votes. Consequently, violence eventually erupted taking a swift 
embodiment of a very strong religious dimension, with the Muslims and Christians killing, 
destroying and looting each other’s properties (Rspd24). Krause's (2011: 39) reference to the 
local count of victims indicates that about 620 lives were lost and over 50,000 were injured 
from the Muslim communities alone. Mosques, Islamic schools and Muslim residential 
homes were also affected. The Catholic community on the other hand, reported 23 people 
dead and about 600 houses and shops destroyed.  
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The expeditious swing from the political elements or characters in the conflict is worth 
noting. Although tension over the occupants of political positions in the local government 
was the immediate explanation for the conflict, it is alleged that violence was principally 
directed at people based on their religious identity rather than their political affinity. Most of 
the published reports present somewhat clear accounts of some of the impact on the various 
religious identities without corresponding accounts based on people’s political allegiance. 
None of the reviewed reports highlight direct attacks against political party’s emblems or 
offices during the conflict. Another unsettling dimension in this conflict was the role the 
military and police force played in the violence. Rather than the restoration of stability and 
order in the city, it is understood that they embarked on reckless killings of people. It was 
reported via various outlets that there were “118 cases of alleged arbitrary killings by the 
security forces that took place between 7a.m and 1p.m on the 29th of November 2008 in 15 
separate incidents” (Ostien, 2009: 32).  
 
Events of violent conflicts in Jos since 2010 are also largely understood as retaliatory attacks 
(Rspd4; Rspd20 and Rspd24), which are illustrated as residues and consequences of 
unresolved and deep-rooted feelings of hurt, suspicion, hate towards the other78 and revenge 
of previous attacks and killings. According Rspd20, who participated in the Ajibolar 
Commission of Inquiry, “positions had hardened during the proceedings of the 2008 Ajibola 
Commissions with participants of the commission taking side with their faction”. This claim 
was reinforced by ICG (2012: 13) who claims that “members of the Hausa-Fulani community 
did not make any representation at the commission and ultimately rejected its October 2009 
report”. The media and other accounts of the Federal Government of Nigeria and the Plateau 
State Government’s effort to investigate and address the root causes of the 2008 conflict was 
considered unsatisfactory due to the inability of these authorities to work in collaboration 
with each other. It was for instance highlighted that:  
 
It would be nice to think that, this time around, one or more of the committees of 
inquiry would produce a comprehensive report, based on solid evidence, that 
would answer, to the satisfaction of people of good will on all sides, the large 
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number of the disputed questions the crisis has thrown up; and that those who have 
committed crimes, including electoral crimes, including big men, would be 
prosecuted. Unfortunately, this is unlikely to happen. Immediately after the crisis, 
President Yar‘adua appeared in several ways to side with the Jasawa against Jang 
and the Plateau indigenes. When Yar’adua appointed his committee of inquiry, the 
Plateau indigenes said it would be biased against them and they would not appear 
before it. When Jang appointed his committee of inquiry, the Jasawa said it would 
be biased against them and they would not appear before it. Jang filed a lawsuit 
challenging Yar’adua’s right to appoint a committee to investigate problems 
within Jang’s jurisdiction. The Jasawa filed a lawsuit challenging Jang’s right to 
appoint a committee to investigate a dispute to which he is a party. Although both 
committees have proceeded with their work, each has received evidence 
essentially from only one side. Little good is likely to come from this process. 
Lesser committees appointed by the Senate, by the House of Representatives, and 
by the Plateau State House of Assembly have faced similar problems and will also 
make little impact. Each side‘s accusations against the other will live on, neither 
proven nor disproven; nothing will be resolved, no one‘s opinions will change, no 
one except perhaps a few of the foot-soldiers will be prosecuted (Ostien, 2009: 
34). 
 
As aforementioned by various interviewees, such discord between leaders intensifies existing 
differences amongst the people and ultimately leads to premonitions and  hunches of vengeful 
attacks from supposed rivals, opponents or enemies. In congruence with the views of the 
study’s interviewees, Higazi (2011: 27) and Kwaja (2011: 5) expressed similar viewpoint. 
They claim that the 2010 conflicts in Jos were premeditated and well executed attacks against 
the indigenes and Christians, owing to the fact that violence in various locations were all 
launched and brought to an end at about the same time. Reprisal attacks by the Biroms, 
Afizere and Anagutas (BAA) resulted in Hausa-Fulani’s loss of life in rural areas in three 
local government areas: Barkin Ladi, Jos South and Riyom. Several businesses and houses 
were destroyed and scores of people relocated within and outside the state.  
 
Unlike the previous conflicts in Jos, the 2010 crisis saw the frequent use of bombs and 
explosives. According to the ICG (2012: 13), there were multiple bomb blasts that resulted in 
the deaths of about 80 people on Christmas Eve. The use of such weapons not only confirmed 
the suspicions of a premeditated element of conflict, it also introduced a new phenomenon in 
the history of conflict in Jos. Questions about the possible presence of the terrorist group 
“Boko Haram” became evident and imperative. Jos, prior to 2010, was considered a fortified 
zone against the insurgent group due to the dominant Christian presence in the city and 
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apparent disparity between indigenes and settlers and the Christian and non-Christians. It is 
understood that Boko Haram, unhesitatingly claimed responsibility for explosive related 
attacks, but ICG’s interviews held in Jos in April and July 2011, reveal many conflicting 
reports on the true identity of the perpetrators (ICG, 2012: 13).  
 
4.3. Youth involvement in Jos conflicts 
 
Assertions about youth involvement in violent conflicts across the globe are increasingly 
becoming common. Youth’s participation in violent conflicts is substantially discussed in 
various narratives that analyse violent conflicts across the globe. Reviews of such narratives 
informed the World Bank’s acknowledgement “neglecting youth in development policies is a 
costly mistake that needs to be redressed with utmost urgency”.  
 
The effect of such negligence and abandonment is felt in Jos, Nigeria, West Africa and global 
society. In the words of Rspd7, a Program Manager of an NGO,  
 
“the youth of course are the tools that have been used to instigate all these 
violence. You’ll not find an elderly person going down the street and saying 
let’s burn this place, let’s kill this and all of that. The youths have often been 
the instruments; they have often been the tools that are used by the “so called” 
elites who are benefiting from the violence or conflict that we are 
experiencing. The youths are often the tools; one would quickly say that they 
are the tools (Rspd7). 
  
In similar tone, Rspd20 also maintains that “The youth are the main characters in these 
conflicts, where there are killings; it’s the youth that you find there both as perpetrators and 
victims” while according to Respd19 “the actors were the youth who were instigated by 
conflict merchants that perhaps were making profit from the conflict. The youth were utilized 
to perpetrate the conflict and they did it with all their strength”. There was in fact a 
consensus amongst the study’s interviewee that the youth were heavily involved in the 
various episodes of conflicts in the Jos. It is worthy of note that Nigeria has a history of both 
systematic and indiscriminate youth execution of violence and conflicts in the society. Omeje 
(2005b: 1), in his article Youth, Conflict and Perpetual Instability in Nigeria, echoes this 
view in his assertion “youth militias and community vigilantes such as the famous Bakassi 
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Boys have cashed in on the vacuum created by the dysfunction and legitimacy crisis of 
government’s law enforcement institutions and agencies. They are alleged substitute for the 
state’s function of law enforcement and crime control in a crude and jungle fashion”. This 
view is firmly supported by Krause with respect to the violence conflicts in Jos. He argues 
that:  
 
The presence of neighbourhood vigilante groups before the 2001 riots provided the 
youth network for local defence. These youths have clearly been involved in 
attacks and counter-attacks. Distinguishing between victims and perpetrators 
among these youths is not straightforward. On the outskirts of Jos and in rural 
areas, attacks by well-organized militia groups formed by both indigenes and non-
indigenes, predominantly Fulani on the Muslim side are well documented. Within 
the city centre, the heavy presence of security forces inhibits such movement of 
militia groups. Many residents in the central poor neighbourhoods fear the 
presence of youths and gang leaders. Once violence breaks out, local youths are 
often drawn into the fighting as joiners who expect opportunities for looting, but 
also as defenders of their neighbourhood (Krause 2011: 43).  
 
In congruence with the study’s interviewees, Krause’s assertion articulates youth’s 
involvement in Jos conflicts in a very clear and concise manner. He presents the complex 
nature of this reality. Kruse (2011) holds that youth are not only perpetrators, but they are 
also victims. This makes youth both agents and victims of violence creating vicious cycles of 
violence that need decisive and directed interventions. It is often the case that people from the 
various categories (children, youth and adults) play various roles in violence conflict in Jos 79; 
however, the representation, activities and initiatives of youth in such conflicts cannot be 
overemphasised. From the preceding discourse of various conflicts in the previous sections, it 
is evident that each conflict was initiated and escalated because of youth involvement. It was 
for instance, clearly reported that the 2008 conflict brewed up through tensions that arose 
when both youth groups waited at the new collation centre for the announcement of the 
election results. Although they were forcibly dispersed by the police, youth gangs went on the 
rampage through the city, killing, burning and looting in the central neighbourhoods (Ostien, 
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 In the reported presented by the Ajibola Commission, established by the former President Umaru Musa 
Yar’Adua, it was understood 92 individuals, groups of persons and institutions, allegedly, were d irectly  
responsible for the unrest. Topping the list of indicted institutions were the police and the army.  
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2009: 31-32). The Ajibola Commission of 2009 summed this up with a detailed report 
identifying [some of] the Muslim youth, the Berom Youth and Tudun Wada Christian Youth 
Vanguard as prominent actors in the Jos conflict (Rspd20 – a member of the Ajibola 
commission).  
 
Although the involvement of youth in Jos conflicts is well established, the study’s 
respondents also alleged that though the youth were at the forefront of all the conflicts, the 
politician, businesspersons and even religious leaders were the orchestrators of conflict.  
Rspd21 for instance argues,  
“it depends which angle one is looking at it from. Definitely, it is human beings 
involved in it. However, you can categorize them into different platforms. Then 
it is firstly the class of the politician; they are in active play. But when you 
come down to the age bracket, you’ll talk of the youth really being the foot-
soldiers ... But the political cluster use knowledge or information to 
manipulate; and the youth, being jobless and not going to school ... become the 
foot soldiers (Rspd21).  
Similarly, Rspd18 holds that  
“The instigators are the people in corridors of power.  By corridors of power, I 
am specifying the government, the religious, or the rich men. Those are the 
instigators. This three categories are the instigators, the powerful men who 
wants to protect their own interest at the expense of other people's lives.  Then 
add those in private organisations, those in government that are only after 
what they get, those are the instigators from my personal understanding.  
When you come to the religion aspect of it, the leaders, that is the religion 
intellectuals always preach provocative things against the other religions. 
 They are not being guided by the ethics of the religion of practicing ...”  
 
In harmony with these respondents, Ambe-Uva (2010: 47) also considers politicians, 
businessmen and young people as key players in the majority of conflict events in the country. 
Politicians and businesspersons, using their influence in society, mobilise the masses in 
favour of their interests. “This permeates all Nigerian States where political elites mobilise the 
pool of unemployed youths, often along the line of ethnic, religious and party affiliation as a 
vital political resource”  (Ginifer and Ismail, 2005: 8). Ginifer and Ismail pointed out that 
incumbents of power, in the run-up to the 2003 elections, aided the proliferation of small arms 
and light weapons in Nigeria by arming youths and political thugs to manipulate electoral 
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outcomes through the kidnapping or killing of political opponents, threatening and 
intimidation of electorates, destroying lives and properties and disrupting election campaigns. 
The direct involvement and participation of youths in conflict makes their contribution and 
role in violent conflict vocal and self-evident.  
 
 
4.4. Fundamental factors responsible for the high representation of youth in violent 
conflict in Jos 
 
It is worth noting that human persons are by nature unique, dynamic and metamorphic. An 
individual person’s rationale for a choice of action is open to changes depending on the 
person’s disposition to the external factors surrounding an event. Hence, the reasons and 
causes of an individual decisions and actions evolve with time and transformations in the 
environment. It is a widespread view that people participate in activities for numerous and 
diverse reasons which ought to be understood and analysed in each specific context 80. 
However, the systematic analysis of every single motive for youth’s participation in violence 
conflict is highly unrealistic. This is for the simple reasons that it is just about impossible to 
track down each individual youth that participate in such conflict and obtain their consent to 
participate in a study or evaluations. This hurdle explains Hilker and Fraser's (2009a:13) view 
that “a major challenge in terms of assessing the links between youth exclusion and violence 
is the lack of systematic studies of individual motivations for their engagement in violence”. 
This is equally acknowledged as a limitation in this study; the qualitative approach for this 
study incapacitates its potential for a broader scope of inquiry. Hence, the study’s inability to 
address every single youth’s motivation for participating in violent conflicts in Jos is 
informed by the very nature of qualitative approach to research. In spite of this, adequate and 
in-depth analysis of available data (from both primary and secondary sources) enhances our 
understanding of some of the underlying factors responsible for the high representation of 
youth in violent conflict in Jos. Thus, working closely with the adopted conceptual and 
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theoretical frameworks, this study employs a people-centred81 lens in its categorisation of the 
identified factors. These are classified into two broad categories, economic and socio-
political insecurities and threats.  
 
Table 5: Insecurities and corresponding threats as factors of violence 
 
Types of Insecurity Main Threats 
Economic (In)Security Unemployment, manipulation and persistent poverty 
Socio-political (In)Security 
Political repression, human rights abuses, inter-
ethnic, religious and other identity based tensions 
  
4.4.1. Unrelenting economic (in)-security 
 
Article 25 of the United Nations’ Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) declared 
economic security as a basic human right: 
 
Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being 
of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, and housing and medical care 
and necessary social services, and the right to security in the event of unemployment, 
sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other loss of livelihood in circumstances 
beyond his (sic) control.  
 
Considering this declaration, it could be insinuated that the concept “economic insecurity” 
ought to have attracted extensive study and a commitment to its eradication employing all 
available resources including scholarly and academic engagement. However, the concept 
remains understudied; it receives arguably minimal attention from economists and 
researchers (Bossert and D'Ambrosio, 2009; Osberg, 2009 and Osberg, 1998). Such a dearth 
in the exploration of this concept is largely attributed to the complexities embedded in the 
discussion of the concept. The United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs 
(2008: p.iv) holds that “it is not easy to give a precise meaning to the term economic 
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 As a people-centered concept, it is understood that human security places the individual at the center of 
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insecurity partly because it draws on comparisons with past experiences and practices which 
tend to be viewed through rose-tinted lenses…” Such comparisons are complicated and 
complex due to the inherent differences in the compared events and moments in histo ry. The 
psychological and subjective components of the issues further compound the complicated 
nature of this concept (Bossert and D'Ambrosio, 2009:1). In spite of these challenges, Osberg 
(1998: 23) developed one of the widely referenced definitions; he defines economic 
insecurity as “the anxiety produced by a lack of economic safety.” The idea of economic 
insecurity is strongly embedded in the uncertainty of a person’s inability to guard oneself 
against the consequences of undesirable moments. Some of such undesirable uncertainties are 
echoed in the voice of some of the study’s respondents. Rspd1, for instance, explained that  
 
“One has to be resolute. They say, the idle mind is the Devils workshop. If you 
don’t find something to engage yourself in, weather there is employment or 
business, you preoccupy yourself with unhealthy and disapproving things. If I 
don’ havet anything doing and I want to a drink, food or even cigarette, I 
would not be able to afford it so I will have to take it by force” 
 
In another interview with Rspd24, he noted “... just like it is said that an idle man is the devil 
workshop, so if you’re doing nothing whatever that comes your way, even if it’s just a peanut 
with some little promises of a N1000, N2000, N5000 after doing whatever, you grab it”. 
Rspd14 further highlight the consequences of economic insecurity experienced by the youth. 
He says,  
 
“I think that boils down to lack of doing something meaningful because as you 
see very much, most of the youths are doing nothing, they are just there. And is 
it a priest or ... (missing word) that say that an idle man is the devil’s 
workshop, so considering that most of them are doing nothing, they will see the 
conflict as another way of even making money. Yes, because some of them 
were just there looting ... eh so the second objective at the back of their mind 
was to get money out of that conflict” (Rspd14).  
 
An irrefutable common denominator of the highlighted respondents views are the elements of 
idleness, unproductively and uncertainty of the youth resulting in their vulnerability to 
conflict. Consistent with Osberg's (1998: 23) understanding of economic insecurity as “the 
anxiety produced by a lack of economic safety,” the emotional and psychological disposition 
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of people are closely linked with individual’s economic status. It is arguable that such an 
emotional and psychological correlation informed the UN’s Department of Economic and 
Social Affairs’ (2008: 4) assertion that “a rising level of economic insecurity is obviously 
damaging to the well-being of the affected households and individuals. It can also threaten 
socio-economic progress by stifling innovation, shortening investment horizons, narrowing 
choices and generating opportunistic and undesirable behavior”. This view was clearly 
articulated in Rspd25’s explanation of the economic insecurities and their consequences. He 
claims that 
 
“The conflicts in Jos have been commercialized. In Jos, we have a group of people 
called ‘conflict entrepreneurs’. These people are interested in the conflict because 
they gain from it. ... We have the idle youth, that are jobless and have nothing doing 
and they find it very difficult to survive in the city. They are interested in the conflict 
and sometimes they offer themselves for the conflict. They are interested in the conflict 
because that is when they are paid to escalate the violence and they also have access 
to loot. To worsen the situation, the former victims have now become the perpetrators 
because things happen to them and nobody cares” (Rspd25).  
 
Embedded in these respondents’ assertions is the understanding the reality of conflict provide 
some sort of employment for the “jobless or unemployed” youth. In Guy’s (2008: 16) and 
Standing’s (2008: 17) assertions “if a person has no security, not only will he/she be 
vulnerable, but it would be unreasonable to expect him/her to adopt the so-called socially 
responsible behaviour. Chronic insecurity induces adverse behavioural reactions”. It follows 
therefore that exhibition of a socially responsible behaviour; development of innovative ideas 
and the actualization of one’s potential require a fertile environment that arouses an 
appropriate emotional, psychological and physiological disposition. Taking into account the 
extracts and narratives from the respondents, it is arguable that unemployment, persistent 
poverty and idleness remain resilient factors that threaten appropriate emotional, 
psychological and physiological dispositions of people for a cultured and refined society.  
 
4.4.2. Insecurities elicited from high unemployment 
 
The International Labour Organization (ILO) defines the unemployed as numbers of the 
economically active population who are without work but available for and seeking work, 
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including people who have lost their jobs and those who have voluntarily left work (Link, 
1997:63). Other writers such as Okafor (2011), Hornby (2010) and Udu and Agu (2005) 
understand unemployment as the situation or condition of people that are capable of working 
but can neither find suitable jobs or paid jobs. The central theme that runs through their 
conception of unemployment is joblessness among employable citizens.  
 
Such joblessness could either be because of a person’s inability to find a job, lack of adequate 
qualification to take-up available jobs or ignorance of available job opportunities. Some 
writers stretch their understanding of unemployment to include people that may be working 
in position that is far below their qualification. For example, a doctoral degree holder that 
may be serving as a cleaner in an office, although such a person may be working, he or she 
will be considered unemployed. Research and statistics from the World Bank puts the 
unemployment rate in Nigeria, the most populous African country and strategically 
positioned economy on the continent, at 22 percent (Subair, 2013). Although this statistic 
emerged from one of the world’s reputable financial and economic institutions, it has widely 
been refuted with the claim that it is not a reflection of reality in Nigeria. Similar to the 
World Bank, the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) in 2013 reported the unemployment rate 
at 23.9% while the Minister of Finance and the Chairperson of the Nigerian Economic Team 
reckoned the unemployment figure was in reality, at 37%. However, other researchers and 
experts in the field strongly criticized the World Bank’s, NBS’s and the Minister’s statistics 
on the basis that other independent research had shown that the level of unemployment in 
Nigeria was a lot higher than the presented figures. Such critics held that “unemployment in 
Nigeria is above 40% and was to rise to 50%” (Ogunmade 2013). A possible factor 
responsible for such a discrepancy could be the failure or the inability of these institutions to 
consider the various forms of unemployment. It is arguably true that not all forms82 of 
unemployment were scrutinized in their study.  
 
Indicators of the youth contingent among the unemployed in Nigeria are highly disturbing. It 
has been repeatedly echoed that more than 60% of Nigerian youth are either unemployed or 
underemployed. The Central Bank of Nigeria holds that “70% o f the 80 million youth in 
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Nigeria are either unemployed or underemployed”. This translates to 56 million unemployed 
and underemployed youth that the Nigerian Central Bank can account for. This depth of 
unemployment and consequent insecurities amongst this number of youth was further 
underscored by Rspd14 in his claim that 
  
“when it comes to issues like political participation, socioeconomic 
participation, the youth are relegated to the background, nobody cares about  
them. In fact, even going to school to get a certificate is becoming a useless 
kind of thing because even when you go to school, you finish, and you have 
certificate, the people you see going to offices and getting appointment are 
different people. So it is no longer an issue of going to school and getting 
something, but it is an issue of who do you know before getting something. 
Because of that, we have so many pools of youth roaming the street without 
anything doing. Therefore, when you have people like that they become cheap 
weapons in the hands of aggrieved politicians” (Rspd 14). 
 
In view of the above account of unemployed and under-employed youth, it is unreasonable to 
rely on NBS’s 23.9% unemployment rate in Nigeria given that the youth contingent is made 
up of more than 25% of the Nigerian population. In support of the Central Bank of Nigeria’s 
statistics, another separate study by the Manpower Board and the Federal Bureau of Statistics 
held that of the 80 million youth, which represents 60% of the Nigerian population, 70% of 
them are unemployed. Figures from these top institutions in Nigeria highlight the depth of 
unemployment in Nigeria which translates to a minimum of 50% unemployment rate among 
the total population of Nigerians with the youth being the worst hit victims (Adepegba, 2011; 
(Abdullah, 2005), 2011; Lartey, 2011; Olatunji and Abioye, 2011; Okafor (Okafor, 2011).  
Urdal (2006) in a study, “A Clash of Generations? Youth Bulges and Political Violence”, 
reinforces the view that “youth bulges provide greater opportunities for violence through the 
abundant supply of youths with low opportunity costs, and with an expectation that stronger 
motives for violence may arise as youth bulges are more likely to experience institutional 
crowding, in particular unemployment”. The recent uprising in the Middle East and other 
events in history gives impetus to this claim that a society with such a high population of 
unemployed youth is vulnerable to violence, political instability and criminal activities, 
especially when they are enduringly exploited by the elite. 
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Jos is one of the cosmopolitan cities in Nigeria and these statistics reflect the realities of this 
city. Just like some other major cities in Nigeria, Jos attracts the immigration of young people 
with the hope of securing meaningful jobs. However, such expected jobs are rare. It is a 
widespread perception that such joblessness is the primary factor responsible for the conflict 
in Jos. The majority of the researcher’s respondents clearly consider unemployment as one of 
the fundamental factors responsible for the violent conflict in Jos. A member of the clerics, 
who works closely with the youth and the government in matters relating to conflict, violence 
and peace-building, in response to a question about factors responsible for youth participation 
in violent conflict in Jos, emphatically holds that:  
 
The rate of unemployment is increasing rather than decrease. And therefore, just 
like it is said that an idle man is the devil’s workshop, so if you’re doing nothing 
whatever that comes your way, even if it’s just a peanut with some little promises of 
a N1000, N2000, N5000 after doing whatever, you grab it. So, it is because they are 
without jobs, they are without anything, and so they become easy prey to be used. 
You see, I think that boils down to lack of doing something meaningful because as 
you see very much, most of the youths are doing nothing, they are just there, … so 
considering that most of them are doing nothing, they will see the conflict as 
another way of even making money
 83
.  
 
The cleric holds that the lack of adequate employment and opportunities for the youth is one 
of a variety of factors responsible for their presence and disposition to violence. Another 
research participant who was a program manager84 of the one of the peace oriented NGOs 
and one of the youth85 cohorts interviewed, attributed youth participation in violent conflict to 
the manipulation of their economic frailty by the elite,  
 
I would say that the politicians could be seen as instigators in these crises, the 
religious leaders would be seen as perpetrators and the youths are the direct 
people involved in the crises. It is unfortunate that our youths are used just as 
weapons in the hands of aggrieved politicians and bad religious leaders. When it 
comes to issues like political participation, socioeconomic participation, the youth 
are relegated to the background, nobody cares about them.  
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A lot of them are looking for where and how to get one or two naira to eat and 
wear good clothes, so in the event of having 500 naira, somebody can do 
anything. Can you imagine a situation where someone was saying give me 5000 
naira and I will finish a particular community? 
 
Such manipulations are fundamentally possible due to the joblessness of the youth concerned 
and their desperation to earn some money at any cost. Hence, the consideration of 
unemployment as the principal factor for youth participation in violent conflict in Jos may 
not be misplaced. This standpoint strongly corresponds with other writers’ view that uphold  
economic insecurity as a fertile ground for the cultivation of vulnerable and socially 
irresponsible people. Standing (2008) and Guy (2008) for example assert that if a person has 
no security, not only will such a person be vulnerable, but also it would be unreasonable to 
expect the person to adopt so-called socially responsible behaviour. Guy went further to 
underscore his conviction that chronic insecurity induces adverse behavioural reactions. 
Although there are no statistical data to demonstrate the depth of unemployment in Jos, it is 
evident from the respondents’ assertions that unemployment among youth is prevalent. 
Going by Standing and Guy’s view, it is only logical to consider unemployment as primary 
factor (or one of the primary factors) responsible for youth participation in violent conflicts 
in Jos. 
 
4.4.3. Culture of socio-political instability and violence 
 
Existing literature, reports, and some responses from the participants of this study, allude to 
the recent culture of political instability and hostility in Jos as another factor that enhances 
youth’s active participation in violent conflicts. Conceptually, political instability is a fluid 
and complex phenomenon that has attracted attentions of scholars over the years, thus leading 
to diverse comprehensions and appreciation of its significance. The indefiniteness86 of the 
concept makes it somewhat difficult to articulate. Consequently, writers either develop 
unique understandings or amplify an existing definition to foster their objective. Asteriou and 
Price (2001:385) in their study of political instability and economic growth in the United 
Kingdom understood political instability as the “instability of government, regimes and 
communities within a nation”. This definition begs the question; it adds no new knowledge to 
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the concept of political instability, thus, it does not facilitate better understanding of the 
concept. Others authors understand political instab ility in relation to the propensity for 
executive change through extra-constitutional means or the propensity for a coup d’état. Fosu 
(1992: 830) for instance, holds that “political instability - instability of governments, regimes, 
and communities within a nation is likely to result from forcefully overthrowing or subjecting 
existing authorities to a relatively high probability of involuntary removal. This may emanate 
from coups d’état, successful or otherwise, typically by the military, and coups plots”. 
Similarly, Alesina et al. (1996: 191), understands political instability as the “propensity of a 
change in the executive power, either by constitutional or unconstitutional means”. While 
these definitions throw some light on the concept, they are rather inadequate for this study 
due to their suggestion that political instability is limited to the change of executive power in 
a society. These definitions are unable to account for other manifestations of political 
instability outside of the corridor of executive powers.  
 
Other scholars such as Cukierman, Edwards and Tabellini (1989); Alesina et al (1996), 
Goldstone et al (2010) and Jalil (2017), in the field, however, stretches their comprehension 
of political instability to include phenomenon associated with unswerving public violence 
and illegal activities such as riots, political assassination and military coups. Gyimah-
Brempong and De Camacho (1998: 454) understand political instability to encompass “an 
event of successful and attempted coups d’état, political assassinations, guerrilla warfare, 
secession movements, revolutions, civil wars, major government crises, larges cale anti-
government riots, politically motivated strikes, major constitutional crises, abrupt and 
unusual constitutional changes, purges, and plots”. Although this understanding may be 
genuinely found wanting due to its all- inclusive disposition, it is considered relevant and 
applicable within the context of this study. This is in view of the fact that Gyimah-Brempong 
and De Camacho’s definition clearly articulates the socio-political realities of some societies 
including the city of Jos. As evident in the previous sections of this chapter, Jos is renowned 
as a conflict-ridden city since 2000. Empirical data gathered for the purpose of this study 
further ascertain the reality of rising culture of violence in the city. In the appraisal of the 
environment of Jos with respect to conflict, Rspd25 holds “the situation is becoming worse as 
the former victims have now become the perpetrators of conflict. This is because they feel 
that things happen to them and nobody cares; they are now looking for opportunity to 
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revenge, building the culture of violence which eventually leads to circle of violence”.  This 
trend of circle of violence was attributable to the identified culture of violence which is 
rooted glaring absence of leadership during and post conflict events in Jos. Rspd2 clearly 
echoes this in his assertion  
“... Violence persists in the absence of good leadership. If our leaders had 
stepped in to intervene during or after the first attack, the victims wouldn’t 
have had the course to revenge. The leaders have the power and influence to 
communicate peace and persuade people to the right part, but they did not do 
that”.  
 
It is comprehensible from the empirical data that decisive and adequate intervention from the 
leaders would have had positive impact on people disposition for alternative mechanism to 
addressing pressing issues rather than violence. On the contrary, the shortfall in the 
leadership skills and acumen of the leaders has arguably given set off the reality of culture of 
violence amongst the people of Jos. Still dwelling on the culture of violence, Rspd1 also 
referred to the circle of violence in Jos claiming “... you think that you’re doing the right for 
your won person. You are trying to defend them at all cost even if it is at the expense of 
others.” In the same vein, Rspd8 also insists, “that everyone was trying to take side with his 
own community arguing that they are the victims while others are the valiant. So the conflict 
kept growing until no one could control it resulting in over ten different episode of violence 
and attack within Jos in a decade.  
 
The reiterated accounts of conflict in Jos do not identify the quest for a change of executive 
government or regime as a primary rationale for these conflicts. Rather, political instability in 
Jos is strongly attributed to deep ethno-political issues ranging from indigenes-settlers’ 
tensions which culminates in large scale anti-government riots, abrupt and unusual 
constitutional changes, political assassinations and so forth. Korb et al (2011), in his study of 
the role of religion in peace initiatives in Plateau State, succinctly articulates the fast-
developing culture of violence and lawlessness in Jos and its consequences for the city. With 
citation from some of the recent works of Human Rights Watch and findings from other 
studies, Korb et al (2011:3) echoes the fact that: 
 
Plateau State, Nigeria suffers from widespread inter-communal violence. In the 
past ten years, over 3,800 people are estimated to have been killed (Human Rights 
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Watch, 2011). Violent outbursts occurred in 2001, 2004, 2008 and 2010, during 
which thousands were displaced from their homes; hundreds were killed; and 
countless churches, mosques, businesses, and homes were destroyed through fire 
and looting. Most recently, several bombs exploded on Christmas Eve 2010, 
killing at least 80 individuals. Since the bombings, tit-for-tat revenge violence has 
continued to date with over 200 victims in the month of January 2011 (Human 
Rights Watch, 2011). The ongoing inter-religious and inter-ethnic conflict between 
the indigenous Christian tribes and the Hausa Muslims has resulted in a growing 
segregation of the society, deepening the walls of mistrust, suspicion and violence. 
 
Consistent with Korb’s (2011) narrative of violence in Jos, a good number of the study’s 
respondents, through a semi structured focus group and individual interviews, articulated 
their knowledge and experiences of the protracted and  sporadic violent conflict in Jos. One of 
the youth participants in this research study, for instance, clearly expressed his views as 
follows:  
 
They all happened while I was a student at the University of Jos.  Jos is usually 
tense since the 2001; life goes on normally, but you’ll sometimes be able to sense 
the tension around because of how people get scared over small things like shout 
in the market place and everyone start running because the think conflict is about 
to start. But then all the ones I experienced took us by surprise because nobody 
knew that something was going to happen, even though sometimes you hear 
rumors and you just hear that they are fighting over there or you already in school 
and you hear that someone has been killed and from those rumors, the conflict 
begin to get intensity and people respond from different places. Usually from my 
experiences, it is always like a Muslim has killed a Christian somewhere over 
whatever reason, sometimes the reason doesn’t even make sense, but then, I think 
most of the time because there is that kind of tense relationship between the two, 
any small thing can actually spark up a conflict. So, from my experience, it has 
always been those rumors or stories that you hear while you’re in school or 
preparing to go to campus, and you hear they are fighting here and there and 
before you know you start seeing smoke and hearing gun shots everywhere and 
then you start looking for places to hide or join the fight, just whatever you think 
you can do. 
 
A review of scholarly literature suggests a strong correlation between people’s exposure to 
violence, and their exhibition of violent behaviour. Singer et al. (1995)  and Singer et al. 
(1999) , understand violent exposure as “being a witness to violence or being a victim of 
violence”. In line with this understanding, respondents’ (both from the NGOs and from the 
youth cohort’s) illustration as mentioned above, throws some light to youth’s exposure to 
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horrendous form of violence both as perpetrators and victims of violence in Jos. Korb’s 
narration went further to highlight some of the consequences of such unceasing exposure to 
violence which includes “… a growing segregation of the society, deepening walls o f 
mistrust, suspicion and (ultimately) violence” (2011:5). Scholars such as Widom (1989) , 
Jaffe, Wolfe, Wilson and Zak (1986), and Singer et al. (1995)  are some of the leading minds 
that identify the positive relationship between peoples exposure to violence and violent 
behaviour. They generally hold the view that one of the possible effects of repeated exposure 
to violence is an increased aggression and internalization of violence as a norm in that 
society. Consistent with some of these long-standing studies, more recent scholars such as 
Weaver et al. (2008), in their exploration of childhood exposure to violence and adolescent 
conduct problems, endorse the view that exposure to violence breeds antisocial behaviour 
among youth. These views, which are backed up by some empirical experiences and 
knowledge of respondents in this study, strongly identify with the growing culture of 
instability and violence as one of the responsible factors for youth’s high representation in 
violence in Jos.  
 
There remains some level of uncertainty about the extent of the impact of the exposure to 
violence on people’s disposition to violence in Jos. To what extent do other realities in life, 
“negatively” or “positively, “constructively” or “destructively” impact (or do not impact) on 
a person’s disposition to violence? These questions and the inability of this study to attend to 
them leaves a gap for other studies that could support existing findings and recommendations 
for better response to youth issues in Jos.  
 
4.5. Conclusion 
 
The principal objective of this chapter was the presentation of the chronological accounts of 
conflicts in Jos and a critical analysis of factors responsible for youth’s involvement in these 
conflicts. Consequently, the first section commenced with a presentation of an overview of 
the history of Jos. The historical account drew attention to the geo-strategic significance of 
Jos in the mid-belt region and to the country at large. The description “Tin City” embodies 
the wealth of the city in natural resources especially in t in ore. The attraction of foreign 
miners and other settlers from the various part of Nigeria strengthens its status as the 
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commercial capital of the middle-belt region. Regardless of the cosmopolitan nature of the 
city, Jos remained one of the few peaceful and placid cities, again attracting the name “the 
City of Peace” to itself.  
 
However, a reaction to the political appointment of a non- indigene to the position of local 
government chairman in 1994 led to the rapid degeneration of the city from being known as 
the “City of Peace” into a city prone to violence.  
 
The second section of the chapter offered a chronological account of the various violent 
conflicts in Jos between the year 2000 and 2010. The chapter offered a comprehensive 
account of the various events of conflict in Jos, with the 2001 conflict noticeably the worst hit 
conflict given the estimated 1,000 – 3000 mortality (the highest reported mortality in the 
various conflicts in this given era).  
 
As discussed, the various events of conflicts in Jos highlighted the multiplicity of factors and 
actors responsible for these conflicts. Although a straight forward classification of these 
conflicts into ethnic or religious conflicts was possible, the chapter adopted an analysis of the 
multidimensional nature of the conflicts. In so doing, the third section of Chapter Four 
explored the economic and socio-political factors within the web of socio-political and ethno-
religious classification of conflicts. Although the socio-political and ethno-religious 
classification of the conflicts were not explicitly highlighted in this study, the reality of these 
various factors was evident in the discussion of the fundamental factors responsible for the 
high representation of youth in violent conflicts in Jos. Examples of such factors, as discussed 
in this chapter, include economic insecurity of youth, unemployment and the persistent 
culture of socio-political instability and violence in the city. The notion of economic 
insecurity, as noted in this chapter, is strongly embedded in the uncertainty of a person’s 
ability to guard oneself against the consequences of undesirable moments, while the central 
theme that ran through the conception of unemployment is joblessness among employable 
citizens. Finally, the chapter concludes with a focus on the entrenched culture of socio-
political violence taking the form of inter-religious and inter-ethnic violence between 
indigenes and settlers, relentless political killings and assassinations.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
A Critical discourse of the multiple peace-building initiatives in Jos in view of youth 
participation 
 
5.1. Introduction 
 
The Fourth Chapter responded to the second objective of this research study through its  
chronological account of conflict in Jos, with a focus on the major events of conflict between 
2000 and 2010 and the factors responsible for youth’s involvement in these conflicts. Chapter 
Five seamlessly builds on the discourse of the previous chapters via further analysis and a 
critical discourse of findings from the primary data pertaining to peace-building initiatives in 
Jos. This engagement with the primary data and relevant findings generates responses to the 
first research objective that seeks to unpack the various peace-building initiatives in Jos. 
Although the third objective will be essentially addressed in the next chapter of this study, 
Chapter Five, through its slight narration of youth participation in the identified peace-
building initiatives, lays a platform for a deeper engagement with questions about youth 
participation in peace-building initiatives in Jos.  
 
Similar to many other conflict-prone societies, a variety of actors have invested resources 
towards peace initiatives in Jos. Krause (2011:46) for instance affirms this view in his 
assertion that “indeed, numerous violent prevention and peace-building efforts, conferences 
and workshops have taken place [in Jos] since the first major riots in 2001”. Included in these 
efforts were the various initiatives directed at the management of existing conflicts and 
prevention of possible crises or conflicts. Examples of these initiatives include government’s 
utilization of commissions of inquiries, the establishment of the office of the Special Advisor 
to the governor on peace-building and trust and capacity building programs.  
 
Whilst these efforts are commendable, it is once again necessary to draw attention to the 
dearth of scholarly materials that interrogate youth participation in these peace-building 
initiatives in Jos. The second section of this chapter bridges this gap through its analysis and 
discussion of the findings that emerged from the empirical component of this study about the 
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various forms of peace-building initiatives in Jos, Nigeria. The second section commences 
with a concise illustration of the various peace-building initiatives in Jos vis-a-vis the 
conceptual underpinnings of such an initiative.  
 
5.2. Analytical review of the various forms of peace-building initiatives in Jos 
 
It is evident from the previous chapters that the city of Jos was one of the few cosmopolitan 
cities in Nigeria that experienced a prolonged absence of violence and widespread “conflict” 
prior to 2001. It is easily comprehensible therefore, that the restoration of “peace” in such 
society was a priority of the government, NGOs and other relevant actors. In addition to 
Krause (2011), studies and reports by the Human Rights Watch, International Crisis Group 
(ICG) and some other literature strongly suggests that effort has been made by pertinent 
actors towards the restoration of sustainable peace in Jos through various initiatives and 
investments for peace. Some of the notable forms of peace-building initiatives that emerged 
from the analysis of the study’s empirical data include the appointment of commissions of 
inquiry, the establishment of the Special Advisor to the Governor on peace-building, 
formation of Inter-Religious Council, trust building initiatives and capacity building 
programs. Bearing in mind that a comprehensive evaluation of the impact of these initiatives 
is beyond the scope of this study. This means that this study will not dwell on issues relating 
to the evaluation of the efficiency and effectiveness of the identified initiatives with respect to 
the restoration of peace. Thus, it is worthwhile to mention once again that this chapter 
discusses identified findings (initiatives and activities) in the light of their contributions 
towards peace-building and youth participation in these initiatives.  
 
5.2.1. Commissions of inquiry to Jos conflict 
 
Commissions of inquiry are autonomous bodies that act meticulously within their term of 
reference. Commissions are one of a variety of ways that the government considers important 
issues and events. They serve as unique and flexible tools often employed to address or make 
inquiries into wide range of issues. They provide valuable opportunities and channels through 
which interested parties and stakeholders can directly participate in decision-making or 
recommendations (Simpson 2012). According to the United Nation’s Human Rights Council, 
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(2011) ... a Commissions of Inquiry are a useful tool and should be considered early on when 
allegations of human rights abuse are made. They emphasised that it is the primary 
responsibility of national authorities to investigate allegations of human rights abuses and, 
where such abuses are found to exist, bring those responsible to justice. The principal 
objectives of most commissions of inquiry include impartial establishment of whether 
violations of human rights law and/or humanitarian law have occurred to highlight the root 
causes of the violence or related issues, to suggest ways of moving forward and to make 
available evidence of the events under scrutiny. The UN’s Human Rights Council (2011 :2) 
states that, “every commission of inquiry’s primary objective should be to establish 
accountability for violations that have taken place, ensuring that those responsible for the 
violations are brought to justice”.  
 
The establishment of commissions of inquiries came across strongly from a few of the 
study’s respondents as the default and principal effort from the government towards the 
restoration of peace in Jos. One of the respondents, who was a high profile member of the 
Plateau State Peace-building Committee, views commissions of inquiry as the government’s 
“moda operandi87” since the formation of such committees is always the first line of action 
subsequent to most violent conflict in Jos. There is a widespread perception among its 
proponents that the outcome of the commissions of inquiry plays significant roles in 
strengthening peace-building through the protection of human rights. According to Simpson 
(2012), “the commissions/missions can provide a historical record of serious violations of 
human rights and international humanitarian law, and influence changes in law and practice 
to advance human rights. Importantly, they assist in ensuring accountability for serious 
violations, which is fundamental for deterring future violations, promoting compliance with 
the law, providing avenues of justice and redress for victims” and ultimately the 
establishment of pathways for the return of peace in society. In a similar fashion, the 
                                                 
87
 By “moda operandi”, he means that the establishment of commissions of inquiry is the characterised approach 
of the government (both at the national and state level) in dealing or addressing events of conflict. It has  become 
a norm that commissions of inquiries are set-up after most events of violent conflict in Jos. Examples of these 
Commission of Inquiries include: “Justice Aribiton Fiberesima Judicial Commission of Inquiry into the April 
1994 Crisis; Justice Niki Tobi Judicial Commission of Inquiry into the September 2001 Crisis; Presidential 
Peace Initiat ive Committee on Plateau State, headed by Shehu Idris, Emir of Zazzau, May 2004; Plateau Peace 
Conference (“Plateau Resolves”), 18 August-21 September 2004;Justice Bola Ajibola Judicial Commission of 
Inquiry into the November 2008 Crisis; and Presidential Advisory Committee on the Jos Crisis, March -April 
2010” (International Crisis Group 2012: 20).  
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commissions of inquiry to various conflicts in Jos are expected to facilitate deeper 
comprehension of underlying issues, factors and actors that set events of conflicts in motion. 
According to Sayne, (2012:7)  
 
At least 16 commissions have been set up to examine the violence in Jos alone, with 
five announced after the 2008 violence. The three most publicised were the 
Fiberesima Commission on the 1994 crisis (the report was only released in 2010), the 
Niki Tobi Commission on the 2001 riots, and the Ajibola Commission on the 2008 
clashes. However, these commissions have no powers to enforce justice and are 
limited to an investigative role where they provide the causes, nature of conflict, 
damages, list of perpetrators and offer recommendations for formal prosecution (cited 
in Ettang 2015: 132).  
  
In congruence with some of these views in existing literature on Jos conflict and peace-
building initiatives, some of the respondents hold that several commissions of inquiry were 
instituted in response to most conflicts in Jos.  In the words of Rspd29, “they always have 
commission of inquiries after almost every conflict in Jos. Those commissions investigated 
and submitted try to investigate and submit a report”. The first major conflict of 1994 was for 
instance, followed with the first commission of inquiry known as Fiberesima Commission 
was tasked with the mandate to investigate the conflicts. Although responses from some of 
the interviewees generally consider the establishment of commissions of inquiry as the 
government’s first point of call after the deployment of the army and armed security forces to 
scenes of violence, they however differ in their appreciation of the impact of this initiative as 
a peace-building strategy. While some respondents applauded the commissions, one of the 
youth respondents had his reservations; he says, “I think the government could have done 
more actually. One of the reasons why I said they have not achieved much with their 
commissions is because of the recurrent violence anyway in the first place. Despite those 
inquiries, you hardly see government implementing their recommendations or punishing 
anyone for playing a major role in the conflict”.  
 
The utilization of commissions of inquiry as a tool for conflict resolution and peace-building 
may come across as a thing of common knowledge to scholars and the elite class in a society. 
However, the analysis of the data collected for this study shows that the appreciation of a 
commission of inquiry as a relevant tool for peace-building is insignificant amongst the 
study’s respondents and most probably among the populous of Jos. Very few participants of 
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this study expressed their awareness of commissions of inquiry as a tool employed by the 
state and federal government in the pursuit of peace in Jos. Yet, these participants were quick 
to also dismiss the contribution of such commissions towards the restoration of sustainable 
peace in Jos. One of the youth interviewed for instance, discloses that:  
 
The best [peace-building effort] that the government has ever done ... is to appoint a 
commission of inquiry … They always have commissions of inquiries after almost 
every conflict in Jos. I think they did in 2009 and 2010 where people were allowed to 
come freely and talk about their experiences. In spite of this, I think these 
commissions were quite redundant because almost all the time, they come and tell us 
the same thing about the conflict. They say things like politicians and religious bigots 
are the instigators of these conflicts. Youth are highly involved because they are 
jobless, they are easily brainwashed88. 
 
In addition to the redundancy of the commissions as highlighted by one the respondents 
above, there were accusations of biased membership in the commissions and subjective 
findings; their findings were not available to the public for years (Krause, 2011; Fwatshak, 
2006). Furthermore, according to Ettang (2015: 132), Governor Jonah Jang (2012) in a 
speech noted that the recommendations arising from investigations into the crisis could not 
all be implemented because some fall under the responsibility of federal agencies. The 
content of such speech underscores the previously discussed redundancy, lack of 
accountability, transparency and political will necessary to sustain the peace processes. In 
summary, the establishment of commissions of inquiry mandated with the task of 
investigating and reporting on the various events of violent conflicts have not been successful 
in preventing and positively transforming the conflict.  
 
One of the Clerics interviewed (also a peace activist) was extra blunt in his appraisal of the 
commissions of inquiry as part of the peace-building initiatives in Jos. He clearly notes  
 
“They [the government] only have commissions at the end of every crisis; and 
we do not call that initiative towards putting together or putting right what was 
already destroyed”89. He furthered his argument with a passionately assertion 
                                                 
88
 Interview with a member of Jos Youth Community (Youth Cohort) 7
th
 August 2013 at Pietermaritzburg 
KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa  
89
 Interview with a cleric (Religious Leader). 1st August 2013 in Jos Plateau State, Nigeria  
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that “commissions are appointed to check-mate, sometimes to victimize or 
induce unnecessary penalty to some groups”.  
 
Akin to some other studies, the participants in this research study considered commission of 
inquiry as a strategy that was consistently employed by the government in the effort towards 
peace-building. People’s overriding disposition with this strategy however, remains that of 
scepticism and absolute distrust in the strategy. Such dispositions emanate from the perceived 
futility of previous commissions of inquiry. As previously mentioned, it was strongly held by 
some of the respondents’ that the commissions come up with nothing new, they only re-echo 
what the community already knows. The commissions were strongly perceived as tools 
employed by the government to chastise and victimize targeted individuals and groups.  
This directly violates the embedded values of human security and the participatory theory 
that advocate protection of people from all forms of insecurities as explicated in the third 
chapter of this thesis and genuine participation of people in decision-making process or 
commissions of such. Interviewees’ responses unquestionably express the commission’s 
disregard for the essence of participatory theories. Consequently, during a focus group 
discussion with the youth and representative of the religious body, the dominant perception 
that emerged from the discussion suggested the loss of confidence in the commission of 
inquiry by the masses. An extract from one of the participants in this FGD reads: 
 
Like my brother has said, they [commissions of inquiry] are mechanisms towards 
solving this issue in Jos; we can say that on the side of the government, there have 
been about ten commissions of inquiries set up by the state government to look into 
the root causes of the crises in Jos. The literature shows commissions of inquiries are 
constructive means of solving and resolving issues. But who are those people that go 
to attend and discuss at this commissions of inquiries? ... Now you find out that the 
people that are the victims of these crises are not involved, they are not represented 
in the commissions. Hardly will you hear about youths been part of these 
commissions. It is the same oppressive structures who cause this violence in the 
society either by instigating or perpetrating violence that come back to sit on the 
commissions. And so, when you begin to read the communiqué of these commissions, 
you will wonder if it is peace-building or peace-making
90
.  
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 Focus Group Discussion 1st August 2013, Jos Plateau State, Nigeria  
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In the another FGD, it firmly held that  
 
... the inquiry into the violence in Jos quite pointless since they did not lead to 
identification of the root causes and players either for fear of destruction of 
reputations and because of the threat that certain findings of fact might be to 
the society. It is almost inevitable that somewhere along the way, or in a final 
report, such an inquiry will tarnish reputations and raise questions in the 
public's mind concerning the responsibility borne by certain individuals. I 
doubt that it would be possible to meet the public’s need and expectation of 
commissions of inquiries whose aim is to shed light on a particular episode of 
violence without in some way interfering with the reputations of the individuals 
involved. 
 
In the same line of reasoning, the ICG (2012: 20) holds that a “stakeholders’ summit 
convened by Governor Jang after the November 2008 crisis was dominated by key sitting and 
former political officers and senior civil servants at the expense of representatives of ethnic 
and religious organisations, youth movements and civil society groups”. It was the case then, 
as espoused by the empirical data, that such individuals did all they can to sabotage the 
revelation of facts that could tarnish their image in the society. The extracts from one of the 
FGDs along with some of the highlighted views from the one-to-one interviews and literature 
uncover people’s reservations about the members compositions, the objectives and the choice 
of commissions of inquiry as adequate tool for peace-building in Jos. Theoretically, 
commissions of this nature serve as a unique tool for nation-building, restoration of trust 
among conflicting parties and ultimately peace-building. However, owing to the widely held 
reservations and suspicions emanating from the composition of the commissions, certain 
groups including the National Council of Muslim Youth Organisation Jos branch 
(NAMCOYO)91 who are strategic stakeholders in Jos conflict withdrew their participation 
from some of these commissions92. Such withdrawal and the government’s unperturbed 
attitude towards their withdrawal question the government’s commitment to peace-building 
via such commissions. In so doing, the government undermined the security of the people 
both at individual and communal level. This is consequent upon the threats and harmful 
actions (or inactions) direction at individuals and groups of people. The withdrawal of 
                                                 
91
 NAMCOYO are considered strategic stakeholders because of the important roles they play in the exacerbation 
of conflict in Jos. To ensure sustainable peace in Jos, it is necessary to win the confidence of such group in the 
process and outcome of such commissions in Jos. 
92
 Interview with a Relig ious Leader (Muslim Cleric). 1
st
 August 2013, Jos, Nigeria. 
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NAMCOYO was a visible and immediate consequence of such threats emerging from the 
commissions that ought to protect and advocate for the voice and rights of the people.  
 
5.2.2. Formation of inter-religious council  
 
The formation of an Inter-Religious Council following the 2001 crisis was highlighted as a 
significant contribution by the government towards peace in Jos. In keeping with Ettang’s 
(2015: 131) view and supported by the empirical data, the Inter-Religious Council set up by 
the State Governor has been instrumental in creating the space that enhances dialogue 
amongst various stakeholders. There is some consensus in the existing literature and amongst 
the study’s participants that the Inter-religious Council is a platform that was established by 
the government and it has to some extent facilitated Christian and Muslim leaders’ discussion 
and interaction with respect to issues of peace and tolerance in Jos. One of the respondents, 
who was a member of the inter-religious council and community leader strongly emphasised 
the strategic significance of the formation of the Inter-religious council and their roles in 
mitigating violence in Jos. He stresses that  
 
“Through the Inter-religious Council, though formed by the government, the 
religious leaders, both Christians and Muslims, were able to calm their faithful 
to some extent. In fact, the inter-religious approach was effective because, 
members of inter-religious council were united around a common problem of  
violence in the society. As they began to tackle the problem, they began to 
influence people that were close to the council members and participants of the 
various projects. Whoever took part in the programs also took it out of other 
group. Such a person propagated the messages to people that did not 
participate in the project or council. As a participant and an outside member 
of the council, I always share the new and surprising things I learnt with 
everyone I knew”  
 
In line with this respondent’s views, Inter-religious Council symbolizes a glimmer of hope 
and a symbol of trust amongst the rival parties. Berkley (2010) drew particular attention to a 
couple of religious organizations [including the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN), 
Jama’atu Nasril Islam (JNI), The Federation of Muslim Women’s Association in Nigeria 
(FOMWAN), Dogon Karfe Abattoir Women’s Development Association, Women Without 
Walls and Plateau Muslim Sisters for Peace] that in some ways mitigated the possible 
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escalation of conflict through their activities and programs. These religious organizations, 
CAN and JNI, have been highly involved and strategically instrumental in bringing groups 
together across the religious divide to participate and contribute in activities like peace rallies 
and dialogue. In the words of a respondents who was also heavily involved in the activities of 
the Inter-Religious Council,  
 
They [Inter-Religious Council] have taken a bold step; specially some of the faith 
based organization, some of the things they do is that they go beyond dialogue. They 
have taken a paradigm shift, especially the JNI, the Catholic community or even the 
CAN. We play an exemplary role by trying to engage ourselves in extra visit. The 
Muslims visiting Christian and Christian visiting Muslims in their various 
communities. The JNI visited Can and the CAN visited JNI to see how we will be 
able to further smoothen relationship and a kind create avenue through which we 
can understand one another better. And again there are several activities that are 
geared towards bringing people together. That is what we call Trauma healing 
activities. There are activities for forgiveness and genuine reconciliation all 
initiated by faith based organization which we refer to as NGO. These things have 
contributed in educating and further bringing people together.  
 
Additionally, the Federation of Muslim Women’s Associations in Nigeria (FOMWAN), 
taking advantage of their countrywide office location, has been functional in interreligious 
cooperation with Christian Women’s Organisations as regards issues of women’s and 
children’s health as well as dialogue forums that promote peace and tolerance. The mother-
body93 of religious organisations - Inter-Religious Council -  which was jointly chaired by the 
chairman of the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) and the chairman of Jama’atu Nasril 
Islam (JNI). The council was perceived as an instrument that mitigated imminent violence or 
a threat of violence through a quick and joint (both Christian and Muslim religious leaders) 
release of communiqué pleading for tolerance, peace and an invitation of the people to 
avoiding violence.  
 
Notwithstanding the highlighted effort from both religious leaders, continuous religious 
oriented events of violent conflict amongst the people questions the worth of the inter-
religious council. Two respondents, an academic and a religious leader, interviewed for this 
study alluded to the unending relapse of the commitment of the members of the Inter-
                                                 
93
 Mother-body in this context denotes the umbrella body under which other religious bodies are form and 
operate. 
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Religious Council’s and the absence of required loyalty to its vision and values. They 
expressed their unease about the irregularities in the council’s meeting schedules:  
 
“...but recently, the committee has not been meeting. The reason for that I do 
not know, but it could be because the government is also supposed to facilitate 
the meetings of this committee”94.  
 
Some other participants in the study further underscore the unenthusiastic attitude of this 
council in their narrative. One of such respondents, a member of the youth cohort asserts that:  
 
The inter-faith religious council for now is not active so to speak. It was the emir of 
Wase, when he died and his son took over, his son was asked to represent the JNI 
because he is the president of JNI. It is by office, once you are the president of JNI, 
you are automatically a co-chair of the council while the Arch Bishop then was the 
chairman of Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN), which makes him an automatic 
co-chair.  But when CAN changed leadership and the Emir of Wase died, the council 
became so weak. I don’t think that they have had a meeting this year, I don’t think 
so
95
.  
 
5.2.3. The Establishment of the Office of the Special Advisor to the Governor on 
Peace-building (SAGPB) and its bearing in Jos peace-building endeavor 
 
In response to the chain of violence in Jos and beyond, Plateau State Government instituted 
an office with the responsibility of coordinating other state- led peace-building initiatives in 
Jos and in other parts of the state. The creation of this unit was the first of its kind in Plateau 
State. The Office of the Special Advisor to the Governor on Peace-building was largely 
embraced by the people and that enhanced some optimism and hope in the society. Until the 
creation of the Office of the Special Adviser to the Governor on Peace-building, it was noted 
by a variety of participants, especially in the Focus Group Discussion held with the youth and 
members of the NGOs,96 that there was no recognized or formal channel of communication 
or interactions with government about the issues of peace-building and prevention of violence 
in the state. A good number of my respondents inferred that the launch of this office was a 
positive expression of the government’s commitment towards peace-building in state. One of 
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such respondents holds that “the mere establishment of the Office of the Special Advisor to 
Governor on peace-building is an effort on the part of the government to give priority to 
peace-building” (Rspd 24). Another respondent equally says, “Recently I read that the 
government appointed somebody to an office to take charge of peace-building and conflict 
transformation in the state which is a credit to the government” (Rspd 23). Such respondents 
view the bureau within the governor’s office as a positive contribution towards the restoration 
and sustainability of peace in Jos. The sentiments and perceptions of these respondents is 
further reflected in assertion by a respondent that  
 
The Special Advisor on peace-building to the Executive Governor of Plateau State has been 
working with a lot of NGOs, CSOs and even the government itself on various activities to see 
that peace really comes back to Jos and Plateau generally
97
.  
 
The establishment of this bureau is perceived by society as an innovative intervention by the 
government and it was positively received by some people. People’s positive attitude towards 
this unit is largely informed by some of the peace-building activities and programs initiated 
by the unit. Echo of the unit’s activities and programs is equally evident in Ettang’s (2015: 
183) assertion: “Special Advisor to the Governor on Peace-building has held communal 
celebrations where Christian and Muslim youth come together under the same roof during 
their respective religious celebrations”. Activities and initiatives of the Office of the Special 
Advisor to Peace-building go a long way to curtail the negative impression and feelings that 
conflicting parties have towards each other while laying emphasis on the need for tolerance 
and accommodation of others, their beliefs and their ways of life. Some other participants 
casually affirm such commitment to the restoration of a harmonious way of life from the 
office of the Special Advisor to the Governor on Peace-building in Jos through its facilitation 
of peace-building activities.  
 
It is worth noting that irrespective of the positive reception of the SAGPB, the dominant 
perception of the participant of this study was that the appointment of the SAGPB was quite 
redundant. It was considered redundant because some respondents were of the view that it 
was unnecessary while others claim that the office of the SAGPB is yet to live up to its 
expectations and mandate. A respondent, who was religious leader, for instance gave 
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emphasis to the point that “peace-building cannot begin with an office and officer. Rather, it 
should be a “bottom-up” approach. It is expected to start at the grassroots looking at those 
policies that can be practically translated to impact to live, perception and attitude of the 
people. For such a person, the Office of SAGPB is a misuse of resources on the account that 
it is not ideal for such an office to oversee peace-building programs in a society. In similar 
fashion, another respondent noted that  
 
“... the office of the SAGPB, yes, has convene different forum for the youth to 
come together and express themselves, but where does it end? I want to assure 
you that some of these advisors may not even see the governor for the whole 
year to give a proposal to the governor; hence they are unable to even advise 
the governor adequately. The Special Advisor comes, sit with the youth, discus 
with the youth but at the end of the day, even those outlined actions will not 
even get to the governor because the governor has his own priorities”. 
 
These view, in essence buttresses the claim that the Office of SAGPB is not necessary since 
they are unable to fulfil their responsibilities for whatever reasons. One respondent clearly 
articulated his reservation saying  
 
“Government-wise, I tell you no! It is no in the sense that we haven’t seen 
anything tangible despite the fact that we have an office of the SAGPB. There 
have not been any activities that is government sponsored that is geared 
towards addressing issues of conflict and what have you”98.  
 
An interesting dimension that requires further engagement in this discussion is the apparent 
disparities amongst the study’s participants’ perceptions of the SAGPB’s endeavours and 
commitments to peace in Jos. It is important to mention that the analysts and study’s 
respondents from the youth cohort and a religious cleric are of Christian and Islamic faith 
respectively. Although the fundamental causal factor responsible for the conflict in Jos has 
been attributed to issues of indigene-ship, religious affiliations however, play a subtle role 
due to their inherent place in the divide between the alleged Christian indigenes and Muslim 
settlers. The subtle pattern that emerged in this study was the indisposition of the non-
Christian participants to give any form of credit to the existing government’s contribution to 
peace initiatives in Jos. On the other hand, the disposition of the Christian participants to 
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bequeath such credit was very obvious in the gathered data. It worth’s pointing out that 
besides one of the Muslim participants from the NGO category that was somewhat objective 
in her perception of the government’s initiatives, who expressed both the strengths and 
weaknesses of government’s peace-building initiatives, the other eleven Muslim participants 
were exceedingly critical of the government’s initiatives bearing in mind it was a Christian 
dominated government. While it is essential to tread cautiously with such one-sided critique 
of the government’s efforts, such a critique raises necessary questions about the efficacy and 
genuineness of the government’s commitment to restoring sustainable peace in Jos. Parallel 
to some of this critical review of SAGPB, the study titled: the Development of a Peace-
building Framework as a Conflict Prevention Strategy, clearly notes that “the government 
has failed to engage and work closely with CSOs and the youth. Aside the regular meetings 
with its Special Advisor on Peace-building, there has been no systematic or regular system of 
coordination and collaboration on various peace-building efforts” (Ettang 2015:). The same 
study also noted that unlike the Civil Society Organizations and Non-Governmental 
Organizations, the government has not succeeded in creating and building relationships with 
the youth.  
 
 Although there were few unprejudiced participants from various categories that were 
somewhat objective in their perception of the government’s contribution towards peace, the 
easy disposition of a sizeable number of the participants towards some form of supposed 
biased assessments is unsettling. This draws attention to the depth of scepticism and tension 
between Christians and Muslims in Jos. An Executive Director of a peace NGO and a 
Christian cleric claims, “The deep suspicions between the Christians and Muslims also 
account for the tension and conflict in Jos”99. The tension is due to the significant presence of 
such a disposition is capable of clouding people’s ability to make a healthy judgement about 
issues and thus stimulating an already tensed environment into violence. 
 
A literary review of academic and scholarly database reveal a great depth of paucity of 
studies and research addressing possible roles and impacts of the Office of Special Advisor to 
the Governor on Peace-building or similar bureau in Nigeria and Jos precisely. Thus, any 
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attempt at extrapolating ideas (both successes and challenges) of such an agency within the 
government department, will be a daunting task.  Irrespective of such a dearth of literature, it 
was underscored by one of the study’s respondents (who serves in the Office of the Special 
Advisor) that the diligent pursuit and execution of the responsibilities of this office will 
contribute positively towards the restoration of peace in Jos. Emerging from the analysis of 
the interviews for this study, there is a strong understanding that the SAGPD serves as an 
advocate of peace as well as the intermediary between the government and the community 
with respect to peace-building and related issues. It is expected that following sufficient 
consultation with communities and other relevant actors, the advisor will instruct the 
government on feasible strategies required to restore peace in Jos while enhancing youth 
participation in the peace-building processes in Jos.  
 
5.2.4. Operation Rainbow (OR) as an instrument for peacebuilding in Jos 
 
The empirical data reveal “Operation Rainbow” as another peace-building initiative that was 
embedded with the potential and features capable of checkmating violence and facilitating 
the restoration of peace in Jos. A few of the representatives from the NGOs and the youth in 
a FGD, offered some insight into the nature and activities of this initiative. Although there 
were a variety and sometimes conflicting views about the peace activities in Jos, summative 
extracts from this FGD is as follows: Cumulatively, they assert that Operation Rainbow: 
 
Is an institution that is expected to provide timely response through early warning 
and to engage communities and groups in some sorts of peace initiatives? They have 
trained people who are addressed as neighbourhood operatives with the goal of 
watching over their communities ... They have one aspect of the Operation Rainbow 
that deals purely with security issues. This involves the mobile police, civil defence, 
and military to form a rapid response team that will be there all the time ... They 
claim also that it is meant to address this issue of excessive use of force by the 
military and believing that this security task force will not be here forever. It is an 
initiative that the state government thinks will adequately replace the current security 
task force. They also have a component of it that is about skill acquisition, building 
the capacity of women and youth in trade like tailoring and other stuff. It is yet to 
fully take shape and it is not without some hesitation by some communities thinking 
that it may translate into state government apparatus where the state government can 
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use it against communities. But generally speaking, this is one of the mechanisms or 
structure that I can say is being put in place by the government
100
.  
 
In addition to the above illustration of the activities of Operation Rainbow, a participant from 
the NGO cohort, noted that “The other structure the government put in place was the one I 
mentioned earlier, the “operation rainbow” which should have been a very good thing to 
help the government identify early warning signs and responds quickly and positively, to nip 
the conflict in the boot so that it does not escalate101”.  
 
The ICG, in their report Curbing Violence in Nigeria: The Jos Crisis threw further light on 
the activities and objectives of the Operation Rainbow in their discourse of the various 
peace-building initiatives in Jos. From their analysis of these peace-building initiatives, the 
ICG (2012) believes that this initiative is a “significant step towards empowering Plateau 
women and weaning the youth out of violence and public mischief by engaging and paying 
them”. The initiative does this through its focus on two major dimensions to security, 
governance and economic/human dimensions:  
 
a. A governance dimension:  
 
Bearing in mind that government’s default reaction to most scenes of conflict was the 
deployment of the military to the scene of violence and the formation of commissions of 
inquiry, the introduction of a new approach (Operation Rainbow) in the management of 
conflicts was pertinent and worthy of applause. The UNDP, for instance, acknowledges the 
effort of Operation Rainbow, along with a variety of actors in the community, to develop an 
effective rapid early warning and early response system. The expressed feeling of positive 
reception principally rests on the initiative’s diversified conflict management style with 
seemingly growing attention to non-military strategies and the increasing appreciation of 
economic empowerment of the people. An attention-grabbing aspect of this initiative is its 
effort to smoothly blend and balance civil and armed forces techniques in the form of the 
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Joint Task Force of military, police, civil defence and the community) in the quest for 
stability in Jos.  
 
b. An economic and human dimension:  
 
The initiative’s emphasis on poverty alleviation and provision of livelihoods through training 
programs for women and youth were unique elements of Operation Rainbow as a peace-
building initiative in Jos. These elements of the initiative, which were also alluded to by 
some of this study’s respondents102 and some existing reports, asserted that the initiative 
facilitated efforts to de-radicalize some of the violent youth while preventing the 
radicalisation of other vulnerable segments of the society (ICG: 2012).  
 
The outstanding criticism and disapproval of this initiative is reflected in literature reviewed 
is that although the Operation Rainbow holds a lot of potential compared with most existing 
strategies and institutions, implementation is usually very poor. Correspondingly, Ettang’s 
analysis of her empirical data leads to the conclusion that  
 
“while the state-created body, “Operation Rainbow”, has offered training to the youth 
and women to build their capacity to engage in income generating schemes and the 
improvement of their livelihoods, it has not been effective enough. It has been neither 
effective nor valuable as the community’s tool for an early warning and early response 
system to potential events of violent conflicts. Operation Rainbow has not been able to 
subdue or control the triggers of conflict, especially at the lower levels” (Ettang 2015: 
154-155).  
 
It is worth mentioning once again that this study is not primarily focused on the evaluative 
assessment of the effectiveness or efficiency of identified strategies. Rather, it centres its 
attention on the depth of youth participation in these initiatives. It is this consciousness, that 
this suspends the robust discourse of the challenges and weakness of this initiative to the next 
chapter, which deals with the analysis of youth participation in peace-building processes.  
 
5.2.5. Trust building initiatives and capacity building programs 
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Embedded in most events of violent conflicts is the reality of the breakdown of trust. The 
brokenness in trust arises from a variety of factors (perceived or actual) in society. Some of 
which include structural domination by certain institutions or classes in the society that 
realises they have desired values, resources and aspirations impossible for other members of 
that society to obtain. The subject matter of indigenisation is an example of such possible 
factor within the context of Jos. This is a factor that remains at the heart of most events of 
violence in Jos. As reflected in some of the interviewees’ responses, “… so in that way, the 
conflict seems to be an expression of existing grievance between the demarcated indigenes 
and settlers within the city of Jos” (Rspd 24). Another respondent, who was a religious leader 
and a founder of an NGO, better articulated this view in his claim that  
 
“Indigene-ship or indigenisation among the people in terms of an identity is 
very prominent in Jos. The so called natives emphasis indigenes in every 
appointment or privilege that must come first to the state; their emphasis is 
first about indigenes. Therefore, if there is a non-indigene that is either 
appointed regardless of the religious affiliation of such a person, there will 
be a reaction. So indigene-ship plays a prominent role in the way things are 
done in Jos that either triggers violence or brings about intolerance amongst 
the people. So the issue is even though religion influences the way people do 
things, ethnic affiliation or a person’s indigenisation status within Jos is also 
very very very prominent and it has often facilitated mistrust and violence 
reaction against the so-called non-indigenes”. 
 
Taking into account the Nigeria’s current constitution, it is more or less impossible for the 
non- indigenes to be considered indigene. This reality creates what Burton (1997) refers to as 
an unmet need; such people (non- indigenes may never be able to meet some of their 
aspirations or needs within the geopolitical space of Jos. Upreti (2004) further broadens this 
view with his assertion that conflict emerges from feelings of unfairness, injustice, mistrust, 
suspicion, and that such feelings are increasingly manifested through violence. The 
awareness of the significance of trust (mistrust) in violent conflicts and peace-building efforts 
makes this subject relevant in the analysis of peace-building initiatives in Jos. 
 
Although this is one of the last few subjects to be discussed in this chapter, it occupies an 
irreplaceable and unique place in the peace-building efforts. It is distinctively positioned to 
the extent that a good number literature reviews of peace-building from the human security 
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viewpoint largely, anchoring their analysis of peace initiatives around trust vs mistrust. For 
instance, scholars such as Clements (1997), Dayton and Kriesberg (2009) uphold the view 
that peace-building strategies cannot be successful without processes that restore trust 
between parties. Initiatives towards such restoration of trust, in their view, include but are not 
limited to the rebuilding of avenues for open and free communication, support individuals in 
moving from past hurt and enmity, finding accurate solutions to problems and identifying 
new avenues for interaction between conflicting groups. 
 
 
a. Trust Building Initiatives 
 
Trust (or the lack thereof) has been identified in some literature as a central component of 
inter-group conflict (Dovidio et al. (2002). Thus, the re-establishment of trust amongst 
conflicting parties occupies a unique and significant place in peace-building efforts. Such a 
need for this component of peace-building is extra visible amongst conflicting parties with a 
tangible line of divide such as ethnicity, religious beliefs and so forth. Along the same line of 
thought, a recent study saw it fit to interrogate and develop models of how cross-group 
friendships, intergroup emotions and trust influence a broad array of behavioural tendencies 
towards the out-groups, in a context of intergroup conflict (Kenworthy et al, 2016). The study 
asserts that “in the aftermath of violent conflict, the parties involved must often undo years of 
segregation, mutual suspicion, and mutual mistrust and work towards a process of intergroup 
engagement, integration and the development of the kind of mutual trust that allows the 
functioning of a stable society” (Kenworthy et al 2016:2).  
 
Respondents, during the interviews, expressed sentiments similar to Dovidio’s and 
Kenworthy’s viewpoint as discussed above. A Professor from the University of Jos for 
instance, questions the ability of conflicting parties in Jos to live together considering the 
existing dichotomy that has exist between Christian and Muslims segregated areas103. 
Another respondent (from Plateau State Radio Television) went further to accentuate this 
point with the assertion “For me this [dichotomy] is not healthy; the more we live together in 
mixed communities, the better for us that a particular area been seen as a segregated Muslim 
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or Christian area”104. This respondent’s positive attitude reflects the majority of this study’s 
participants’ frame of mind and disposition. Regardless of the diverse views held by the 
participants of the Focus Groups Discussions (FGD) with respect to the possible root causes 
of the violence in Jos, there was a strong consensus in the condemnation of the divide and rift 
created across conflicting parties in the city of Jos. In the expression of their views and 
thoughts, the majority of the FGD participants alluded to some students and youth’s 
expression of their intense dislike of the polarised state of affairs in Jos. Such a firm and 
fierce demonstration mirrors the society’s and the populations’ positive attitude towards 
reconciliation, stability and peaceful co-existence. A summarized account of this discussion 
as evident in other individual interviews, asserts that such students opted to organize a rally 
and an outreach event in an effort to rebuild some level of trust between the Christian and 
Muslim occupants of Jos. One of the youth in the FGD remarked that: 
 
We [sic] tried to organize rally as young people where both Christians and Muslims 
could work together... In the course of this rally we paid a visit to Angwa Rogo - one 
of the Muslim densely populated areas in Jos, one of those places that you are told as 
Christian that you cannot go to whether there is conflict or not; if you go there you 
will not come back alive. We visited the head of the place (the community leader) to 
just promote peace. The Muslim students participated; the Christians could only go 
there due to the guaranteed protection from the Muslim students
 105
.   
 
While one of the religious leaders considered government’s call for dialogue to be 
uninteresting and redundant106, one of the youth leaders (also a candidate for the Ward 
Councillor election) identifies NGOs invitation of conflicting parties to regular dialogue and 
meeting as a noticeable attempt towards healing and the restoration of trust amongst the 
people107. Such meetings and dialogues were directed at addressing issues of 
misunderstanding, stereotypes and biases held against each other. Some respondents further 
stressed the abovementioned view in their assertion that religious institutions such as the 
Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) and Jamaturu Nassiru Islam (JNI’s), and the 
Network of Civil Society’s collaborative effort through their continued meeting and joint 
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media statement have helped in pacifying people. In the view of one of the study’s 
respondents, 
 
We played an exemplary role by trying to engage ourselves in extra visit. The Muslims 
visiting Christian and Christian visiting Muslims in their various communities. The 
JNI visited Can and the CAN visited JNI to see how we will be able to further 
smoothen relationship and a kind create avenue through which we can understand one 
another better. And again there are several activities that are tend or geared towards 
bringing people together. That is what we call Trauma healing activities. There are 
activities for forgiveness and genuine reconciliation all initiated by faith based 
organization which we refer to as NGO. These things have contributed in educating 
and further bringing people together. 
 
Such efforts, he claims, facilitate people’s disposition for peace and embracing dialogue 
rather than violence. The impact of these efforts on their recipients is open to debate; 
nevertheless, its slow and steady progress in the restoration of some sense of stability and 
peace cannot be undermined. The milestone attained thus far with respect to sustainable 
peace in Jos was underscored by people’s response to the 20th of May, 2014 bomb blast in 
Jos’s market square. Historical accounts of conflicts in Jos suggest that attacks, violence or 
events of such nature often served as triggers to widespread conflict amongst the people. 
Contrary to such historical facts, media reports and informal conversation with witnesses and 
affected people reveals an overall sense of solidarity amongst both the so-called indigenes 
and non- indigenes and the Christian and Muslims divide. Wase, a professor of Criminology 
at the University of Jos, re-echoes this view in his claim that “the calculation in Jos was that 
within 15 or 20 minutes of the bombs going off, the whole state would be on fire, as 
happened previously. They wanted to capitalise on the anger already burning there. But 99% 
of people realised this would be walking into a trap.108"  
 
It is reasonable, therefore, to infer that some these trust-building initiatives in Jos may have 
reinforced the progress in the people’s disposition to a peaceful oriented analysis and 
understanding of potentially violent issues. In addition to the abovementioned initiatives, 
other initiatives that were considered symbolic and instrumental by most of the study’s 
participants were the deliberate joint activities by both the Christian and Muslim 
communities. Examples of such activities, beside the aforementioned extract from some of 
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the respondents, include the joint breaking of the Ramadan fast by Jos Christian leaders and 
the Muslim community and collective community sanitation and joint seminars and 
conversation between Christians and Muslims. The various occasions of joint break ing of the 
Ramadan fast was claimed, by majority of the participants, as a unique and transformative 
initiative109.  
 
In the final analysis, it is evident from the analysis and discussion of the empirical data vis-à-
vis existing literature that the root causes of violent conflicts in Jos goes beyond the narrow-
minded ethnic, religious and indigene vs. settler’s divisive factors. Some of the root causes 
are indeed embedded in the political economy and socio-political realities and challenges in 
Jos. Hence, Ettang (2015: 99) asserts the “importance of understanding the role of uneven 
development, political exclusion and economic marginalisation in the political setting of a 
society and within the broader conflict discourse”. Ettang (2015) further argues that 
“conflicts cannot be solved by focusing [solely] on political or isolated factors, but such 
peace effort must also critically examine and analyse the economic and social factors that 
drive and sustain violent conflicts” (Ibid). Narrowing this to the socio-political context of Jos, 
genuine effort needs to be made towards political, social and ethno-religious discourses with 
the objective of reducing the differences and disparity created via social, political and 
economic resources exclusion of certain groups to the benefit of others.  As Addison (2005: 
406) notes, “a society that achieves economic growth and a rising standard of living for 
everyone is far better placed to manage the politica l trade-offs that inevitably arise in 
balancing the interests of competing, and potentially antagonistic, social groups.” The 
achievement of such economic growth and a rise in the standard of living for everyone, as 
previously mentioned by Addison (ibid) better positions the society to reduce the disparities 
that arise from feelings of economic marginalisation, political exclusion and suspicions. 
Ultimately, such an endeavour will increase the citizen’s trust and further legitimize the 
power and influence of the society’s governing bodies.  
 
b. Capacity Building Programs  
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The lack of employment opportunities, declining prospects of the entrepreneurial youth 
generation is gradually becoming synonymous with the identity of Nigerian youth. The 
residents of the city of Jos are equally affected by this reality. It is not surprising therefore, 
that almost all the respondents of this study alluded to the rising issue of unemployment and a 
deficiency of entrepreneurial skills as a primary point of concern in the interro gation of 
violent conflicts and peace-building initiatives in Jos. A leader of a Muslim organization (also 
a Program Manager of an NGO) noted “unemployed youth are always disposed and available 
to be utilized as catalyst for violence”110. Another respondent, a cleric that works closely with 
the Non-Governmental Organizations and the government in matters of peace-building, 
upholds this view in his assertion that “the rate of unemployment is increasing rather than 
decreasing hence, a little promise of N5000 (approximately $13) is sufficient to lure the youth 
into violence”111. In fact, other respondents in an FGD drew attention to some youth’s 
demand for N5000 ($13) in order to exert violence on any targeted group 112. Considering the 
significant unemployment rate or inactivity of youth as two of the major factors responsible 
for the violent conflicts in Jos, it is logical that issues related to various forms of capacity 
building and job creation, form part of the peace-building programs in Jos.  
 
Consequently, capacity building was reported as one of the various peace-building initiatives 
in Jos. Honadle’s (1981) study of a capacity building framework, broadly conceives capacity 
building to mean the increasing ability of people and institutions to develop agents and actors 
to do what is required of them. Capacity building is seen as a process by which individuals, 
groups, organizations, institutions and societies increase their abilities to perform core 
functions, solve problems and define and achieve objectives. Furthermore, capacity building 
can understand and deal with their development needs in a broad context and in a sustainable 
manner (UNDP, 1997). These understandings, as noted, may be broad but still considered 
tolerable to the extent that they remain a preview to an in-depth conceptual discourse of 
capacity building. Other authors such as Eade (1997) considers capacity building as an 
approach to development which encompasses all the fields that influence the development 
sphere, thus leading to the popular catchphrases such as “helping people to help themselves; 
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teach a man to fish” rather than fishing for the man. Lastly and similar to Eade, Amadi and 
Abdullah (2012) view capacity building as: 
 
[a] comprehensive process that involves all dimensions of life. It is not so much a 
matter of just implementing a project or enhancing a particular aspect of life. It is an 
approach to development, which aims to enhance the capability of people in a 
comprehensive manner. As a people-centred activity, capacity building is a process 
of community development where people are the focus of capacity enhancement. It 
creates an enabling environment where people are developed in order to manage 
themselves and contribute to their societies. To this end, community development 
becomes the ultimate output of capacity building process. It is a strategy that 
stimulates and upholds empowerment of a people while responding to a community’s 
developmental needs [216-7].  
 
Genuine capacity building ought to empower the targeted cluster with the specific ability to 
adequately deliver their responsibilities and undertaking. In this line of reasoning, Honadle 
(1981: 576) considers the primary goal of capacity building to be developing the capacity of 
... jurisdictions ... to manage their own affairs, and to more effectively protect and promote 
their interests and decrease their vulnerability to disruptive changes from without. Therefore, 
he construes capacity building as a “concept that encompasses a broad range of activities that 
are aimed at increasing the ability of citizens and their governments to produce more 
responsive and efficient public goods and services” (Ibid). Consequently, to this 
understanding, capacity building in relation to youth involved in peace-building initiatives, 
refers to activities and/or programs intended to improve youth’s ability to be a productive, 
responsible and secured or protected group of people in a society. Such activities are 
expected to extensively decrease their vulnerability to other causes of conflict in the city. 
This may include, but is not limited to the creation of formal employment for youth, the 
enhancement of their entrepreneurial skills, educational empowerment with respect to peace-
building and related skills. It is expected that capacity building oriented activities or programs 
ascertain the weaknesses that youth experience in achieving their human and basic rights and 
unearthing appropriate means through which their abilities in these respects are increased to 
overcome the causal factors for their exclusion and marginalisation. It encompasses a strong 
process of learning and education. In addition, for capacity building to be sustainable, new 
technologies and new knowledge and information needs to be introduced, especially in this 
era of information and communication technology. In essence, capacity-building initiatives 
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ought to be holistic in nature and include all aspects of human development such as academic 
development, spiritual/religious development, economic development, social development 
and so forth. 
 
However, unlike the Inter-Religious Council and project where Operation Rainbow received 
widespread acknowledgement amongst the research participants, only five of the thirty 
participants recognized capacity-building efforts in Jos as peace-building initiatives. A 
participant’s account of the capacity-building dimension of peace-building initiatives 
emphasised the creation of employment opportunities for the community, though having the 
youth as a primary target. In the words of this respondent, “There is this tackling poverty 
together program. This was a scheme that was design by the government to now empower 
most of these youths that were doing nothing” 113. Similarly, a Muslim leader and a youth 
representative, both respondents of this study, alluded to the same scheme in their accounts of 
peace-building initiatives. In her elucidation, the youth representative stated “I know that 
recently, the governor provided vehicles, buses and tricycles as a form of economic 
empowerment for these young people”114 while the Muslim leader expressed a more positive 
opinion of this initiative with the claim that:  
 
At least that (vehicles and tricycles) has so much help in curbing conflicts. Most of them 
(youth) are now engaged; unlike before that almost 90% of them were doing nothing. As it is 
now, most youths do not have time to go about doing any other thing; they only think about 
their businesses and they know that if there is no peace some of these businesses will not 
work
115
. 
 
These positive appraisals reported by the above-mentioned respondents gives some hint of 
the relevance and importance of such capacity building initiatives for a community with close 
to 90% youth unemployment as disclosed by an Executive Director and the CEO of an NGO.  
 
From a more critical perspective however, a founder of one of the peace oriented NGOs in 
Jos was cautious in his appraisal of this initiative. Like other respondents that alluded to 
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 Interview with a member of Jos Youth Community (Youth Cohort). 4
th
 August 2014, Pietermaritzburg, South 
Africa 
114
 Interview with a member of Jos Youth Community (Youth Cohort). 5
th
 July 2012, Ankpa, Kogi State, 
Nigeria. 
115
 Interview with a Muslim Leader. 1
st
 August 2013, Jos, Plateau State, Nigeria.  
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capacity building initiatives, he also acknowledged the relevance of such an initiative, but 
was also quick to dismiss the impact of this initiative due to the flawed process involved in 
the circulation of vehicles and motorcycles. He emphatically claimed: 
 
I know that recently, the governor provided vehicles and tricycles as a form of 
economic empowerment for these young people. But given the number of these 
young people who are without jobs in comparison with the number of vehicles 
and tricycles that have been brought and circulated, you will understand that 
amounts to nothing. In spite of the insignificant nature of this effort, even the 
distribution process was politically influenced; some of these young people 
who are really in needs have not been given because they are not politically 
connected. But however, one would say that it is a good attempt by the 
government to empower these young people.  But then the office of the special 
to the governor on peacebuilding must go beyond conversations, must go 
beyond just advocacy, the office must work closely with community leaders to 
create substantial employment and livelihood for the people.  
 
While the indicated capacity building initiative by means of employment and creation of 
business opportunities is commended, it is equally important to draw attention to some of the 
possible implications of the highlighted weakness in the execution processes of such an 
initiative. Available literature strongly draws attention to religious and ethnic divisions as 
one of the primary causal factors responsible for Jos conflict over the years. As reflected in 
the literature review, there are persuasive arguments that ethno-religious identities play 
significant roles in service delivery and in the election and appointment of individuals to 
governmental offices. It is opined that the ethno-religious factor plays a leading role in the 
Christians dominant presence in the government116 between 2000 and 2010. The reservations 
and resentment of the marginalised group have sometimes led to violent conflict in Jos. In 
view of this, the expressed perception and concern that the adopted capacity building favours 
people (the Christians) who are politically connected are afforded, poses a fundamental risk 
to the peace-building efforts as a whole and to the sustainability of acquired peace in Jos. 
This is because it can radicalize marginalized people against their perceived oppressors.  
 
                                                 
116
 According to Moddibo (2012: 4), “the incumben t Governor and his Deputy are Christians. Of the 17 elected 
Local Government Chairmen two are Muslim. The Executive Council which consists of 18 commissioners has 
two Muslims only while the rest are Christians. Out of 28 Permanent Secretaries in the variou s Ministries and 
Parastatals, only two are Muslim. The House of Assembly which consists of 21 elected members has only 4 
Muslim representatives”. 
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Additionally, people’s perception of government’s favouritism of a particular group over 
others serves to validate people’s distrust and scepticism in the government’s impartial 
provision of service and protection to the occupants of Jos. Considering the volatile nature of 
people’s readiness to defend their ethnic and religious beliefs and identities, impressions of 
discrimination based on these identities further widens the divide among conflicting parties. 
It was in view of this that some of the respondents strongly stressed that the government 
needs be detribalised. The government, they assert, ought to be the government of all groups 
of people regardless of religious affiliation and ethnicity.  
 
On a different and more positive note, one of the youth respondents draws attention to other 
forms of capacity building initiatives aside the circulation of vehicles and other apparatus 
that keeps the people engaged and productive in their communities. He highlighted the 
didactic dimension of a capacity building initiative in Jos. He notes that  
 
Many NGOs play roles in community peace-building initiatives that build capacity and train 
youths, men, women, artisans and even some community leaders in the act of peace-building, 
conflict monitoring and even dialogue and mediation. Such people help in monitoring 
conflicts in their community and reporting to relevant agencies when necessary. They as well 
create space for building peace and coming up with different activities in their 
communities
117
 
 
The educational and attitude transformation dimension to capacity building as highlighted 
above is considered important and extremely necessary in peace-building programs. This is 
the reason that such components of capacity building initiatives empower its recipients with 
the skills and disposition to resist violence when confronted with it.  
 
Without any repudiation or undermining of any possible positive impacts of these initiatives, 
it is pertinent to draw a strong attention to the piecemeal nature of the capacity building 
programs and activities due to their deficient nature. They are deficient on the grounds of 
their tendencies to generate other issues and conflict from their implementation processes; 
they are flawed and inadequate because the capacity programs were not geared at equipping 
the people holistically. At no point was it highlighted or even suggested, for instance, that  
people’s psycho-social and spiritual needs and development were considered or developed in 
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 Interview with a member of Jos Youth Community (Youth Cohort). 5
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the capacity development endeavours. This oversight continuously leaves a vacuity that can 
generate violence for other reasons and through other angles.  
 
5.3. Conclusion 
 
The aim of this chapter was to critically assess a variety of peace-building initiatives and 
programs in the city of Jos. This was embarked upon by tracking the historical trajectory of 
peace-building efforts by various stakeholders. It was noted that given the historical peaceful 
nature of the city of Jos, there was a plethora of interest from several actors and stakeholders 
to work ardently towards the restoration of peace in Jos. Different strategies were therefore 
employed in promoting and safeguarding the relationship and peaceful nature of the city. The 
first section provided a synopsis of the various peace-building initiatives while drawing close 
attention to questions about the level of youth participation in the identified initiatives. 
Attention was drawn to the challenging scarcity of detailed studies about the peace-building 
programs and initiatives in Jos. This chapter contributed to the scholarly world by bridging 
this existing gap via its rigorous empirical assessment of the multiple peace-building efforts 
in Jos.  
 
The second section commenced with an in-depth explication of the various peace-building 
initiatives in Jos vis-a-vis the conceptual underpinnings of these initiatives. It went about this 
through its engagements with the various discourses that dealt with the characteristics, 
processes and activities of the individual peace-building initiatives. The chapter, in this 
section, also discussed stakeholders’ behaviour, the proposal, resourcefulness and ingenuity 
geared towards the restoration of peace in Jos. Commissions of inquiry was quite popular 
amongst the respondents as one of the default peace-building initiatives always embarked 
upon by the both the Plateau State government and the Federal government of Nigeria. 
Comparable with other studies, the participants of this study’s overriding opinion was that 
commissions of inquiry were futile and ineffective exercise. This conviction emanates from 
their experiences of unproductive and unrewarding previous commissions of inquiry. As 
noted earlier, it was strongly held by one of the respondents that the commissions never come 
up with anything new and they only re-echo what the community already knows; while at 
other times, they serve as tools designed to unjustly chastise certain individuals and groups.  
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Contrary to commissions of inquiry, the formation of the inter-religious council and the 
various trust building initiatives were perceived in a positive light. It was noted that Inter-
Religious Council, notwithstanding its challenges, did provide the platform for dialogue and 
interaction, especially between the Christian and Muslim leaders. While the efforts 
(especially initiatives from the non-governmental organisation) to re-establish trust amongst 
the occupants of Jos was greatly applauded by the participants.  
 
In summary, this chapter critically assessed peace-building initiatives in Jos between 2000 
and 2010. Commissions of Inquiry to the Jos Conflict, Capacity Building Programs, Trust 
Building Initiatives, Operation Rainbow (OR), Office of the Special Advisor to the Governor 
on Peace-building (SAGPD) and the formation of the Inter-Religious Council were identified 
as the key peace-building initiatives in this given timeframe. The primary focus of the next 
chapter will be the analysis of the profundity of youth participation in these initiatives. It will 
go about this through a critical analysis of youth participation vis-a-vis the desired depth of 
citizens’ participation as illustrated in the participatory theories.  
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CHAPTER SIX 
 
Analysis and summary of research findings:  
 
6.1. Introduction   
 
The preceding chapter assessed and presented an overview of the peace-building initiatives in 
Jos. In doing so, it offered detailed assessment, providing insights into the various peace-
building initiatives and the stakeholders’ commitment to peace in Jos. Through the 
assessment of the various peace-building initiatives, the previous chapter also noted the 
potency and drawbacks of the highlighted peace programs. The chapter explored the 
relationships, relevance and impression of the various peace-building initiatives on the 
stakeholders’ overall disposition to violence and the reality of violent conflict in Jos. In this 
regard, it explicated both the key state and non-state stakeholders who have positively 
contributed towards the restoration of peace in the city of Jos.  It is pertinent at this point to 
analyse and summarise the research findings through the exploration of the depth of youth 
participation in the aforementioned peace-building initiatives in Jos. Chapter Six therefore, 
focuses on youth participation in peace-building processes in Jos. It commences with its 
exploration of the specific initiatives, programs and activities that positively influenced youth 
participation in the relevant peace-building processes. In so doing, it responds to the 
researcher’s broad question of the depth of youth participation in peace-building in Jos.  
 
This chapter explores the depth of youth participation in peace-building by analysing and 
summarising relevant peace-building initiatives and the effort of the initiators and 
stakeholders that were directed at the enhancement of youth participation in their peace 
programs. The first section introduces the chapter while the second section offers a clear 
picture of youth’s reality with respect to their participation in peace-building initiatives. In 
this section, attention will be drawn to part of the rationale that informs the exclusion of 
youth from certain societal or peace-building activities. It will be noted for instance, that 
according to Hollingshead (1949), the marginalisation of the youth, through their exclusion 
from certain activities and programs was altruistically motivated. This was because leaders 
and adults felt the need to protect the younger ones from the cruelty of conflict and 
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contradictions in that society. A later part of this section refutes such justifications for the 
manipulation of youth through its explication of the shortcomings of such arguments and the 
consequences of youth exclusion of peace-building and other societal activities.  
 
 In section two and three, this chapter expatiates on the various forms of youth participation 
in the peace-building exercises. It goes about this through its interrogation of specific 
exercises, within various peace-building initiatives, aimed at incorporating the youth in these 
peace-building initiatives. These sections ascertain youth’s outright omission from, and in 
some instances, their marginal participation in peace-building processes. Following this, the 
fourth section discusses some key challenges to youth participation in Jos. The crux of this 
section rests on its discussion of stakeholders’ lack of political will in the enhancement youth 
participation in peace-building endeavours. Such a lack of political will and absence of the 
necessary disposition further hampers possible efforts towards the enactment and 
implementation of relevant policies to this effect. Finally, the fifth section concludes this 
chapter.  
 
6.2. Questioning the youth participation in the peace-building initiatives in Jos 
 
The propagation and esteemed reputation of the concept of civic participation in the twentieth 
century could be attributed to the implicit assumption of its necessity and benefits to the 
larger society. It is necessary on the account of its ability to facilitate accountability and the 
realisation of the diverse rights a people, especially the vulnerable. Equally, arguments for its 
inherent aptitude to improve the quality and sustainability of delivered services make it 
beneficial. Hence, it is understood that people’s active engagement in societal issues is 
inherently good (Farthing 2012: 74). Arnstein (1969: 2) was one of the earliest advocates of 
this view through her conceptualisation of participation as a form of  
 
Redistribution of power that enables the have-not citizens, presently excluded from 
the political and economic processes, to be deliberately included in the future. It is the 
strategy by which the have-nots join in determining how information is shared, goals 
and policies are set, tax resources are allocated, programs are operated, and benefits 
like contracts and patronage are parcelled out. In short, it is the means by which they 
can induce significant social reform, which enables them to share in the benefits of 
the affluent society. 
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It is arguably common knowledge that the youth are part of the marginalized groups in most 
societies. It was asserted by Bangura (2015:103) that the youth understand that their 
marginalisation and voiceless-ness stems from their inability to meet their essential needs 
socially and economically, and that they have not been able to enjoy proper representation 
and participation in decision-making processes. Other scholarly debates and writings such as 
Bay and Blekesaune (2002), Utas (2005), Clark (2008), Wong, Zimmerman and Parker 
(2010) and Zeldin, Christens and Powers (2013) attests to this reality of youth 
marginalisation. Wong, Zimmerman and Parker (2008:7) unambiguously consider “young 
people as a marginalized population due to their lack of power and voice in adolescent 
discourse and mainstream culture”. Although such marginalisation remains questionable and 
detestable, Hollingshead (1949) noted some marginalisation was altruistically motivated. 
This was because adults felt need to “segregate children from the real world” as a form of 
protection from world conflicts and contradictions. Equally, Zeldin et al (2013: 386) citing 
the President’s Science of Advisory Committee of 1974, drew attention to the view that  
 
Professionalism and bureaucratization have sharply narrowed the range of youth’s 
contacts with adults outside of leisure. The forces that have isolated young people and 
cut off certain options once available to the have not, thus, been necessarily mean or 
reactionary. Paradoxically, they have been, at least in original intent, enlightened and 
altruistic... what was once done to protect youth from manifest exploitation, now 
serves to reinforce the ‘outsider’ status of youth, to the point where they deprive 
youth of experience important to their growth and development (Zeldin 2013: 386).  
 
It is from this viewpoint that “most Western governments now advocate enhanced youth 
participation as part of a discourse about modern citizenship, so much so, that it has become a 
policy cliché´ to say ‘increased youth participation’ will ‘empower’ young people” (Bessant 
2004: 387). The perceived integrity and legitimacy inherent in civic (or youth) participation 
sometimes result in the abuse and manipulation of the concept by practitioners, politicians 
and policymakers. In keeping with Bessant’s (2004) view, such abuse via government and 
other service providers’ routine and repetitive employment of the concept of youth 
participation leads to: 
 
“Their failure to recognize the significant obstacles that young people currently experience 
when the youth try to participate socially, economically and politically.  It results in their 
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failure to think through what democratic practice requires. Lastly, both the conceptualisation 
and operationalisation of official youth participation policies reveal an agenda that is 
seriously at odds with the rhetoric of civil participation. This raises questions about whose 
voice is actually being heard and to what effect (Bessant 2004: 387-388). 
  
 Attempt to address such manipulations, along with the objective of broadening the 
comprehension of civil (or youth) participation, leads to the development of multiple 
typology or forms of youth participation as discoursed in the theoretical framework. 
Additionally, the justifications for the desirability of youth participation were extensively 
discoursed by Sinclair and Franklin (2000), Cleaver (2002) and Warshak (2003). Warshak 
offers the most recent and compelling justification of the three mentioned authors. His four 
key justifications for youth participation are as follows: 
 
i. An enlightenment justification that sees young people as bearers of their own 
truths that only they can share through participation; 
ii. An empowerment justification which suggests that participation can fulfil 
children’s rights and shift power down the generations;  
iii. A citizenship rational, that sees participation as a way of maximising young 
people’s citizenship; and 
iv. An outcome for relationships based rationality that suggests participation reduces 
intergenerational conflicts (Warshak 2012:74 and 75).  
 
While Warshak’s validation of youth participation rema ins relevant, some other literature 
argued that youth’s adoption of leadership roles within communities via their involvement in 
governance, activism, media and research enhances their development and civic engagement 
skills (Zeldin, Christens, Powers 2013: 385). Additionally, Wong, Zimmerman and Parker 
(2010:101) asserts that “youth participation has the potential to promote individual and 
community health by satisfying developmental needs in a positive manner while also 
enhancing the relevance of research, policy, and practice to lived experiences of children and 
adolescents. These justifications are considered compelling owing to their facilitation of the 
citizen controlled level of participation as elucidated by Arnstein. Employing Arnstein’s 
Ladder of Citizen Participation and Warshak justifications, this section of the study analyses 
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the identified peace-building initiatives in Jos. Findings from this analysis respond to the 
study’s questions about the depth of youth participation in peace-building processes.  
 
In congruence with the grand objective of this chapter, this section draws attention to the 
depth of youth participation in peace-building initiatives. It furthers the analysis of these 
initiatives with the view of ascertaining the depth of youth incorporation in the afore-
discoursed peace-building activities/programs. The adopted understanding of peace-building 
in this thesis upholds peace-building as a “comprehensive concept that encompasses, 
generates, and sustains the full array of processes, approaches and stages needed to transform 
conflict towards more sustainable, peaceful relationships” (Lederach 1997:84). Imbedded in 
this view is the appreciation of the human person (youth) as the fundamental point of focus in 
peace-building agenda. Identified peace building initiatives will therefore, be analysed in the 
light of youth participation in such initiatives and how their participation contributes to the ir 
empowerment to manage and transform conflicts, tensions and hostilities to more sustainable  
peaceful relationships in Jos. Successes and challenges of identified initiatives including 
questions about the sustainability of attained peaceful relations will be further discussed 
within the framework of community participation. Hence, unlike the state-centric118 
approaches, expedient peace-building activities from the human security perspective ought to 
seriously consider issues relating to the enhancement of a person’s disposition for peace and 
their aptitude or propensity to retain such a disposition amid various threats, coercion or 
pressure to act to the contrary. Writers such as Amundsen (1982: 25) is of the view that 
“community participation is a prerequisite to community acceptance [and success] of public 
works projects. If a publicly funded project is to be successful, it must be supported by those 
who will pay for it and be affected by it”. The acknowledgment of this view positions 
participation as an integral instrument in the effectiveness and efficiency of peace-building 
projects in Jos. 
 
The sizeable population of youth, amongst other reasons, strategically positions them as 
indispensable stakeholders in society. This implies that their incorporation in peace-building 
processes is considered inevitable in ensuring community acceptance of relevant projects and 
initiatives. Civic participation and community-based approaches in peace-building explicitly 
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advances the idea of empowerment of local community groups and institutions through the 
community’s unambiguous influence over decisions and decis ion-making processes including 
planning, execution and monitoring of projects and services (Haider 2009:4). Ansell (2016), 
Bersaglioand Kepe (2015), Carter and Shipler (2005), Kurtenbach (2008) and Omeje (2006), 
in recent literature, equally echo this sentiment in various ways, with a unanimous 
recommendation for youth’s active participation in peace-building processes. The analysis of 
Randolph’s efforts to transform Junior from violence to a peace-oriented lifestyle as 
discussed in Chapter Two validates the conclusion that “it is paramount to create 
opportunities for youth to participate in peace-building and reconciliation efforts”. Bekker  et 
al (2015), McEvoy (2001) and Rice and Felizzi (2015) uphold and further the argument that 
youth are the primary actors in grassroots community development/relations work; they are at 
the frontlines of peace-building. This presents an even a stronger argument for the 
institutionalisation of young people’s participation in peace-building processes. 
 
It was alleged by Wong, Zimmerman and Parker (2010: 100) that prior to the emergence of 
the ongoing shift about youth as agents of peace rather than violence, “Young people were 
rarely asked to voice their opinions or participate in the development of research and 
programs designed for them”. They were rather pushed to  the sidelines either as spectators or 
as mere recipients of the peace-building processes. In recent years, some countries have made 
some progress in this respect with their enactment of youth oriented policy. As alluded to in 
the previous chapters, Nigeria, Kenya, Ghana and some of the first world countries have 
developed national youth policies that reorient the people on the management  youth related 
issues. It is expected that such policies will facilitate the repositioning and comprehension of 
youth in the society. Irrespective of the perceived openness towards the idea of youth’s 
agency as expressed in some nations’ youth policy, a meaningful depth of youth participation 
in nation building is perhaps yet to reflect itself in those societies. The enactment of such 
policies is of course admirable; thus far, not much is seen with respect to the implementation 
of such policies. Felice and Wisler (2007: 3) clearly assert that such a declaration is more 
rhetorical than substantive given the that there is very limited action-oriented data to back up 
the declaration. Consequent upon such reservation and criticism, the interrogation of the 
policy implementation strategy becomes indispensable. It is worth emphasising at this point, 
that with a focus on the Jos peace-building strategies and initiatives, this section interrogates 
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the depth of youth’s participation in Jos peace-building initiatives as discussed in the 
previous chapter.  
 
6.2.1. Non-governmental sectors’ integration of youth in peace-building 
initiatives in Jos 
 
Corresponding to the increasing reinforcement of the campaign for youth’s active 
participation in societal building, several respondents for this study acknowledged some of 
the stakeholders’ incorporation of the youth in their programs and activities. A few of the 
respondents further affirmed efforts towards the incorporation of youth in some of the peace-
building initiatives in Jos. It was clearly articulated by one of the youth participants in this 
study, that the youth’s awareness of the future coupled with a nudge from some of the 
stakeholders, has compelled them to take the campaign of peace, reconciliation and 
forgiveness further. 
 
We (the youth) are now getting out of our minds to face our future because there is a 
lot of life and future ahead of us… Those that are informed now take the campaign of 
peace and reconciliation and forgiveness forward. So most of the time, we are the 
ones in the front now; rather than being foot-soldiers in fighting, we are the ones 
going into different communities and collectively with all our differences working 
together, going to advocate for peace from the elders in that community and trying to 
improve the issue of dialogue
119
. 
 
Another respondent from a FGD concurs with the a forementioned interviewee’s claims. He 
asserts  
 
I am where I am because of some of these peace initiatives. I was a victim and 
a perpetrator of violence during the conflict. During one of the crisis, my 
family and I slept in the bushes and in the morning when we woke up from 
where we were hiding from the violent people, they came with ammunitions 
killed my brother and my dad, we could not defend ourselves. This deeply hurt 
me; I chose to retaliate. I killed and ate their flesh… I could not forgive 
anybody until I started participating in some of these organised peace 
initiatives. Now, I may not have forgotten about the death of my family 
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members, but I no longer hate those murderers. Some of these activities have 
helped me to forgive and heal myself…FGD2 
 
The above extracts suggest youth’s active involvement in some of the peace initiatives via 
community meetings and possibly through some other initiatives and activities. Drawing on 
the accounts of various respondents, the youth played integral roles in the facilitation of 
peace-oriented communities meetings with a central focus on the empowerment of the 
community for the re-establishment of peace in the city of Jos. At its worst, the facilitation of 
such peace-oriented community meetings makes it easy for youth’s integration of some peace 
values and cultures. As experienced in the extract from the FGD, the person concerned was 
highly bitter, in fact to an extent of eating human flesh. In spite of that, his participation in 
some of the peace initiatives facilitated his healing. After talking, most at times, most people 
come to realise that look there is no point in killing ourselves, it would have even better if we 
had sat down and discuss some of these things. Another respondent from the youth category 
also expressed that they were able to heal, let go of grudges and forgive however painful the 
memories may be. This respondent stated,  
 
‘the organized community dialogue has helped a lot now in our area, I can feel 
the difference after we talked. It is also very easy to see the difference in a 
person who actively and genuinely participated in the meeting and dialogue 
sessions. even though the memories don’t end you still feel that meeting was 
necessary to kick-start the healing process.  
 
Nonetheless, it is worthy of note that such an assembly or congregation of people with 
antagonizing and opposing views of reality always led to moments of heated debates and 
wrangling. The youth’s experience in successfully co- facilitating such meetings with a high 
potential for violence will develop their skills in conflict management.  
 
Corresponding to this view, some of the respondents both from the religious sectors and from 
NGOs express similar viewpoints. They reiterated the view that the youth are indeed 
beginning to play active roles in peace-building. It was however, noted, that they seem to be 
committed to the activities to the extent that they are invited to contribute or participate. For 
this reason, the youth can only participate to the extent that they were instructed. There was 
consensus amongst the respondents that the youth played their part in both in religious and 
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non-religious approaches towards the restoration of peace in Jos. A program manager to one 
of the NGOs, specifically identified sports and peace education in schools via the formation 
of peace clubs as concrete examples of peace-building activities that enhanced youth 
participation. Other youth participants substantiated the above respondent’s views with the 
viewpoint that they go to communities, even in informal settings, to build peace groups that 
are able to sit regularly to discuss their plight and the issue of peace in order to increase 
community cohesion. Peace clubs have effectively been applied as a medium for 
empowerment and as capacity building strategies across the world. In South Africa, Peace 
clubs120 are considered “an effective medium of providing positive behaviour models for 
children and an avenue for the cultivation of leadership skills in young people for 
continuation of peaceful approaches to conflict resolution” (GMSA, n.d.). Similar to the 
membership of other organizations, youth’s identification as members of peace clubs 
provides a “sense of security and belonging, and gives members an alternative set of accepted 
values and behaviours to emulate” (GMSA, n.d.). Within the specific context of Jos, the 
youth facilitates and participates in Peace Clubs’ meetings that regularly engage with issues 
pertaining to the reality of conflict and violence in the city, with the ultimate goal of 
increasing people of tolerance and cohesion in Jos.  
 
 
 
6.2.2. Government’s integration of youth in peace-building initiatives in Jos 
 
One of the study’s participants was a senior staff member of Plateau State peace-building 
committee who works closely with both the Governor and the Office of the Special Advisor 
on the issue of peace-building in Jos. This participant noted that while working on the peace-
building projects in Jos, the youth were his primary target and relentless effort was made by 
the government to unite the youth from both religious arms of society. He further emphasis 
this claim with the assertion 
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According to GM South African, some of the known objectives of Peace Clubs are to foster a culture of peace 
and community service, encourage a well-balanced lifestyle, instil positive communication skills, teach Peer 
Mediation skills and encourage development and use of creative skills in peaceful dispute resolution. 
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During my tenure in the office of the peace-building, I worked closely with the 
youth. I sent a Muslim friend to go round all the Muslim quarters and 
identified the Muslim leaders and youth leaders. I did the same with the 
Christian side, identifying all the Christian youth leaders and invited them 
form of dialogue and let them know that violent is a wrong approach. I also 
condemned rumour spreading and road blocks. They agreed that they were all 
wrong and then we started.121.  
 
Such effort was summed up in the “break of fast” organized by the government for the youth 
of rival parties.  The government spokesperson firmly held unto this “break of fast” as a 
unique, sole initiative that demonstrates government’s efforts to incorporate the youth in their 
peace-building initiative. He firmly asserts, “the initiative of the SAGPB and the Plateau 
State peace building committee in incorporating youth was the only record of government’s 
incorporation of youth in peace-building endeavours. There was no formidable effort that 
one can refer to in terms of government’s effort to involve the youth in peace initiatives”.  It 
can be deduced therefore, that the government’s effort to incorporate the youth revolves 
around a mere invitation of the youth to meetings that were often focused on the 
condemnation of violence and their participation in conflicts. Although, youth’s presence in 
such meetings encouraged the formation of a youth organisation (Flash Point Youth for 
Peace), it is still striking that no other participant in this study was aware of the activities or 
existence of this youth organisation (Flash Point Youth for Peace). Participants’ ignorance of 
the existence of such a youth organisation may suggest the ‘inactive’ status of the 
organisation.  
 
Over and above the aforementioned assertion by the participant from the Office of the Special 
Advisor, other participants of this research study strongly alluded and applauded the joint 
break of fast by both Muslim and Christian youths during a Ramadan in Jos. A large segment 
of the participants mentioned this ‘joint break of fast’ to illustrate their perception of youth 
participation in peace-building initiative. The respondent from the government sector 
highlighted the significance of the joint break of fast with some enthusiasm:  
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“drawing attention to the elders’ reminisce of the past joint festivity of both Muslims 
and Christians in the community, I now suggested to the Muslim youth invite the 
Christian youth for a joint break of fast. They unanimously agreed to do it together 
with their Christian brothers. We organized the Salah together inviting everybody and 
stakeholders from both Christians and Muslims sides.  
 
Another respondent, a Program Manager of an NGO summarized this dominant view from 
the study’s fieldwork in her assertion; she noted,  
 
Working with Special Advisor to the Governor on Peace-building, we bring (sic) both 
Christian and Muslim youth into Muhammodu Wada community
122
 and break the fast 
together during the Ramadan season. That one was an immense step towards 
restoring relationship; it was a tangible peace-building activity. When it is Salah 
time, we are going to bring both Muslim and Christian together alongside the 
government to come and celebrate together again …
123
 
 
This example of a peace-building activity in Jos, relevant to the ethno-religious undertone of 
Jos conflict, is considered inadequate with respect to this study’s desired depth of youth 
participation. Findings, with respect to this initiative, failed to highlight attempts or efforts 
made by the relevant stakeholder(s) in incorporating the youth in the decision-making phases 
of the initiative. Neither the youth nor the NGO respondent gave an indication of any input 
from the youth in the planning and implementation of this activity. In fact, the phrase, “we 
bring both Christian and Muslim youth...” sums up the impression that the youth were just 
invited or brought in to partake in the ‘break of fast’. Their input, therefore, was not 
considered in the planning and decision-making phase of this activity. Scholars such as 
Arnstein (1969) and Connor (1988) depict this as an “empty ritual form of participation”. 
Farthing (2012: 78) in his critique of youth participation, argues that this form of youth 
participation in decision-making processes is perhaps best comprehended as another exercise 
in power over them. Elsewhere in the same document, he terms it “a hegemonic tool for 
social control” over the youth.  Participation of this nature neither benefits the youth nor does 
it empower them in any form; rather it provides the dominant power structures with the room 
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to argue that all voices were heard in the decision-making processes and to persuade the 
youth’s compliance  
 
It is worth mentioning that the above highlighted effort by the various stakeholders deserves 
some acknowledgement for their attempt in incorporating the youth in the peace-building 
initiatives in Jos. The responses from the study’s participants suggest a wide-ranging positive 
perception of youth participation in peace initiatives, especially owing to their delight with 
the ‘break of fast’. It is valuable that these responses touch upon the growing disposition for 
youth participation in peace-building initiatives. However, the immeasurable disposition to 
the feeling of contentment with the ‘break of fast’ and other peace-building activities 
amongst the study’s participants, perhaps, may be attributed to their naivety with respect to 
the acceptable or recommendable level of participation. It may furthermore, be a 
demonstration of their appreciation and an expression of a deep-seated yearning for the 
recurrence of such a gesture and interest in youth involvement in other activities and 
programs.  
 
In summary, it is apparent that the empirical data gathered for this study suggests a certain 
level of contentment with youth participation in the peace-building processes in Jos. 
However, an analysis of research data, within the framework of human security and civil 
participation theories, brings some inherent weaknesses and dissatisfaction with the mode of 
youth participation to light. 
 
 
6.3. Non-participation and the inadequacy of youth involvement in peace-building 
initiatives in Jos 
 
This study’s reflection on participation in the theoretical framework advocates a pluralistic 
form of participation. Pluralistic forms of participation in this context reflects the various 
dimension and depth of participation in peace-building initiatives. Youth participation as 
understood in this thesis involves the ongoing process of youth’s active contribution in 
decision-making processes at various levels in matters that affect them. This requires that 
children and youth’s evolving capacity and their interest in determining the nature of their 
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participation be respected at the various levels of decision-making. (Lansdown 2004 cited in 
Drummond-Mundal and Cave 2012: 65). According to Smith (1983), cited in Rowe and 
Frewer (2000) "public participation" encompasses a group of procedures designed to consult, 
involve, and inform the public to allow those affected by a decision to have an input into that 
decision. In participation, "input" is the key phrase, differentiating participation methods 
from other communication strategies. Participation goes beyond mere information or 
instruction; its values are deeply rooted in affected parties’ abilities to genuinely contribute 
and influence or affect decisions and implementation of decisions made.  
 
The identified trepidations of youth participation in the analysed peace-building initiative 
may not be a sufficient ground to draw conclusions about the effectiveness and efficiency of 
the various peace-building initiatives and activities in Jos. They nevertheless offer persuasive 
call for a critical analysis of the undesired depth of youth participation in peace-building 
initiatives in Jos. Much more depth and quality of participation is desired or required in a 
peace-building initiative that receives extensive applaud and recognition amongst the 
research respondents. The lack of sufficient depth of youth participation in such a commonly 
acclaimed peace initiative raises questions about the depth of their participation in other 
peace-building initiatives in Jos. Thus; this section delves into the empirical data with the 
specific focus of unpacking the inadequacies of youth participation in peace-building 
initiatives in Jos. 
 
Tschigiri (2004: i), notes that  
 
Many international actors responded to the challenges of post-conflict peace-building 
by creating designated units, new policy instruments and special funding mechanisms. 
While these innovations were important, they did not translate into significant policy 
changes, institutional reforms or funding arrangements. 
 
The Federal Government of Nigeria (FGN) and the Plateau State Government (PSG) are not 
immune to the shortcomings of peace-building interventions as highlighted by Tschigiri’s 
2004). Similar to a variety of other actors, the Federal Government of Nigeria (FGN) and the 
Plateau State Government (PSG) took active steps to curbing continuous violent conflicts in 
Jos. This effort is reflected in the above-mentioned peace-building initiatives. By a way of a 
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recap, the Jos peace-building initiatives include the institution of COIs (commissions of 
inquiry), the appointment of the SAGP in Plateau State, the establishment of Operation 
Rainbow and some other ad hoc activities in an effort to restore sustainable peace to Jos. 
Although these were relevant and commendable initiatives, the analysis of the depth of youth 
participation in these initiatives revealed respondents’ enormous dissatisfaction with these 
initiatives. Such dissatisfaction and frustration are evident in some of the youth participants’ 
unequivocal assertion that the youth do not partic ipate in the peace-building activities in Jos. 
Some of the youth respondents (one of which was a community leader and a political 
candidate for a Ward Councillor election124) and an NGO Program Manager125 were 
unanimous in the view that: 
 
The youth are not really involved, because usually these processes you see are organized by 
more of elderly people and like I said, people who are not actually involved in the 
conflict…but the person who actually carry the ammunitions are hardly involved in the 
peace-building processes., Their (youth) involvement sometimes is when they are called for a 
workshop, something like that, and they agree to attend or when someone comes to the 
community, some community do that, they bring young people together and they sit and they 
talk. 
 
Contrary to these respondents’ outright dismissal of youth participation in the peace-building 
initiatives in Jos, some respondents, as discussed in the immediate section above, affirmed 
stakeholders’ effort towards the incorporation of youths in peace-building. Such a divergence 
of views highlights people’s contrasting perceptions with respect to the depth of youth 
participation in the peace-building initiatives.  
 
Despite these contrasting views from some of the respondents of this study, a detailed 
analysis of the gathered data throws light on some of the shortcomings of peace-building 
initiatives with respect to youth participation. Such limitations and inadequacies in the 
participatory processes, as we shall come to understand, explain the unsatisfactory nature of 
Jos peace-building efforts. It is not a surprise therefore, that some of these peace-building 
initiatives are considered redundant even by some of the youth participants of this study. The 
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invitation to participate (or the actual participation) in an already planned and organized 
workshop is considered an insufficient attempt at incorporating the youth in peace-building 
endeavours. The form of participation that exploits the youth presence in committees, 
meetings or other decision-making platforms for the advancement of an adult-driven agenda 
easily gives rise to manipulation, decoration and tokenism (Wong et al 2010: 106 and 
Arnstein 1969: 4-8). The analysis of distinct peace-building initiatives will advance our 
comprehension of the lack of (or the inadequacy) of youth participation in the peace-building 
initiatives in Jos. 
 
6.3.1. Youth’s outright omission from some of the peace-building initiatives 
 
The institution of commissions of inquiry, as previously discussed, was the instinctive 
mechanism employed by both Federal Government of Nigeria (FGN) and Plateau State 
Government (PSG) in their effort to curtail the spread of violence in Jos. Although these 
commissions had their shortcomings and weak points, they remain valuable mechanisms in 
peace building processes given their distinctive ability to foster dialogue and illustrate 
individual stakeholder’s perspectives. In keeping with Flanagan’s (2011: 281) viewpoint, one 
of the “the sociological significances of commissions lie in the understanding it offers of the 
link between print culture, Blue Books (parliamentary inquiries) and politics”. Similarly, 
published reports of the commissions of inquiry to Jos conflicts furthered people’s 
understanding of the history, causes and the stakeholders’ experiences of conflicts. Although 
some of these commissions’ reports were published late, evidence and statements by 
witnesses of the conflicts in these reports enhanced people’s comprehension of Jos’ conflicts. 
In so doing, the commissions demonstrated their aptitude to enhance an in-depth 
understanding of the various conflicts via the review of relevant evidence and reports as they 
relate to various individuals’, communities’, institutions’ and other stakeholders’ experiences.  
 
It is however, strongly argued by Bulmer (1980) and Catt (2005) that the successful 
realization of the value of commissions of inquiry to some extent, rests on the selection 
process and representativeness of the members of a commission. Catt (2005: 78) specifically 
argues, “In the past, deference to judges and other worthy people who were put on 
commissions, may have gone some way towards ensuring acceptance. However, more 
 
 
215 
 
broadly, the people are more likely to accept a commission if they think that it is fairly 
constituted”. He went further to underscore his point that fairness may be demonstrated 
through the absence of any primary stakeholder or the presence of all key stakeholders. This 
in simple terms, insinuates that commissions can only be considered fairly constituted when 
either all the key stakeholders or none of the stakeholders are members of the commission.  
This entails that the inclusive nature of the constituent members of a commission enhances 
the legitimacy of the commission and people’s disposition to comply with the processes and 
recommendations of such commissions.  
 
The second chapter of this study positions the youth as strategic stakeholders with respect to 
violent conflicts and peace-building in Jos. Catt’s (2005) argument as stated above and the 
recognition of youth as key stakeholders in the conflict and peace related issues in Jos offer 
compelling reasons for the active participation of the youth (as key stakeholders) in peace-
building initiatives. Their participation in these initiatives (including s of inquiry) ought to be 
apparent from their inception to the implementation and evaluation phases of the programs.  
 
Despite this awareness, findings from the research data demonstrates the exclusion of this 
stakeholder (the youth) from the membership of any of the constituted commissions of 
inquiry in Jos. One of the study’s respondents, for instance, bemoans this fact in his assertion 
that “The government usually appoint people high in the government or a retired governor, 
like one Solomon Lar126, who was a formal governor of Plateau State to constitute 
commissions. He was appointed to head one of those inquiries” 127. The view from the FGD 
threw further light on the constituent members of the commission and the clear absence of 
youth as a member of the commission. It was generally held by the group that  
 
The people that are the victims of these crises are not involved; they are not 
represented in the commissions. Hardly will you hear about youth been part of these 
commissions. It is the same oppressive structures who cause this violence in the 
society, either by instigating or perpetrating violence, that come back to sit on the 
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commissions. And so, when you begin to read the communiqué of these commissions, 
you will wonder if it is aimed at peace-building128 (FGD). 
 
Additionally, a respondent from the Plateau State Peace-building committee bluntly reiterates 
this dominant view among the individual respondents and the FGD participants. In his 
declaration, he remarked that the commissions of inquiry neither addressed issues of youth 
nor were the youth participants in the commissions. He says, 
 
“Actually, I do not think that the commission of inquiries really address the 
issue of youth. Even the stakeholders meeting that used to take place in the 
Government House was restricted to some elders, and/or those referred to as 
stakeholders in the society and the youth were not always involved. Like I told 
you earlier, I invited the Muslim and Christian youth leaders, would you 
believe that they told me that it is only now that the government knows what it 
is doing and that it is only now that peace effort as far as they are concerned is 
being given required attention.  That means all along, they were not involved”. 
 
In similar sentiment, one of the study’s respondents, also a religious leader, concurred with 
the above assertion in his claim, 
 
Of all the resolution that were passed in the communiqué of Tobi Niki’s 
commission, no single item was mentioned about the real issues that seems to 
cause the crisis in Jos which have to do with political marginalisation, 
political exclusion, ethnicity or religion. This is because the real people who 
are involved in the conflict were not involved. For the government to involve 
the youth in peace-building in Jos ... in fact the youth should be involved at all 
level of discussion, let us hear from them why they are always angry, 
revengeful and taking up arms against one and other. But since they are not 
always included no one hears from them. If we do not involve the youth in the 
peace-building process, Boko Haram would involve them in its unrest.  
  
 
The above-cited extracts from the FGD and the individual respondents underline people’s 
antipathy towards the composition of the commissions. It is worth noting that such a dislike 
or antagonism towards the composition of commissions negatively affects people’s 
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disposition to collaborate with the process of inquiries and ultimately, the outcome of 
inquiries conducted by such commissions. Direct consequences of such feelings of 
disapproval led to the Muslim communities’ withdrawal from the 2008 commission of 
inquiry. A respondent’s expression of such a reservation highlighted the negative ambiance 
that is fostered by such an ‘unfair’ composition of a commission. He notes that “This 
translate to what we saw in the situation where the state government set up a commission of 
inquiry and one section of the society says “no we are not participating in that but gave their 
allegiance to commission of inquiry formed by the Federal Government of Nigeria”129. 
Furthermore, the outright conclusion that “commissions are necessary to check-mate and 
sometimes to victimize or induce unnecessary penalty to (sic) some groups or individuals”130 
draws further attention to people’s scepticism and the clear feeling of victimisation of certain 
groups in Jos. The concept “checkmate” used by the above participant suggests a deep-seated 
conviction that commissions are instruments used to thwart, frustrate, defeat and justify 
penalties against targeted groups and individuals. Illustrated extracts from the empirical data 
established the divisive and conflict-ridden elements entrenched in the unrepresentative 
composition of the commissions.   
 
Should opinions of these respondents be anything to go by, then it is safe to infer that such 
commissions, partly through inadequate participation and representation of the constituting 
members, perhaps breed unintended feelings of injustice, animosity and ultimately violence.  
Likewise, is the need for other interested parties’ positive acceptance of a commission and its 
recommendations. It is imperative to acknowledge the African Youth Charter’s (2013: 6) 
stipulation that every young person has the right to meaningfully participate in all spheres of 
society and in making decisions about issues that affect them. The exercise of this 
fundamental right according to Goldberg (2013: 156) is indispensable. Participation at this 
level of decision-making platform (commissions of inquiries) enhances youth’s ability to 
analyse the sources of their oppression as a means to understanding themselves while putting 
their narratives forward. Representativeness of the all key-stakeholders in the Jos 
commissions of inquiry would have been a step in the right direction. Youth’s meaningful 
participation in the commissions will undeniably offer them the opportunity to reflect on their 
                                                 
129
 Interview with an Execut ive Officer of an NGO. 1st August 2013, Jos, Plateau State, Nigeria.  
130
 Interview with a Muslim Relig ious Leader. 1
st
 August 2013, Jos, Plateau State, Nigeria. 
 
 
218 
 
roles in violent conflicts, develop an improved or a holistic understanding of other 
perspective of the conflicts while committing themselves through their participation to 
uphold peace in their society. In summary, the desired depth of youth participation would 
have indeed demonstrated the youth as “bearers of their own truths that only they can share 
through their participation” and it could have “reduced intergenerational conflicts” through 
their improved enlightenment and empowerment (Farthing 2012: 74-75). Contrary to this, the 
youth were completely denied any form of meaningful participation in the commissions of 
inquiry related to the Jos conflicts.  
 
6.3.2. Youth as marginal participants in peace-building initiatives in Jos 
 
It is clear from the theoretical framework chapter that various participatory frameworks have 
been designed and discoursed over the years. A common feature of these participatory 
frameworks or typologies is the undisputed drive for in-depth involvement of the citizens in 
the various decision-making processes from the agenda setting to the implementation and 
evaluation of programs and policies. Arnstein (1969) breaks down her typology of 
participation to three broad classes (Nonparticipation, Tokenism and Citizen Power) with 
citizen power as the most meaningful form of participation. Nonparticipation is the level of 
participation that does not enhance genuine involvement from the participants; rather 
according to Arnstein (1969: 2), it provides power holders a platform to “educate” and “cure” 
the participants, while tokenism is a degree of participation that may allow a limited form of 
participation from the people. Citizen power is considered the ideal degree of participation. 
Within this category of participation, people are endowed with increased decision-making 
influence. The people can enter into a form of partnership that enables them to negotiate and 
engage in trade-offs with traditional power holders (Arnstein 1969: 12-13). 
 
Similar to Arnstein’s (1969) propagation of participatory theory, Thurston et al (2005) and 
Haider (2009) argues that the application of this theory to youth and their participation in 
peace-building initiatives in Jos would seek to grasp the participatory status of the youth in 
political space and within the policy community. Haider (2009: 4), specifically advocates for 
the empowerment of “local community groups and institutions by giving the community 
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direct control over investment decisions, project planning, execution and monitoring, through 
a process that emphasises inclusive participation and management”.  
 
With respect to this study’s inquiry about the depth of youth participation in the trust and 
capacity building initiatives, the analysis of gathered data suggests that the youth were 
relegated to nonparticipation and tokenism levels of participation. In Thurston’s terminology, 
there is a lack of adequate youth integration in this peace-building initiative.  This is because, 
aside the youth- led peace building initiatives, most of the other initiatives only enabled the 
youth a minimal form of participation either as recipients or implementers of ad ult- led ideas 
without many opportunities to influence ideas and decisions. Research participants’ allusion 
to government’s capacity building initiatives through vehicles and tricycle distribution 
indicated that the youth participated in this initiative to the extent that they accepted and 
utilized the vehicles and/or tricycles. Re-occurring views about the depth of youth 
participation lament the absence or limitations of youth’s participation due to the adult- led 
orientation of most initiatives and the frustration youths encounter when they pioneer or set-
off peace initiatives. One of the religious leaders interviewed holds that  
 
The youth are not involved because these initiatives you see are organized by more elderly 
people ... but the person who actually carry the ammunitions are hardly involved. Instances of 
their involvement sometimes are when they are called for a workshop and they agree to 
attend or when someone come to the community in order to bring the youth together to talk to 
them
131
 
 
 The prevalent view among most of the study’s respondents is that youth participation is a 
social construct. Their participation is socially constructed in such a way that they have 
marginal power to influence anything when invited to be part of peace building events. At 
one of the peace conferences that saw a relatively good youth presence, one of the study’s 
participants who happened to be one of the organizers of the conference, encapsulate other 
respondents’ views in the articulation of his stance. She holds that: 
 
When I retrospectively think about the conference now, I remember that the youth 
participation was that of mere invitation for some kind of performance. For instance, in a 
conference room, they could be called in to present a poem, or have some dances but in terms 
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of organising and spearheading ideas and events, I think their role was very marginal and 
they were accepting of what was being said
132
. 
 
The described form and depth of participation reiterates the marginal levels of youth 
involvement in the peace-building initiatives in Jos. Such intentional and socially constructed 
form of youth participation validates some criticism against the participatory theories with the 
claim that young people’s participation in the design and implementation of ideas is perhaps 
another form of governmentality133 (Bessant 2003). This view claims that such marginal 
participation is another form of control of the youth. It is worth noting that the invitations of 
youth as “participants” in peace building programs are rare in Jos. In view of that, the 
invitation to participate in a peace conference, even just as entertainers, is sometimes 
perceived as sufficient by some youths and some stakeholders. In so doing, the government 
camouflages youth’s nonparticipation and tokenism in such marginal roles.  
 
The consequence of this marginal degree of participation is that the desired objectives of a 
meaningful participation are not achieved. The youth are neither empowered nor enlightened 
via such trivial involvement; they are no more secure as people. The invitation to present a 
poem or dance at a peace a conference has very little effect (if any) either in the youth’s 
ability to adequately manage a conflict prone situation or resist taking up arms and violence 
when the opportunity presents itself. While there may be some skeletal policies, structures, 
programs and activities in place, in reality, it has been repeatedly noted that the youth has 
very little decision-making power or influence in these processes, and ironically, the 
structures to support youth are not manned by youth. For example, the Ministries of Youth in 
almost all sub-Saharan African countries, including Sierra Leone, have no young people 
serving as ministers, nor are they seen playing very active roles in the hierarchy. As noted in 
the study’s discourse of participatory theories, Haider (2009: 4) stressed the need to empower 
the local community, in this case the youth, by endowing the youth with direct control or 
meaningful influence in project planning, execution and monitoring through a process of 
inclusive participation and management. This is an approach that calls for equal partnership 
rather than a master-servant relationship where servants are instructed on what, when, where 
and how to behave without a platform for meaningful dialogue.  Bearing in mind youth’s 
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strategic place in Jos’s violence, such a meaningful degree of youth participation in peace-
building initiatives is fundamental to the successful implementation of projects and the 
sustainability of acquired peace.   
 
6.4. Key challenges to the enhancement of genuine youth participation in peace -
building processes, Jos 
 
Reflecting further on youth participation, it could be easily believed that a large proportion of 
the youth cohort was adequately disposed to participate in relevant peace initiatives. The easy 
disposition to admit to youth’s readiness and availability to participate in the peace-building 
endeavours largely emanates from their positive response when called upon for meetings or 
present their creative acts in conferences. It was evident, from the empirical data, that the 
youth for the most part were willing to participate in various peace-building activities when 
called upon, irrespective of the trivial and insignificant nature of their roles. One of the 
religious leaders’ respondent clearly noted  
 
I want to believe that most of the youths are ready, I don’t want to say that all of 
them are ready because there are youth out there how have made up of their 
mind to be destructive. But I want to say that as far as I am coming from 
Plateau State, I know that we have hardworking and very zealous people; if they 
are given the encouragement, they would take it. So the youth are ready for it, 
but the government has not involved them, they are marginalized, so they cause 
whatever they want to cause.    
 
Likewise, one of the youth respondents, who was a youth peace activist, along with some 
other respondents drew attention to various youth- led initiatives in Jos that demonstrated their 
eagerness and availability to contribute to the development of a culture and a value of peace 
in the city. Some of these initiatives include the youth’s launch of inter-religious magazines 
and joint-organisation of a Peace Rally, spearheaded by young students from the Department 
of Religious Studies at the University of Jos. It was reported that “even though they 
experienced relative success in their endeavours, the magazine gradually lost its significance 
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due to lack of adequate support and lack of necessary leadership, while the peace rally, 
though approved by the school, was strongly rejected and denied on the day of the event”134.   
 
As highlighted above by one of the study’s respondents, the study is cognizant of the fact that 
there may be some youth cohort that may not have been interested in positively contributing 
towards peace-building processes in Jos. However, this does not undermine the available and 
justifiable evidences that advance arguments for the positive disposition of a large youth 
cohort to participate in Jos peace building endeavours. Inferring from the empirical 
component of this research, this study argues that the absence of a clear peace building and 
civic participatory policy declaration and operational frameworks coupled with the dearth of 
stakeholders political will, remains a serious challenge and threatens the enhancement of 
youth participation in peace-building initiatives in Jos.  
 
6.4.1. Lack of peace-building and civic participatory policy declarations and 
operational frameworks 
 
The findings from this study reveal no conventional comprehension of peace building as a 
concept nor was there an identification of a framework that guides and unifies efforts towards 
the enhancement of public participation in the various peace-building endeavours, activities 
and approaches. According to Kriesberg (1989:219) it is necessary that “In situations of 
intractable conflict, policy discussions must be clear on the timelines for policy 
implementation even to the point of being specific on how many days, weeks, months, years 
or decades it will take”. The African Youth Charter (AYC) (2013:7) in harmony with 
Kriesberg (1989) beckons African states to develop policies that cater for youth’s active 
participation in decision-making at all levels of governance in issues concerning youth and 
society as a whole. The Charter stipulates, “Youth perspectives should be integrated and 
mainstreamed into all planning and decision-making as well as programme development”. It 
is expected the African Youth Charter’s recommended policy stipulations will first ly provide 
peace building practitioners and other relevant stakeholders with an unambiguous and 
common understanding of peace-building in Jos and on the African continent. Additionally, it 
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will provide guidelines with respect to other details such as the timeline for the 
implementation of certain forms of peace building initiatives and the threshold for the 
evaluation of the successes and challenges of such initiatives. A lot of the study’s respondents 
sighted lack of adequate and necessary support as a contributing factor to the challenge of 
genuine youth participation in peace-building initiatives; these include the structural and 
direct support. For example, one of the respondents from the NGOs stated,  
 
“Young people in some of our meetings and trainings  complained about a lack 
of support from the government, both at the local and state level of 
government. They consistently maintain that they did not have any contact at 
all with the government and they only randomly hear about possible activities 
during their meetings with relevant NGOs or from friends. This was not 
enough and did not do much to build relationships. There should be guiding 
principle or clear procedure about the incorporation of youth in government-
led peace-building initiatives”.  
 
As expressed by the abovementioned respondent’s view, a clear civic participation 
framework would have gone a long way to offer guiding principles and strategies that 
enhance the public’s participation in decision-making processes. According to Lansdown, the 
recognition of children’s participation rights inherently requires the evolution of children 
from the status of passive recipients to being accepted and respected as active agents. 
Lansdown states, “This necessitates the transfer of greater power for children to have 
influence in their lives” (Lansdown 2010: 13). The depth of their recognition therefore, could 
measure the genuineness of youth participation in peace initiatives as active agents that are 
influencing decisions about issues that pertains to their lives. One of the study’s respondents 
from Plateau State peace-building committee duly acknowledged the establishment of the 
Special Advisor to the Governor on Peace-building as the exclusive strategic and structural 
approach to peace-building in Jos. He notes, “the role of the special advisor in incorporating 
youth was the only record of government’s incorporation of youth in peace-building 
endeavours. There was no formidable effort that one can refer to in terms of government’s 
effort to involve the youth in peace initiatives”.  Without adequate strategy for necessary 
course of action, the establishment of such an office will be incapable of realizing its ideal 
objectives.  
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The nonexistence of such a policy declaration in Jos and Plateau state was a challenge that 
adversely affected the possible effort made towards the harmonization of any adopted 
understanding, objectives and strategies of peace building and youth participation in the 
initiatives. The study’s empirical data revealed overwhelming admiratio n (by most of the 
participants, including a top staff member from the office of the Special Advisor to the 
Governor on peace building) of the initiative to invite the Muslim and Christian youth to a 
joint ‘break of fast’ as epic youth involvement in a peace building initiative. Such admiration 
is a demonstration of people’s ignorance and the lack of common understanding of genuine 
public participation. Consequently, people are ill equipped to challenge, evaluate and demand 
their genuine participation; thus, enabling easy manipulation of the public by the government 
and other stakeholders. 
 
6.4.2. The dearth of political will for youth participation in peace-building 
initiatives 
 
This study acknowledges that the concept of political will could be difficult to evalua te or 
analyse due to its complex and multiple comprehensions. When vaguely employed, the 
concept loses its meaning since it could mean everything and nothing at the same time to 
different people. For this reason, efforts have been made by various authors to offer specific 
and narrowed understanding of the concept. Kpundeh (1998:92) understands political will as 
the demonstration of the credible intent of political actors (elected or appointed leaders, civil 
societies watchdogs, stakeholders group etc) to attack perceived causes or effects….at a 
systematic level” (Kpundeh 1998 : 92). Other scholars such as (Brinkerhoff and Kulibaba 
(1999:3); Brinkerhoff (2000:242) and (Rose and Greeley (2006:5) understands it through the 
lens of actors’ dedication to a specific cause. They see political will as a “sustained 
commitment of politicians and administrators to invest political resources to achieve specific 
objectives and to sustain the costs of those actions over time.”  A common trait to the 
highlighted understanding of political will is the actors’ steadfastness and uncompromising 
determination to achieve a set of goals and objectives. These traits are sometimes reflected in 
stakeholders’ endorsement, support and attitudes regarding relevant objectives (Post 2010: 
659).  
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Findings from the empirical of component of this study reveal considerable shortfall of these 
traits among the stakeholders as it concerns youth participation in the Jos peace-building 
initiatives. When asked about the stakeholders’ commitment to involving the youth in the 
peace building processes, the overwhelming response was that of disapproval and distrust in 
some of the stakeholders’ efforts. A Professor from the University of Jos, for example, asserts 
 
“Commitment to youth participation ought to be far beyond making a political 
statement and establishing the office of the special advisor on peace building. 
It requires real concrete actions, real actions to be taken by the government in 
terms of providing employment for the youth. As it is not enough for the special 
advisor to summon the youth to a meeting, it needs to go beyond that”135.  
 
It was further emphasised by some other participants that the youth have come to the 
realisation that outcomes of their meetings with the Special Advisor to the government on 
peace-building neither gets to the State Governor nor are they considered in decision-making 
processes. A point that is worth emphasising from the participant’s assertion is the relevant 
stakeholder’s, (in this case the government), failure to demonstrate genuine interest and effort 
in getting the youth to adequately participate in peace building initiatives. As noted in the 
previous section, for the most part, the government only summoned the youth to either 
address them or have them perform a dance/poem at some of the peace conferences. They are 
not valued enough to participate in peace building and other decision-making processes even 
though it has been established that they play instrumental roles in the violent conflicts in Jos.  
One of the respondents vividly captures this point in his declaration,  
 
“I want to believe that most youth are ready, I don’t want to say that all of them are 
ready because there are youth out there who have made up of their mind to be 
destructive. All the same, I want to say that as far as I am coming from Plateau State, 
I know that we have hardworking and very zealous people; if they are given the 
encouragement, they would take it. So the youth are ready for it, but the government 
has not involved them, they are marginalized, so they cause whatever they want to 
cause”.    
 
In congruence with these views, one of the youth respondents in this study notes  
 
                                                 
135
 Interview with a Professor from the University of Jos. 6
th
 July 2012, Jos, Plateau State, Nigeria.  
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The young people in my community do want to contribute positively to rebuilding the 
society. We are interested in helping solve the problems; but there are no spaces, 
there is no motivation from any the government and the little done by the NGOs is not 
sufficient. Young people already have a different academic level, we have more open 
minds, we know about politics, we know who is who, how they work and for whom 
they work. We are more open and we want to do something for our community, only 
there is no one to spur us on or to provide us with the necessary resources. 
 
Some other respondents echoed their resentments with the government and other 
stakeholders’ indisposition either to recognize or to support some youth organizations that are 
striving to contribute towards peace in Jos.  A respondent in this study who was also a 
founder of an outstanding peace oriented NGO in Jos articulated this clearly stating: 
 
I was privileged to once serve in the leadership team for civil societies in Jos. I have 
worked closely with the special advisors on NGOs and peace building to the 
government, but you will never see anything in the budget appropriated for the NGOs 
or the youth to access funding in terms of contributing to the welfare of the state in 
terms of peace building and conflict transformation. It is all about one meeting or 
another. The special advisor wants to meet with the youth, they would come, highest 
you take Coca-Cola and its done
136
.  
 
Furthermore, other respondents recounted their experience of the lack of institutional support 
for peace building initiatives in Jos by the youth. With a deeply sad heart, an interviewee 
related her experience of the lack of support. 
 
“I know about this small nonviolent Muslim group ... they have something to do  with 
the Sufi tradition of Islam. A few of them started something in Jos, and they were 
promoting a kind of peace and nonviolence. They were totally against violence but 
they did not not survive because they were not considered as true Muslims. They had a 
publication of their nonviolent magazines but their magazine was not very well 
received by other Muslim communities and they had to disappear”
137
.  
 
Scholars and practitioners have repeatedly highlighted the high representation of the youth 
cohort in violent conflicts in Jos. It is expected therefore, that peace building endeavours, in 
some way, ought to be relevant and inclusive of the  youth in Jos. The availability of such a 
nonviolent oriented youth organisation, as recounted by some of the respondents of this 
                                                 
136
 Interview with a Christian Relig ious Leader and a Founder of a Peace NGO. 19
th
 August 2013, 
Pietermaritzburg, South Africa  
137
 Interview with a member of the Youth Community (Youth Cohort). 6
th
 August 2013, Jos, Nigeria. 
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study, presented the government and other stakeholders with an exceptional opportunity to 
tap into the potential wealth of youth agency, passion and drive for the enhancement of peace 
in Jos. Investment in capacity development, capital, mentoring support and collaboration 
opportunities are possible ways that various stakeholders could express their encouragement, 
empathy and support for the values that they stand for. Without a doubt, these would have 
strengthened the capacity of the youth and such youth organisations in peace-building while 
simultaneously dissuading their inclination to participate in violence, terrorism and illegal or 
criminal acts. In so doing, the government and relevant stakeholders would have 
demonstrated their commitment to youth participation in peace building initiatives in Jos. On 
the contrary, findings from this study revealed the many shortcomings of stakeholders’ 
inclination and commitment to enhancing youth participation in peace building initiatives in 
Jos.  
 
6.5. Conclusion 
 
This chapter presented and analysed research findings on peace-building initiatives in Jos. It 
explicated the data collected during fieldwork, providing further insights into the peace 
building endeavours that were assessed in Chapter Five. The presentation and analysis in this 
chapter discussed the various peace building initiatives from the perspectives of the 
participants’ conceptualization of participation in this study, against the backdrop of the main 
trends in civic participatory theories.  
 
The second section, which was comprised of two parts, presented and analysed research 
findings on the depth of youth participation in peace-building initiatives. Logical inferences 
were made from the data to explicate youth participation in the first part while the second part 
highlighted the various inadequacies entrenched in the adopted form and depth (quality) of 
youth participation. The research findings demonstrated both the government and non-
governmental sector’s interest in the involvement of youth in their peace-building 
endeavours. However, the second part of this section draws attention to the inadequacies of 
youth involvement in peace-building initiatives. As discussed, this paucity expressed the 
outright omission of youth from some of the peace-building initiatives and their marginal 
participation in Jos peace-building initiatives. It was noted that the exclusion of the youth 
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from initiatives such as commissions of inquiry or their meagre involvement in other 
activities via presentation of dance, poem and dramas was not sufficient. The insufficiency of 
these initiatives is based on the account that such forms of participation neither offer the 
youth the opportunity to make decisions about such activities nor enhance meaningful 
empowerment of the youth through the acquisition of relevant skills.  
 
The third and final section discussed the key challenges to the enhancement of youth 
participation in Jos’s peace-building initiatives. Deducing from the empirical data, the study 
recognized the lack of clear peace-building and civic participatory policy declarations and 
operational frameworks as one of the key challenges to the enhancement of youth 
participation in peace-building initiatives. As noted, the nonexistence of such policy guidance 
in Jos negatively affected potential efforts towards genuine youth participation in peace 
building activities. It deprived stakeholders of a relevant threshold against which their effort 
at youth participation can be compared.  
 
In addition to the absence of peace building and civic participatory policy declarations and 
operational frameworks, the dearth of stakeholders’ political will remains a serious challenge 
and threat to the enhancement of youth participation in peace building initiatives in Jos. 
 
Next, Chapter Seven presents a summary of the study and policy recommendations against 
the backdrop of the study’s findings.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
 
Conclusion and Recommendations  
 
7.1. Introduction 
 
This study grappled with the question of youth participation in peace building initiatives. The 
primary objective of this study was the acquisition of a deeper comprehension of the depth of 
youth participation in peace building initiatives in Jos. As highlighted in the first and second 
chapters of this thesis, apart from Mech’s study on NGOs empowerment of youth in peace 
building, there is a lack of a thorough and comprehensive study in the field of youth and 
peacebuilding in Jos and in Nigeria at large. In an attempt to contribute towards bridging this 
existing gap, this study interrogated the various peace-building initiatives and programs in 
Jos, with the aim of unravelling questions around the genuineness of youth participation in 
peace building initiatives. Its primary unit of analysis were the peace-building initiatives that 
were set rolling both by the government and civil societies. Essentially, this study has 
examined the profundity of youth’s participation in the identified peace building efforts and 
initiatives in Jos.  
 
This chapter will provide a summary of the research study. The summary taps into the 
reviewed literature and the empirical data gathered from the participants of the study. The 
summary will be succeeded by relevant recommendations. These recommendations are 
considered relevant to the general public, but they will however, be of special interest to 
individual stakeholders in peace-building such as the government (State and National), 
members of the NGOs, the youth cohort and researchers with a unique interest in peace 
building and youth. The final part of this chapter draws attention to possible spheres for 
future research. 
 
7.2. Summary of research study 
 
To clearly understand and appreciate the essence of this study, it was necessary to clearly 
identify and stipulate the nature and rationale for this study. Although the various chapters 
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commenced with succinct introductions, Chapter One of this thesis provided a broad 
introduction to the study. The chapter’s presentation of the background and the context of the 
research served to underscore the research problem. It went about this by drawing attention to 
the contextual and geographical significance of Jos, the reality of reoccurring violence in the 
city and the questions regarding youth participation (or lack of) in the peace building 
initiatives in Jos. The chapter also established the research objectives and corresponding 
research questions. As highlighted in the first chapter and other parts of this thesis, the 
study’s research objectives were as follows: 
 
i. To analyse youth participation within the context of peace-building 
initiatives in Jos, Nigeria. 
ii. To identify the primary factors that influence youths’ involvement in 
violent conflicts 
iii. To explore peace-building initiatives in Jos, Nigeria 
iv. To establish the depth of youth participation in peace-building processes 
 
Furthermore, the first chapter also delineated the scope and limitations of the study. This was 
followed with the articulation of the significance of the study and an outline of the structure 
of the study.  
 
Chapter Two was essentially a review and evaluation of relevant literature. It interrogated a 
variety of literature that addresses the subject of conflict, peace, peace-building and the 
concept of youth. The chapter made an effort to provide an in-depth comprehension of the 
above-mentioned subjects, and with special attention to the nexus between youth, violence 
and peace. Hence, the analysis was done with the view of offering a critical and in-depth 
theoretical underpinning of these concepts while unravelling the relationship between the 
concepts. The chapter further examined debates about the nexus between youth and violent 
conflict. It was evident in the Chapter Two that the literature contains accounts and 
arguments that uphold and disprove the claim that youth are inherently violent in nature. 
Through this chapter’s analysis of the factors that influence and dispose youth to violent 
behaviour, it was noted that arguments for the inherent link between the youth bulge and 
violence was problematic. It was further established that other secondary factors, such as 
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unemployment, a decline in economic growth, and youth’s heightened expectations because 
of higher educational attainment, precipitate, intensify and maintain the high representation 
of youth in violence.    
 
Additionally, Chapter Two through a review of relevant literature engaged with the debate 
around the concept of peace and peace building. Importantly, besides the chapter’s 
explication of the both negative and positive peace, it went further to unpack youth 
participation in peace-building initiatives across the globe. This dealt with relevant actors’ 
endeavour in incorporating youth in their peace-building operations. With the aid of its 
analysis of their participation in peace building activities across the world, this section 
reiterates the view that youth are not inherently predisposed for violence; rather the youth can 
be strategic instruments and agents of peace-building if relevant structures that facilitate such 
agency are put in place.  In summary, Chapter Two presented a critical appraisal of conflict, 
and youth with the aim of unpacking existing understanding of these concepts and their 
applications in available literature. This exercise was pertinent owing the fact that it 
established a conceptual foundation in the subsequent comprehension of peace building 
initiatives and the analysis of such initiatives in this study.  
 
Having elucidated the concepts – violent conflict, peace, peace-building and youth and the 
nexus between the three concepts in Chapter Two, Chapter Three undertook the presentation 
of the theoretical and analytical perspectives on peace-building initiatives. The chapter 
explored various schools of thought, theories and points of view relating to peace-building. 
The chapter was split into connected sub-themes with the aim of building a consistent 
understanding of broad peace building frameworks. It commenced with the analysis of 
relative deprivation and structural functional theories. As discussed in Chapter One, it is 
maintained by proponents of the relative deprivation theory that the deprivation of people 
from expected ‘good’ leads to feelings of anxiety, frustration, terror, depression, aggression 
and rage, which eventually creates a collective discontent and translates to violence Gurr 
(1971) and Richardson (2011). Within the context of this theory, therefore, it is expected that 
a positive response in attending to associated deprivations among the deprived will enhance 
peace in society. It was however noted that not all violent conflicts might be consequences of 
deprivation, whether relative or absolute. The deprivation theory’s inability to offer a 
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sufficient explanation or account of other conflicts and the ways that they could be brought to 
rest made it unsuitable for this study. This was due to its insufficient allowance for the 
exploration of young people’s participation in the peace building processes. It was also noted 
the structural- functional theory is a conflict analytical tool that understands conflict through a 
“generational” prism. It focuses on the age differences which result from man’s biological 
nature (Goertzel 1972: 328). The theory holds that youthful unrest is considered as a 
troublesome but temporary problem resulting from the personal traumas of adolescence. 
Given this understanding, it maintains that the reality of youth involvement in violent 
conflicts may be considered a normal process in their development and integration into the 
adult world. Similar to the relative deprivation theory, the structural- functional theory’s 
account of young people’s psychological disposition to conflict does not offer much room for 
a discourse of peace building in a society.  
 
Chapter Three made it apparent that even though these above-mentioned theories offer a 
possible rationale of youth’s involvement in violent conflict via specific lenses, they do not 
offer much guidance in this study’s quest to explore and comprehend youth’s participation in 
the peace building initiatives in Jos. Consequently, the human security and the civic 
participation theories were reviewed and adopted in this chapter as foundational tools for the 
exploration of youth participation in peace building initiatives in Jos. Inherent in the human 
security argument is the safety of individual person as the focal point. It is a theory that 
argues for protection of people from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the pattern of daily 
life, and also advances the goal of stability within and between states through the protection 
of people’s socioeconomic status and human rights (Newman, 2001, p. 241). The human 
security theory served as a framework for a systematic engagement with the goals of peace-
building initiatives as stipulated by Lederach’s and other scholar’s interpretation of peace-
building and its processes. In view of the central focus of this (that is the examination and 
propagation of genuine youth participation in peace building) the civic participation theory, 
through its principal focus on the active involvement of the citizens in decision-making 
processes, buttresses the argument for genuine participation of youth in the espoused human 
security approach to peace-building. It advances strategies and mechanisms through which 
youth could play significant roles in the peace-building initiatives. The utilisation of both 
theories was considered necessary due to their ability to mutually facilitate the realisation of 
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the study’s objectives. Chapter Three concludes with the view that the proposed human 
security oriented peace-building programmes should be informed by inputs from the local 
population in order to be both legitimate and effective in achieving the objectives of the 
affected community(ies). Given this conclusion, Chapter Four essentially emphasises the 
necessity of practitioners to include youth in existing and subsequent peace-building 
programs since they are strategic stakeholders both as perpetrators and victims of violent 
conflicts. 
 
The analysis of literary text on conflict, peace, peace building and youth in Chapter Two 
offered the background and conceptual context for the examination and comprehension of 
these concepts in the geographical context of Jos. Chapter Four undertook a detailed 
depiction of Jos with some focus on the history, economy and politics. The chapter illustrated 
some of the tangible elements of Jos. These include its wealth in the production of tin, the 
strategic importance in the geographical location of the city and its commercial and political 
importance in the North Central (commonly known as Middle-Belt region).  
 
As noted in the chapter, the wealth and strategic position of the city attracted immigrants 
from other nations and world at large to the city. Despite this reality, the city upheld a high 
level of peace that it was nicknamed “The City of Peace”. However, the city experienced a 
turn around since its first major event of ethno-political violent conflict of 1994. Since then, it 
has been ridden with recurrent violent conflicts.  
 
Chapter Four facilitated some reflections into the violent and peace-building historicity of Jos 
via its narrative of these various events of violent conflicts and peace-building initiatives in 
the city. The chronological review of the key events of violent conflicts presented in this 
chapter illustrated youth’s consistent exposure to the realities of violent conflicts and the 
possible consequences of such exposure on their youth’s predisposition to violence. Some of 
the literature examined in Chapter Four emphasised a strong correlation between their 
exposure to violence, and their exhibition of violent behaviour. A relationship of such was 
further buttressed by some of the research findings which explained that participants of this 
study alleged that mere rumours, stories and previous experience in vio lent conflicts are 
capable of easily leading the youth to engage or start up a conflict. Furthermore, Chapter 
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Three unpacked some of the fundamental factors responsible for the high presence of the 
youth in Jos’ violent conflicts. Some of the identified factors include economic insecurity and 
Socio-political instability and violence. As noted in this chapter, indicators of the youth 
unemployment in Nigeria are highly disturbing with more than 60% of Nigerian youths 
considered to be either unemployed or underemployed. In fact, the Central Bank of Nigeria 
holds that “70% of the 80 million youth in Nigeria are either unemployed or 
underemployed138”. The general perception of the participants in this study identified 
economic insecurity (unemployment to be precise) as one of the dominant fundamental 
factors for youth participation in violence with the assertion that some youth are willing to 
kill for N5000 ($13). This claim further substantiated Guy (2008) and Standing’s (2008) 
contention that a person that has no security is not only vulnerable but that it will be 
unreasonable to expect such a person to adopt socially responsible behaviour. In summary, 
the Chapter Three offered a clear historical account of Jos to the extent that it is relevant to 
the subject of youth, violent conflict and peace in Jos.  
 
Chapter Five undertook the presentation and analysis of the empirical data of youth 
participation in the Jos’ peace-building initiatives. The chapter was fundamentally divided 
into two main sections. The first part of the chapter presented the findings from the empirical 
component of this research. In this section, data gathered during the fieldwork from relevant 
stakeholders were presented as short extracts from the transcribed data prior to the discussion 
of the nature and status of the identified peace-building initiatives in Jos. Direct quotes 
(verbatim) from transcribed data were provided (where possible) to retain the originality of 
respondents’ thoughts while representing their opinions.  
 
Chapter Six provided a critical analysis and discussion of the overall research findings. Such 
findings from the empirical component of the research were judiciously discussed along the 
lines of the focus of this study embodied in the adopted theoretical framework s (Human 
Security and Civic Participation theories) and the conception of peace and peace-building 
initiatives in this study. As discussed in Chapter Two of this study, the acquisition of an in-
depth and comprehensive understanding of peace is imperative in the implementation and 
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 Underemployed refers to a form of employment that does not meet a person’s qualificat ion. A clear example 
is when an engineer by qualification is employed as a car guard due to scarcity of jobs . 
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interrogation of peace-building initiatives. Hence, in addition to the study’s focus, (the 
analysis of youth participation in peace building initiatives), the study paid attention to the 
stakeholders’ comprehension of peace and how such understanding possibly influenced their 
peace building initiatives, and the depth of youth participation in these initiatives.  
 
The chapter examined the specific peace-building activities in Jos and the effort made by 
proponents (stakeholders)139 of such initiatives to incorporate youth in them. In so doing, the 
chapter shed light on the priorities and disposition of the key stakeholders that can influence 
youth participation in peace building activities in Jos. These stakeholders included the 
government, religious bodies, non-governmental organisations and the youth themselves.  
 
Some of the notable forms of peace building initiatives that emerged from the analysis of the 
study’s empirical data include the appointment of commissions of inquiry, the establishment 
of the Special Advisor to the Governor on peace building, peace, trust-building initiatives and 
capacity building programs. As noted in the study, the understanding of human security is a 
shift away from the traditional state-oriented security approach that gives rise to the 
employment of the military power based on the quest for state security. The idea of human 
security draws attention to the people, both as individuals and groups, who live within the 
state. The findings in this study indicated that the Nigerian government and Plateau State 
government in particular, is progressively subscribing to the idea of a human security 
oriented approach to peace-building over State- focused security. Even though a lot more 
needs to be done in this respect, the identified peace-building initiatives are steps in the right 
direction. 
 
The research data revealed respondents’ inadequate and unsatisfactory comprehension of 
peacebuilding processes and the genuine depth of stakeholders’ participation in peace 
building initiatives. These were evident in some of the respondents applaud of other 
stakeholders’ invitation of the youth to participate in peace-building initiatives which were 
limited to the presentation of poems, dance and recitation of reflective writings. Considering 
the various levels of participation discussed in the Chapter Three of this thesis, a 
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 These stakeholders, as evident in the previous chapters, include the government, the relig ious bodies, the 
non-governmental organizations and the youth themselves. 
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commendation or an acclaim of such negligible and insignificant participation demonstrates 
the participants’ lack of adequate knowledge with respect to the acceptable or desired depth 
of participation.  On the other hand, there were a handful of participants that were critical of 
such an effort in encouraging youth participation. Although these respondents considered 
participation of such nature to be too negligible to be genuine, the predominant standpoint of 
participants was that admiration and endorsement of such depth of participation.  
 
With inferences from the research findings, the chapter discussed emerging subject matters 
while highlighting lessons learnt from this study about youth participation in Jos’ peace-
building initiatives. Some of the key findings that were of substance for the focus of the study 
and research questions included the regular institution of commissions of inquiry, the 
formation of an inter-religious council, the establishment of the office of the Special Advisor 
to the Governor on Peace building, the creation of Operation Rainbow and the setting-up of 
trust-building and capacity building programs in an effort to restore lasting peace in Jos. 
Further analysis of these initiatives strongly suggested non-participation of youth in some of 
the peace building processes; while other stakeholders’ efforts to get the youth involved in 
peace building initiatives were inadequate; thus, bring about inadequate or marginal 
participation of youth in such initiatives.  
 
Finally, Chapter Seven drew attention to some of the key challenges hindering and thwarting 
adequate incorporation of the youth in peace-building initiatives. Included in some of the 
challenges deduced from the empirical data is stakeholders’ inadequate knowledge of 
participatory principles, was a lack of essential resources and the absence of necessary 
political will from the leaders.  
 
Inclusive in the summary of the research study is a succinct il lustration of the attainment of 
research objectives. This centres on the accomplishment of the research objectives via a short 
and snappy explication of the links between the study’s findings and its objectives.  
 
One of the objectives of this study was the analysis or establishment of the depth of youth 
participation within the context of peace-building initiatives in Jos, Nigeria. The study 
interrogated the highlighted peace-building initiatives through the lens of civic participation 
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and human security theories. The theory of civic participation was very instrumental in the 
analysis of the peace-building initiatives since it provided a base or framework for the study 
of the depth or quality of youth participation in the peace-building initiative. Some of the key 
or expected outcomes and validation of the quest for genuine youth participation as indicated 
in this study, included the opportunity for unique enlightenment that sees young people as 
bearers of their own truths that only the youth can share through participation. It is instructive 
to once again restate that given the youth’s history of active involvement in violent conflict, 
this study is sympathetic to the view that their commitment to peace-building initiatives will 
make them less available for conflicts through their empowerment and enlightenment. Hence, 
the advocacy for their genuine participation in Jos peace-building endeavours in the quest for 
sustainable peaceful society.  
 
The analysis of youth participation of Jos peace building initiatives was embarked upon via 
the interrogation of the mind-sets or motivations that encapsulate the strategy, interests and 
roles of the various stakeholders in the peace-building processes. Findings from the study 
indicated some effort by active peace building stakeholders at incorporating the youth in their 
programs and initiatives towards peace building in Jos. Some such initiatives include the 
formation of peace clubs, utilisation of sports, education and recreational activities. However, 
adequate comprehension of the civic participation and the analysis of youth involvement in 
the identified peace-building initiatives reveals weak youth’s participation and, in some 
instances, non-participation of the youth in peace-building efforts. These were clearly evident 
in the trivial and frivolous form of their involvement. As previously mentioned in the 
discussion and analysis of the study’s empirical data, the dominant mode of youth 
participation in the Jos peace-building process was their presentation of dance, poems and 
creative writings/thoughts during peace-building events. Hence, they were denied the 
opportunity to authentically and legitimately participate in the decision-making processes. 
This depth of participation does not empower, enlighten nor develop the youth’s disposition 
to either embrace or protect peace-building strategies. From the findings of this study, it was 
inferred that the youth did not genuinely participated in peace-building initiatives in Jos; 
rather the youth were clearly omitted from some of the initiatives while they were only 
allowed marginal participation in other initiatives.  
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The second objective of this study was the identification of the primary factors that 
influenced youths’ involvement in violent conflicts in Jos. To facilitate this objective, the 
study undertook a detailed review of the relationship between youth and violence. Central 
focus was accorded to the analysis of the fundamental factors responsible for the high 
representation of youth in violent conflicts in Jos. The analysis identified economic insecurity 
as one of the fundamental factors responsible for youth participation, especially in Jos. 
Inherent in the explication of economic insecurity were issues of unemployment, persistent 
poverty and easy manipulation of youth due to their desperate economic conditions. The 
youth were easily manipulated by belligerents (elders, politicians and leaders) that adopt 
violence to achieve their goals in society. It was noted that the youth were often manipulated 
into being foot soldiers for a course that they neither understand nor stand to benefit from it. 
Another identified factor was the reality of socio-political insecurity in the city. This drew 
attention to the reoccurring violent conflicts in Jos and the probable consequences of youth’s 
experience and exposure to such violence. Alluding to the other scholarly text, it was 
elucidated that exposure to violence breeds antisocial behaviour among youth.  
 
In view of the account of the economic and socio-political insecurities which are backed up 
with empirical knowledge and experiences of respondents in this study, this thesis identifies 
the growing culture of socio-political instability and the high depth of economic insecurity as 
the fundamental factors responsible for the high representation of youth in violent conflict in 
Jos.  
 
In satisfying the third research objective (the exploration of peace-building initiatives in Jos, 
Nigeria), the study attended to this objective by unpacking various comprehensions of peace-
building from scholarly literature in order to establish a base for the identification of peace-
building initiatives. Eventually the concept of positive peace, which is understood as the 
prevention of violent conflicts through the harmonious integration of human society (Galtung 
1964) informed this study’s, adopted understanding of peace-building. The study’s adopted 
understanding of peace building was Lederach’s (1997:84) illustration, which depicted peace-
building as a “comprehensive concept that encompasses, generates and sustains the full array 
of processes, approaches and stages needed to transform conflict towards more sustainable 
peaceful relationships”. This definition, in conjunction with other comprehensions, 
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underscores the complexities and fussiness of peace-building initiatives due the blurred lines 
between peace-building activities and other developmental programs. That notwithstanding, 
this specific understanding was considered vital given that it allows thorough interrogation of 
youth integration in the full array of processes and approaches employed towards peace-
building in Jos. It is worth mentioning that the empirical data portrayed some disparity in 
participants’ knowledge of the desired peace-building processes and approaches. While some 
respondents were critical of some stakeholders’ peace-building initiatives due to their 
irrelevant and unproductive nature, others were quite satisfied and applauded the same 
initiatives and the marginal participation of youth in these initiatives.  
 
The fourth and final research objective focuses on the explication and establishment of the 
depth of youth participation in the identified peace building processes in Jos. The analysis of 
Jos peace building initiatives went beyond the traditional conflict/peace building analysis, 
which in most cases militarises peace building endeavours. It rather comprehended peace-
building initiatives via the lenses of the human security paradigm. The research findings 
demonstrated that the comprehension of peace-building in Jos is progressively being 
transformed and re-oriented towards the human security approach to peace-building rather 
than the traditional militarisation or the state-warring parties focused peace building 
approaches. This re-orientation was evident in the peace building mechanisms, structures and 
initiatives identified from the analysed empirical data. The Office of the Special Advisor to 
the Governor on Peace-building and related issues, if properly utilised, is a structure that is 
capable of increasingly facilitating and intensifying the human security dimension while 
ensuring that the implemented initiatives, programs and activities are relevant to society and 
its people. Despite the adoption and re-orientation towards human security centred peace-
building initiatives, the in ability of the government and relevant stakeholders to maximise 
the benefit of the highlighted initiatives through genuine youth participation wa s clarified. 
This was evident in the participants’ repeated allusion to the government’s failure to public ise 
and implement the findings of the various commissions of inquiry. It was also emphasised 
that initiatives from the inter-religious dialogue group was greatly under-utilized on account 
that they did not contribute much towards peace-building in the state nor youth/civic 
participation in these initiatives. Although there were a handful of success stories and a sense 
of accomplishment with some of the human capacity building initiatives, the dominant 
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perception of participants from the gathered data was that pessimism and underachievement 
of the various peace building initiatives, especially in their efforts to get the youth involved. 
The summary of the study’s empirical findings is that the youth are practically denied the 
opportunity to genuinely participate in decision-making processes. Where they are offered the 
opportunity to get involved, the depth of their participation remains at a marginal level 
bearing in mind that such depth of participation neither empowers, enlightens nor develops 
them in anyway. Appropriately, it was inferred from the findings of this study that the youth 
did not genuinely participate in peace-building initiatives in Jos. Rather they were excluded 
from some of the initiatives, while in some other initiatives, they were only allo wed marginal 
participation.   
 
7.3. Recommendations 
 
It could be inferred from the analysis of this study’s literary review and the empirical data the 
youth are not a homogeneous group. They are simultaneously both agents of violence and 
peace. On the account of the youth’s agency as reflected in their global contribution to violent 
conflicts, they are considered key stakeholders in peace building processes. For this reason, 
the nexus between peace building programs and civic participation remains central in the  
analysis of peace building initiatives. As previously noted, Abbink (2005:10) affirms the 
view that “agency rightfully calls attention to the individual power of actors and their 
cumulative impact...and that the actor-oriented perspective associated with agency is 
productive but only when the interaction with structural elements is taken seriously”. This 
viewpoint reinforces the argument and rationale for more effort towards genuine youth 
participation and interactions with peace-building processes in Jos. According to Smith 
(1983), genuine participation is characterised by the participants’ ability to influence both the 
decision-making processes, the decisions made and the implementation phase of the decision.   
In spite of this, and other robust arguments for genuine participation of the public in the 
decision-making process, there remains a lackadaisical attitude towards the incorporation of 
the youth in peace building processes. This study therefore, recommends that the government 
develop a comprehensive peace building policy and civic participatory framework that could 
facilitate and guide stakeholders’ effort towards genuine youth participation in peace-building 
initiatives, the prioritization of public participation in peace building and other communal and 
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societal affairs, the enhancement of government’s commitment to peace-building efforts and 
civic participation, and lastly, the development of stakeholders’ capacity and the culture of 
accountability with a focus on peace building and genuine youth participation in decision-
making processes.  
 
7.3.1. The Development of a comprehensive peace-building policy and civic 
participatory framework  
 
It is evident from the findings of this study that efforts have been made towards the 
restoration of peace in Jos. This was apparent in the identified peace-building initiatives and 
in some of the stakeholders’ attempt at incorporating the youth in their peace-building 
initiatives. However, the lack of a state policy statement and an operational framework that 
necessitates, stipulates and guides the activities and participation of relevant stakeholders all 
through the various phases of the initiative was problematic. The nonexistence of such a 
policy statement or frameworks designed for the context of Jos resulted in the obscurity of 
the expected depth of youth participation and the appropriate strategies that would have 
enhanced genuine youth participation in the adopted initiatives.  
 
There is a need, therefore, for a policy stipulation with respect to civic participation a nd the 
establishment of an operational framework that enhances genuine citizen participation in Jos 
and Plateau State at large. It is expected that such po licy documents will facilitate public 
awareness and a common understanding of the expected depth of youth participation and 
possible approaches that guarantee genuine youth participation in the Jos peace-building 
initiatives.  
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Figure 8. 
 
 
It has repeatedly been mentioned by Rowe and Frewer (2000) that in genuine civic 
participation requires “higher levels140 of communication that seeks some degree of public 
input, as in the solicitation of public opinion or the active participation of public 
representatives in the decision-making process itself”. Such depth of authentic flow of 
communication among parties and beyond is required for the desired genuine youth 
participation. As portrayed in the figure above, this study further recommends that a policy 
and framework of this nature should offer clear guidance and counsel with respect to the 
possible initiatives, approach and activities that optimizes each stakeholder’s likelihood of 
achieving genuine depth of youth participation. It is becoming common knowledge that peace 
                                                 
140
 The lowest level involves top-down communication and a one-way flow of informat ion, while the highest 
level is characterized by dialogue and two-way information exchange. 
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building programs are complex in nature and require multifaceted interaction between the 
various stakeholders and youth participation. The figure however, draws emphasis and 
attention to the need for the centrality and a pertinent need for genuine incorporation and 
participation of youth in peace building endeavours. It is instructive to mention that the 
nature and form of adopted peace building initiatives may perhaps be at the discretion of the 
stakeholders; but the expected depth of such interactions and decisions about the profundity 
of youth participation should be championed by the possible participatory framework or 
policy statement. In so doing, the uncertainty, absence of leadership and ignorance that 
clouds stakeholders’ efforts at enhancing the youth’s (and public in general) participation will 
be significantly trimmed down.  
 
7.3.2. The Need for prioritization of public participation in peace-building 
 
As highlighted above, the development of relevant policies addressing issues of peace-
building and civic participation will be a step in the right direction. However, the design of 
“ideal” policies that are devoid of contemporaneous commitment is futile. As noted in the 
theoretical framework chapter, such futility dominates the rhetoric about youth participation 
across the globe in the absence of a genuine interest and commitment to the implementation 
of such dialogue and discussion around it. Farthing’s (2012:71) allusion to Kothari re-
emphasis that the view “participation has become such a powerful idea that it is approaching 
orthodoxy”. This he noted, is especially true for youth practitioners as participation features 
significantly in much policy formation and it is close to becoming a hegemonic practice in 
youth work. In spite of the high applaud for the significance and acknowledgement of youth 
participation across the globe, findings from this study present a different picture. It was 
brought to light in Chapter Six of this thesis that the youth participation was in most cases 
that of a mere invitation for some kind of performance or creative art. In some other 
initiatives, it was clear that the youth were not considered in decision-making processes. This 
feedback led to the conclusion that the youth merely had negligible participation in some of 
the peace-building processes while they were completely omitted from some other initiatives. 
 
It is comprehensible that some of the contributing factors to such neglect and marginalisation 
can be attributed to the absence of relevant policies and guiding documents. However, 
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stakeholders’ prioritisation of public participation in decision-making processes would have 
improved youth participation in the peace-building initiatives in Jos regardless of the lack of 
policies that impose on such an initiative. Considering Farthing’s articulation of the inherent 
benefits of public participation in decision-making processes and the stipulation of the 
African Youth Charter, it is recommended that relevant stakeholders give priority or 
appropriate acknowledgement to youth participation in peace-building initiatives. Such 
priority or acknowledgement of youth with other decision makers could be expressed in the 
government’s and other stakeholders’ recognition of informal institutions and platforms that 
provide the youth with avenues to express their grievances and their concerns. Hence, the 
government ought to be proactive in working closely with religious, academic and 
cultural/traditional institutions that provide space for young people to express themselves. 
Methodical and meaningful participation of young people should be prioritized and 
acknowledged as a condition for sustainable peace building efforts.  
 
It is worth noting that the enhancement of youth participation inherently translates into 
making the youth more powerful. This is a reality that may dissuade some stakeholders’ 
commitment to youth participation bearing in mind that empowered cohorts of youth are 
supposedly more difficult to manipulate or coerce into violence. It is recommended, 
therefore, that the government give precedence to the support of initiatives that are for youth 
participation over less youth oriented initiatives. It is expected that reliable support for such 
initiatives portray the image of governments’ positive disposition towards youth 
participation, which will optimistically influence other stakeholders’ disposition towards 
greater and genuine youth participation in peace initiatives.  
 
7.3.3. Enhancement of government’s commitment to peace -building initiatives 
and civic participation 
 
The empirical component of this study reveals deep-seated distrust and scepticism in 
government’s activities and efforts towards peace building. This was apparent in some 
participants’ reservations and concerns that the government interventions are there to 
checkmate (or prevent), victimize or induce unnecessary penalties on some groups. Over and 
above this, some other participants echoed their trepidations that the masterminds responsible 
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for some of the conflicts, even though identified in the process of the commissions of inquiry, 
are not brought to justice. Conduct of this nature emanating from the government does not 
offer nor contribute in building people’s confidence in government- led initiatives; rather it 
justifies peoples’ scepticism and reservations against government-led programs and activities. 
It is enlightening to note that irrespective of the highly publicised nature of Operation 
Rainbow141, some of the respondents resiliently denied the government of any credit in peace 
building efforts. Such participants asserted, “We did not see any program, organized by the 
government towards peace-building”142. They only have commissions at the end of every 
crisis”. There is no meaningful or genuine dialogue that tends to bring people together which 
was initiated by the government”. In light of this study’s empirical data, it was deduced that 
the government’s failure to remain committed and unbiased in the execution of its mandate 
divulges the government’s lack of the political will for the enhancement of youth 
participation in peace building initiatives. Consequently, the masses have developed strong 
reservations and misgivings about the government and its initiatives.  
 
It is recommended therefore, that the government works extra hard to win-over the trust of 
everyone in Jos, especially the youth and other minority groups that feel marginalized and 
threatened. As noted in the previous chapter, Dovidio et al (2002) stated that trust (or the lack 
thereof) is a central component of inter-group conflict. It is necessary therefore, that adequate 
effort is made at re-establishing an acceptable depth of trust, not only among the people, but 
also between the youth and the government. According to the UN Guiding Principles on 
Young People’s Participation in Peace-building, genuine levels of trust could be enhanced 
through power sharing among decision makers and young people via intergenerational 
dialogue and youth and adult trust-building activities. Government’s unwavering 
commitment to people’s interest through an unbiased support for the welfare of everyone and 
feasible peace-building endeavours is another approach through which trust could be 
fostered.  
 
Additionally, it is imperative that the government deals decisively with issues of human 
rights and their abuses without favour or fear. This includes fulfilment of the youth’s rights to 
                                                 
141
 Operation Rainbow as discoursed in chapter six was one of the highly publicised government -led in itiat ive.  
142
 Interview with a Relig ious Leader (Muslim Cleric). 1
st
 August 2013, Jos, Nigeria. 
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participate in making decision about issues that concern them. The inclusion and adequate 
participation of youth as members of subsequent commissions of inquiry would demonstrate 
government’s willingness to embrace and enhance embedded values in youth participation. It 
is nevertheless worth mentioning that a common challenge amongst the youth and some other 
stakeholders in Jos is from their lack of soft skills, which negatively affects their participation 
at this level of interaction and decision-making. It is recommended that the government 
demonstrate their commitment to peace-building efforts through their facilitation of the youth 
and other stakeholders’ acquisition of relevant soft skills (leadership, communication and 
nonviolent problem solving skills) to better enable their substantive participation in peace-
building initiatives. In so doing, the government creates a prospect for young people’s 
continuous participation in local, state and national peace-building initiatives.  
 
Finally, there should be genuine effort towards fair trials of implicated citizens and justice for 
the identified victims. In so doing, the government will be championing the fight against the 
culture of impunity that has ridiculed society and some peace-building endeavours. Clear 
manifestation of this depth of commitment from the government (government’s positive 
political will) towards issues of youth participation will hopefully dispose the public and 
other stakeholders to genuinely embrace youth and the public participation in peace-building 
and related initiatives.   
 
7.3.4. Advancement of genuine youth participation via the stimulation of 
scholarly research focusing on the nexus between peace-building and civic 
participation  
 
Additionally, it is commonly understood that research is the quest for in-depth knowledge 
and wisdom in an identifiable area. Stakeholders’ commitment to civic participation and the 
restoration of peace in Jos could be expressed in their unwavering support for research 
oriented projects and programs with respect to youth participation and their sustainable 
contribution to peace building. Consequently, this study recommends that in collaboration 
with interested and relevant parties, the government and the academic institutions 
(universities and research centres) devote their commitment and resources to the in-depth 
quest for innovative and sustainable techniques and practices that ensures youth and other 
stakeholders’ genuine participation in peacebuilding initiatives in Jos.  
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This could be achieved through the enhancement of peace building knowledge and skills of 
young people within their daily activities and sports. It was for instance, noted by Vos (2015), 
that “youths are more likely to remember and practice conflict management lessons they 
learnt through sports”. Ensuing from this understanding, stakeholders are encouraged to set 
up training opportunities that introduce the youth to both the theoretical and practical 
dimension of peace-building. The theoretical approaches may include the abstract discuss ion 
of the various lenses through which issues of peace building are understood, while the more 
practical approaches could be hands-on exercises such as advocacy, actual dialogue and 
negotiation within the context of their daily activities and sports. In simple terms, the 
enhancement of youth’s peace building knowledge and skills requires the exposition of young 
people to peace educators, facilitators, peace networks and educational programs that will 
refine and groom their peace-building skills 
 
It is not new news that many researches have previously been embarked upon but which were 
neither implemented nor published for the public’s consumption. Participants’ allusion to the 
outcome and report of the various commissions of inquiry and the government indisposition 
to publish or implement recommendations from such commissions clearly illustrates this 
point. It will be equally an inadequate and futile exercise if research and other scholarly 
exercises (conferences, seminars and symposium) are embarked upon without the disposition 
or political will to allow the findings of such studies to inform subsequent decisions and 
policies in the relevant areas. It is therefore strongly recommended that outcomes of such 
research are made available to the public in the shortest possible time and stakeholders’ 
careful implementation of its recommendations and findings ought to be encouraged and 
enforced where possible.  
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7.3.5. Development of stakeholders’ capacity and the culture of accountability 
with a focus on peace-building and genuine youth participation in decision-
making processes 
 
The data from the empirical component of this research points to the dearth of adequate 
comprehensions and expectations of civic participation among the stakeholders interviewed 
for this study. Correspondingly, findings from the analysis of the gathered data revealed a 
widespread sense of contentment and admiration for the superficial depth of youth 
participation in the identified initiatives. This ignorance of participatory principles also 
speaks to the need for holistic capacity building143 programs amongst stakeholders in Jos. It is 
necessary therefore, that the government invests in the capacity development of relevant 
peace-building stakeholders in matters of peace-building, civic participation and related 
fields. It is expected that such capacity programs will improve stakeholders’ comprehension 
of the nexus between peace-building and youth participation.  
 
Enrolment and completion of short educational courses or programs in peace building and 
civic participation are a viable medium for the actualisation of such capacity development 
programs. The adoption and institutionalization of such programs in the city of Jos through 
its existing scholastics and other implementation institutions, will positively contribute 
towards the reorientation of the public towards embracing peace building values and youth 
participation principles. According to Paffenholz and Spurk (2006:41), “Education is the 
influential source to shape people’s minds”. Correspondingly, the improvement of youth 
participation in peace-building activities requires the internalisation of participatory values 
within the context of peace building through relevant capacity development programs.    
 
Finally, it is recommended that the government encourages and supports the monitoring and 
evaluation of peace building initiatives and the genuineness of youth participation in peace-
building. It is commonly argued that monitoring and evaluation serves to hold governments 
and service providers responsible. In the light of this understanding, it is recommended that 
government develop modalities to inculcate a culture of accountability in society. The 
                                                 
143
 Holistic capacity building program here refers to an approach to capacity building that takes cognisance of 
various components of life as it engages with and equips an individual with necessary skills to stand up to life’s 
challenges.  
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development of peace-building initiatives’ monitoring and evaluation framework will be a 
starting point in the effort to enhance stakeholders’ capacity in this field. Such a framework 
will provide stakeholders with the acceptable or expected threshold of genuine depth of youth 
participation. Youth involvement in peace-building initiatives could be more readily 
ascertained by measuring stakeholders’ efforts in this respect against the stipulated threshold 
in the monitoring and evaluation framework. Additionally, the availability of such a 
framework and evaluation programs facilitates regular feedback and communication from 
and among the stakeholders, including the youth to enable some form of accountability to the 
public.  
 
7.4. Novelty and contribution to new knowledge 
 
Numerous studies have been conducted, but, with isolated focus on issues of peace building, 
youth and civic participation (Omeje 2005; Checkoway and Gutiérrez 2008; Mcintyre and 
Thusi 2010; Wong, Zimmerman and Parker 2010). Only a few researchers have adequately 
dealt with the web of issues about youth and their participation in peace-building in a single 
study, especially within the local context of Jos. As a consequence, there is a critical literary-
gap in the discourse of sustainable peace-building in Jos and Nigeria at large. The 
composition of this study, (the focus on youth, civic participation and peace-building in Jos), 
contributes towards bridging this existing gap. Through its focus on the assessment of the 
quality of youth participation in the various peace building initiatives in Jos, this study makes 
a distinct contribution by advancing an understanding of the actual quality of youth 
participation in peace building in Jos. The originality of this study is further demonstrated via 
the study’s ability to unearth the weaknesses of the current strategies geared towards the 
enhancement of youth participation and the challenges faced by the youth in their attempt to 
get involved. Hence, the novelty of this study is embedded in the very nature of the study that 
centres on youth’s participation in peace-building activities as a subject of interrogation. 
Given the dearth of scholarly research about youth involvement in peace-building initiatives 
in Jos, the researcher’s exercise of his independent critical competence makes a substantial 
contribution through his recommendation on how the youth could be supported into 
becoming integral agents of peace in the city. Unlike many other studies on Jos, this study 
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offers youths the opportunity to make their ideas and visions heard in relation to how they 
can be active and constructive participants in peace-building processes in Jos. 
 
From a theoretical point of view, the utilisation of both human security and civic participation 
theories in the appraisal of youth involvement in the peace-building initiatives in Jos, is 
innovative. This study stands out through its successful interrogation of issues of youth in 
peace building via these theories. Through these theoretical frameworks, pertinent issues of 
young people’s active citizenship were brought to light. Methodologically this study 
contributes to existing literature through the inclusive nature of the study. Unlike other 
studies that exclusively focus on either, the government- led or civic society- led peace-
building endeavours. This study interrogated the quality of youth participation in all the 
identified peace building initiatives in Jos. Accordingly, unlike other studies and reports, 
findings from the empirical component of this study offer a more comprehensive 
understanding of peace building endeavours in Jos, the various stakeholders’ roles and the 
genuine will of the government to involve youth in these initiatives.  
 
7.5. Future research 
 
The colossal approval and admiration of the marginal depth of youth participation in the 
identified peace building initiatives in Jos is disquieting. This questions people’s depth of 
knowledge with respect to the theory and processes of genuine civic participation. Hence, it 
creates a need for a comprehensive appraisal of the people ’s knowledge and their 
understanding of civic participatory principles. It is expected that such a study will reveal the 
profundity of their familiarity and comprehension of civil participation principles while 
simultaneously unpacking the relevant areas that requires pertinent attention.  
 
Furthermore, subsequent studies may take the form of comparative studies of youth 
participation in peace building initiatives across the globe. These could endeavour to 
highlight some of the potential benefits and challenges of involving the youth in peace-
building or state-building as a whole. 
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There is a need for a systematic or scholarly evaluation of peace-building processes in Jos 
and Plateau State as whole. Such a study will unpack the effectiveness and efficiency of the 
adopted peace building initiatives in Jos. Additionally, such an evaluation will reveal other 
pertinent issues that are worthy of the public’s attention. Possible specific area of interest for 
such studies may include but are not limited to the impact and relevance of Jos peace-
building initiatives to individuals with physical and psychological challenges. These may 
include people such as the mentally challenged, the blind, the crippled and so forth.  
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APPENDICES 
Appendix 1a  - Research Instrument for the Youths 
 
Objective: To identify the primary factors that influence youths’ involvement in violent 
conflicts 
 
1) What do you know about the violent conflicts in Jos between the year 2000 to 2010?  
a. Give me a brief account of some the violent conflicts in Jos within the given 
time frame 
 
2) Who are the main actors in these conflicts? 
a. Give me some specific roles that the local elite, the media and the 
government/security personnel play in these conflicts?  
b. Why did they engage in such roles?  
 
3) What roles do the youths play in these conflicts? 
a. Can you give me examples of some of these roles?  
b. From your perspective, what are the factors that intensify their involvement in 
the violent conflicts in Jos? 
 
 
Objective: To analyse youth participation within the context of violent conflict and 
peace-building initiatives in Jos, Nigeria. 
 
 
1) What are the mechanisms or structures set in place for the management of these 
conflicts and for peace-building in Jos? 
a. Who are the main role players in these processes or structures?  
 
b. How would you assess government’s commitment to peace-building activities 
in Jos? 
 
c. In what ways have the Non-Governmental Organizations and Civil 
Organizations contributed towards these peace-building processes in Jos? 
 
2) What are your views about youth participation in these peace-building processes? 
a. Are the youths aware of the various peace-building activities in Jos? Please 
substantiate your views with the aid of examples (if possible).  
b. What roles (if any) have the young people play in the peace-building processes 
in Jos?  
i. With the aid of examples, please tell me how they fulfil these roles.  
ii. What do you think are their primary motivations in assuming these 
roles?  
iii. If none, why are they not playing any role in these processes?  
c. As a young person, how would you evaluate young people’s disposition to 
actively participate in these peace-building activities? 
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d. What are they underlying factors that hinder youth’s participation in these 
processes? 
i. With the help of some examples (if possible), tell me how the 
aforementioned factors actually impede their participation?  
 
Objective: To explore further strategies needed for peace-building initiatives in Jos with 
respect to youth participation 
 
1) In what ways can young people’s participation be further ensured and made relevant 
to the society? 
 
2) How aware is the government with regards to the importance of youths’ participation 
in the peace-building processes? 
 
3) Do you think that they are committed to incorporating youth in these processes?  
i. If yes, how have you participated through activities initiated by the 
government? Illustrate with examples please.  
ii. If not, why? 
 
Objective: To explore peace-building initiatives in Jos and depth of youth participation 
in peace-building processes  
 
1) What initiative could be taken by the government to further enhance young people’s 
participation? 
i. How would these initiatives actually improve youths’ participation?  
ii. How would their participation in these initiatives address the root 
causes of their activism in violent conflicts? 
 
2) Is there any form of collaboration between the government and NGOs/CSOs in the 
effort to incorporate young people in the peace-building processes? 
 
3) How would you assess their collaboration: To what extent is this collaboration 
making positive difference with youths’ participation in the peace-building processes? 
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Appendix 1b - Research Instrument for other Participants 
 
Objective: To identify the primary factors that influence youths’ involvement in violent 
conflicts 
 
 
4) What do you know about the violent conflicts in Jos between the year 2000 to 2010?  
a. Give me a brief account of some the violent conflicts in Jos within the given 
time frame 
 
5) Who are the main actors in these conflicts? 
c. Give me some specific roles that the local elite, the media and the 
government/security personnel play in these conflicts?  
d. Why did they engage in such roles?  
 
6) What roles do the youths play in these conflicts? 
a. Can you give me examples of some of these roles?  
b. From your perspective, what are the factors that intensify their involvement in 
the violent conflicts in Jos? 
 
Objective: To analyse youth participation within the context of violent conflict and 
peace-building initiatives in Jos, Nigeria. 
 
 
3) Are there any mechanisms or structures set in place for the management of these 
conflicts and for peace-building in Jos? 
a. Who are the main role players in these processes or structures? 
b. How have the government (at the national, state and local level) contributed 
towards these mechanisms? 
i. How would you assess their commitment to peace-building activities 
in Jos? 
 
c. In what ways have the Non-Governmental Organizations and Civil 
Organizations contributed towards these peace-building processes in Jos? 
 
d. How would you evaluate the synergy between the government and NGOs in 
the peace-building processes? 
i. From your viewpoint, how would you assess government awareness of 
the relevance of NGOs and their activities in peace-building in Jos? 
ii. To substantiate your point, can you tell me the level of support that 
NGOs enjoy from the government? 
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e. How have Academics and Researchers contributed towards the design and 
implementation of these peace-building initiatives? Do their publications, 
seminars and conferences inform your processes? 
 
4) What are your views about youth participation in these peace-building processes? 
a. Are the youths aware of the various peace-building activities in Jos? Please 
substantiate your views with the aid of examples (if possible).  
b. What roles (if any) do the young people play in the peace-building processes 
in Jos?  
i. With the aid of examples, please tell me how fulfilling these roles.  
ii. What do you think are their primary motivations in assuming these 
roles?  
iii. If none, why are they not playing any role in these processes?  
c. How would you evaluate young people’s disposition to actively participate in 
these peace-building activities? 
d. What are they underlying factors that hinder youth’s participation in these 
processes? 
i. With the help of some examples (if possible), tell me how the 
aforementioned factors actually impede their participation?  
 
Objective: To explore further strategies needed for peace-building initiatives in Jos with 
respect to youth participation 
 
4) In what ways can young people’s participation be further ensured and made relevant 
to the society? 
 
5) How aware is the government with regards to the importance of youths’ participation 
in the peace-building processes? 
a. Do you think that they are committed to incorporating youth in these 
processes? 
i. If yes, how do they do that? Illustrate with examples please.  
ii. If not, why? 
 
Objective: To explore peace-building initiatives in Jos and depth of youth participation 
in peace-building processes  
 
4) What initiative could be taken by the government to further enhance young people’s 
participation? 
i. How would these initiatives actually improve youths’ participation?  
ii. How would their participation in these initiatives address the root 
causes of their activism in violent conflicts? 
 
5) Is there any form of collaboration between the government and NGOs/CSOs in the 
effort to incorporate young people in the peace-building processes? 
 
6) How would you assess their collaboration: To what extent is this collaboration 
making positive difference with youths’ participation in the peace-building processes?  
  
